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There has been a growing trend in accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) in the last decade. 
ASRs are an alternative to commonly used open market repurchases (OMRs). In an ASR, a firm 
commits itself to repurchasing an announced number of shares through an investment bank at the 
average stock price during a pre-agreed period, with almost all shares immediately delivered at the 
inception of the ASR. I posit that firms have incentives to maximize the benefits of ASRs and 
offset the high opportunity costs associated with ASRs by deflating stock prices prior to ASRs. I 
find that firms alter news releases around the ASR initiation date and shift negative news from the 
post-initiation period to the pre-initiation period. Firms also report abnormally low accruals prior 
to ASRs to deflate reported earnings. Furthermore, I find that firms choose to use news 
management and earnings management in a manner that best aligns with and serves the ex ante 
motivations for ASRs. News management and earnings management appear to be successful in 
deflating stock prices prior to ASRs, and the market does not appear to see through both strategies 
at the ASR announcement date. However, as managed news releases and abnormal accruals 
reverse eventually following ASRs, I find that pre-ASR news management predicts short-term 
stock price performance, and that pre-ASR earnings management predicts long-term operating and 
stock price performance. Collectively, these findings suggest that firms strategically use their 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The rapid growth in accelerated share repurchases (ASRs), an important innovation in 
share repurchases, has drawn considerable attention in business press and academic literature. In 
this research, I investigate whether firms strategically use discretion in news releases and financial 
reporting around ASRs to deflate stock prices. 
ASRs started to gain momentum in 2004 and have since surpassed tender offers and 
privately negotiated repurchases, standing only second to open market repurchases (OMRs). From 
2004 through 2013, $246 billions of stock was repurchased through ASRs. In 2013, ASR 
announcements (84) represented 14.3 percent of the total number of repurchase program 
announcements (587).1 In a typical ASR, a firm commits itself to repurchasing an announced 
amount of shares through an investment bank. At the ASR commencement, the firm makes an 
upfront payment to the bank, and the bank borrows the firm’s shares from existing shareholders 
and delivers these shares to the firm. The bank fulfills its obligation to return the borrowed shares 
by purchasing shares in the open market during a pre-agreed period. At the end of the period, the 
repurchase price is adjusted to the average stock price during that period, and the firm and the bank 
settle the price difference in shares or cash. 
Two key features differentiate ASRs from OMRs. The first difference lies in the speed of 
share delivery. An ASR involves a substantial number of shares all being delivered at the ASR 
commencement. This is the “accelerated” part of the repurchase. In contrast, a firm usually 
                                                 
1 The total number of repurchase program announcements is extracted from Capital IQ Buybacks Database 
and includes repurchase programs announced by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the 
NASDAQ Stock Market, and the American Stock Exchange. 
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conducts OMRs in smaller increments and takes years to repurchase the same number of shares 
using OMRs. The second difference is the degree of credibility. An ASR obliges a firm by contract 
to repurchase its shares through an investment bank. In contrast, a firm has no legal obligation to 
repurchase any shares through OMRs. Thus, ASRs represent a more credible commitment to 
repurchase shares than OMRs. In sum, ASRs permit a firm to achieve its goals of share repurchases 
more quickly and credibly. 
Most of the prior studies explore the immediacy and enhanced credibility of ASRs, and 
examine alternative motivations to explain why firms use ASRs instead of OMRs to implement a 
repurchase program (Marquardt, Tan, and Young 2009; Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang 2010; 
Bargeron, Kulchania, and Thomas 2011; Akyol, Kim, and Shekhar 2014; Kurt 2014). Unlike these 
studies, this research analyzes the stage where firms have decided to use ASRs and examine 
whether they deflate stock prices prior to ASRs to maximize the benefits of ASRs. Because the 
primary advantage of ASRs lies in the immediate and substantial retirement of shares at the 
inception of the program, firms may enhance the advantage by deflating stock prices prior to ASRs, 
thereby increasing the number of shares to be delivered at the front end. Furthermore, ASRs have 
higher opportunity costs than OMRs because firms effectively give up the flexibility to alter a 
repurchase program in response to subsequent changes in market conditions and cash availability, 
an option that has significant economic value (Dittmar and Field 2015). To the extent that the 
deflated stock prices may persist during the relatively short contract period, firms may partially 
offset the high opportunity costs of ASRs, since the ultimate repurchase price is determined by the 
average stock price during that period. 
I focus on two tools available for firms to deflate stock prices prior to ASRs. The first is 
firm-generated news management. This means that firms may change the coverage and tone of 
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firm-generated press releases by releasing more negative press releases prior to ASRs. Ahern and 
Sosyura (2014) argue that firm-generated press releases are particularly suitable for news 
management because regulations for this type of news are much more lenient than those for 
financial statements, allowing for greater flexibility for firms to manage news flows. The second 
is downward accrual-based earnings management. This means that firms may deflate reported 
earnings prior to ASRs. 
Using a sample of 365 ASRs announced by non-financial firms during the period 2004–
2013 and a large-scale sample of firm-generated press releases retrieved from Factiva, I find 
abnormally high levels of negative press releases in a short window before the ASR 
commencement and abnormally low levels of negative press releases in a short window that 
follows, suggesting that firms shift negative press releases into the pre-commencement window 
and away from the post-commencement window. I also find that negative accruals are abnormally 
high in the quarter immediately before the ASR commencement. These findings suggest that firms 
use news management and earnings management to deflate stock prices prior to ASRs. 
Next, I examine the effects on pre-ASR news management and earnings management of 
motivations for ASRs. If the deflation of stock prices prior to ASRs contradicts the motivations for 
ASRs in the first place, I expect that firms are less likely to use news management and earnings 
management. Consistent with my expectation, I find that firms are less likely to use news 
management and earnings management if ASRs are motivated by undervaluation and takeover 
concerns. I also find that firms use news management instead of earnings management if ASRs are 
motivated by increasing earnings per share (EPS), since downward earnings management will hurt 
EPS. These findings suggest that firms weigh available tools and select the one that serves their 
purpose best. A related finding is that firms just meeting the earnings target for the quarter 
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immediately before the ASR commencement are less likely to use earnings management, 
indicating that reducing repurchase prices is a secondary consideration to meeting earnings targets. 
I then examine the association between pre-ASR news/earnings management and 
operating/stock price performance over specific periods. Specifically, I find that pre-ASR stock 
returns are negatively associated with pre-ASR news/earnings management, suggesting that news 
management and earnings management appear to be viable strategies. I also find that ASR 
announcement returns are not associated with pre-ASR news/earnings management. Thus, the 
market does not appear to see through news management and earnings management, and correct 
for them accordingly at the ASR announcement date. Further evidence shows that earnings 
response coefficients remain unchanged following ASR announcements, corroborating that ASR 
announcements will not alert investors to pre-ASR earnings management. However, if earnings 
deflation and resulting stock price deflation prior to ASRs result from opportunistic strategies 
rather than from changes in fundamentals, I expect to observe reversals of operating performance 
and stock price performance following ASRs eventually. Consistent with my expectation, I find a 
positive association between pre-ASR earnings management and operating/stock price 
performance for both one-year and two-year horizons following ASRs. In contrast, because firms 
simply shift negative news around ASR commencement in short windows, negative news is 
reversed quickly and I find a positive association between pre-ASR news management and stock 
price performance during a short window following ASRs. 
The findings in this research provide evidence consistent with firms strategically managing 
news and earnings prior to ASRs. However, an alternative to the strategic management explanation 
is a timing one, where firms time ASRs to follow the periods of abnormally high negative news 
and accruals, and both pre-ASR negative returns and pre-ASR negative news/accruals simply 
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capture deteriorating prospects of ASR firms. Additional analyses appear to rule out the strategic 
timing explanation. First, the heightened scrutiny from auditors should reduce managers’ 
discretion and make earnings management harder in audited quarters. Thus, the strategic 
management explanation predicts less earnings management if the pre-ASR quarter is an audited 
quarter, but the strategic timing explanation predicts no such difference as abnormal accruals are 
unrelated to earnings management in this explanation. The empirical results support the prediction 
of the strategic management explanation. Second, I examine a subset of ASR firms for which the 
strategic timing explanation should be less plausible. Specifically, I select 80 ASR firms who have 
superior and stable operating performance in the four consecutive quarters prior to ASRs. For this 
group of ASR firms, I still find evidence of pre-ASR news management and earnings management, 
which is consistent with the strategic management explanation. 
This research is most related to prior studies that investigate financial reporting and 
voluntary disclosure practices prior to announcements of OMR programs (Brockman, Khurana, 
and Martin 2008; Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008; Rodríguez and Yue 2008). Because OMRs occur 
quietly in many small increments over years following announcements, it is hard to attribute pre-
announcement practices to actual repurchase activities. In contrast, ASRs typically involve 
immediately repurchasing a large number of shares. Thus, ASRs provide a cleaner setting to 
investigate managers’ strategic behaviors attributable to share repurchase decisions. In addition, 
Louis and White (2007) and Gong et al. (2008) find that firms exhibit different patterns of earnings 
management prior to tender offers than to OMRs, and ASRs can be seen as a hybrid combining 
some features of OMRs with others of tender offers. Thus, conclusions from prior OMR studies 
may not be generalized to ASRs. 
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This research also contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the recent 
literature on ASRs primarily investigates why firms elect ASRs instead of OMRs, and this 
literature, collectively, does not provide consistent evidence (Marquardt et al. 2009; Chemmanur 
et al. 2010; Bargeron et al. 2011; Kurt 2014). To my knowledge, there is no research examining 
corporate news releases and financial reporting choices after firms have decided to conduct ASRs. 
This research fills the void and sheds light on financial and nonfinancial information conveyed by 
ASR firms. Second, most of the prior studies use management forecasts as a proxy for corporate 
voluntary disclosure. However, firm-generated press releases are much more extensive, from 
customer acquisition to product development. This research employs large-scale data of firm-
generated press releases encompassing extensive types of contents across major media outlets, 
which allows me to study a richer set of voluntary disclosure. Third, it is unusual for firms to 
attempt to manage earnings downward and deflate stock prices. Prior literature identifies such 
attempts in limited settings, such as OMRs (Brockman et al. 2008; Gong et al. 2008; Rodríguez 
and Yue 2008), management buyouts (Perry and Williams 1994), and employee stock option 
reissues (Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy 2006). This research contributes to this line of research and 
analyzes a useful setting where firms’ incentives may be opposite to the typical ones to manage 
earnings upward and inflate stock prices. 
Chapter 2 introduces the background of ASRs. Chapter 3 discuss the related literature. 
Chapter 4 examines news management and earnings management prior to ASRs. Chapter 5 
examines the association between pre-ASR news/earnings management and operating/stock 




Chapter 2  
Background of ASR 
2.1 ASRs and Share Repurchase Programs 
ASR is an innovative method that a firm can use to implement its share repurchase program. 
U.S. firms first started to adopt share repurchase programs in large numbers in the early 1980s. In 
1998, U.S. firms distributed more cash to investors through share repurchases than through cash 
dividends for the first time in history (Grullon and Ikenberry 2000). 
Before a firm repurchases its shares, the firm’s Board of Directors must explicitly approve 
a share repurchase program with a specified amount of common stocks to be repurchased in an 
estimated period of time. Once approved, the firm usually implements the share repurchase 
program from time to time through one or a combination of four methods—OMRs, tender offers, 
privately negotiated repurchases and structural programs (typically ASRs)—although a share 
repurchase program does not oblige the firm to repurchase any particular amount of common stock, 
and the program may be suspended at any time at the firm’s discretion. The following quote from 
Form 10-K of CVS Health Co. dated February 11, 2014 reveals the relation between an overall 
share repurchase program and its implementation methods: 
“On December 17, 2013, the Company’s Board of Directors authorized a new share 
repurchase program for up to $6.0 billion of outstanding common stock (the “2013 
Repurchase Program”). On September 19, 2012, the Company’s Board of Directors 
authorized a share repurchase program for up to $6.0 billion of outstanding common stock 
(the “2012 Repurchase Program”, and together with the 2013 Repurchase Program, “the 
Repurchase Programs”) The Repurchase Programs, which were effective immediately, 
permit the Company to effect repurchases from time to time through a combination of open 
market repurchases, privately negotiated transactions, accelerated share repurchase 
transactions, and/or other derivative transactions. The Repurchase Programs may be 




Of the four share repurchase methods, OMRs are the most commonly used and tender 
offers and privately negotiated repurchases remain relatively uncommon (Grullon and Michaely 
2004; Gong et al. 2008). ASRs have gained popularity since 2004 and have been second only to 
OMRs thereafter (Bargeron et al. 2011). Figure 1 presents the dollar value and the number of ASRs 
from 2004 to 2013. Although they were rare before 2004, ASR announcements quickly increased 
to 12.8 percent of total share repurchase program announcements in 2007. ASRs lost momentum 
in 2008–2009 mainly because they are very costly when stock prices are highly volatile, which 
was the case during the financial crisis over that period (Bargeron et al. 2011). ASRs rebounded 
quickly following the financial crisis. In 2013, ASR announcements accounted for 14.3 percent of 
total repurchase program announcements. 




Note: Figure 1 presents the dollar value and the number of ASRs from 2004 to 2013 (including ASRs 




2.2 Structure and Timeline of ASRs 
Figure 2 depicts the structure and timeline of an ASR. In a typical ASR, a firm enters into 
a contract with an investment bank at the inception of the ASR. At that time, the firm makes an 
upfront payment to the bank, and the bank borrows the firm’s shares in the market from existing 
shareholders and delivers those shares to the firm. The initial delivery is a substantial number of 
shares that the firm can repurchase with the upfront payment at a price that is equal to the closing 
price at the inception of the ASR. The bank fulfils its obligation to return the borrowed shares by 
purchasing shares in the open market during a pre-agreed period. Typically, the bank delivers 
additional shares to the firm at the end of that period, such that the total number of shares delivered 
by the bank throughout the ASR is equal to the upfront payment divided by the firm’s average 
stock price during the ASR contract period minus a pre-agreed discount. Depending on the stock 
price performance and the initial delivery of shares, there may be uncommon situations where the 
total number of shares that should be delivered is less than the initial delivery. In such situations, 
the firm is obligated to return some of the shares to the bank, or pay cash instead. In other words, 
the ultimate repurchase price is adjusted to the average stock price during the ASR contract period 
minus a pre-agreed discount, although the repurchase price at the initial delivery is the closing 
price at the inception of the ASR. If the stock price rises during the ASR contract period, the firm 
will end up receiving fewer shares. 
ASRs also can be tailored to incorporate additional features such as collars and caps. For 
example, the adjusted repurchase price in a collared ASR is subject to a price cap and floor, which 




















Note: Figure 2 presents the structure and timeline of an ASR. In a typical ASR, a firm enters into a contract 
with an investment bank at the inception of the transaction. At that time, the firm makes an upfront payment 
to the bank, and the bank borrows the firm’s shares in the market from existing shareholders and delivers 
those shares to the firm. The bank satisfies its obligation to return the borrowed shares by purchasing shares 
in the open market during a pre-agreed period of time. Typically, the firm receives additional shares at the 
end of that period although depending on the stock price performance and the initial delivery of shares, the 
firm may be obligated to return some of the shares to the bank, or pay cash instead. 
 
2.3 Disclosure Requirements for ASRs 
First of all, a firm must publicly disclose a share repurchase program prior to its 
implementation (the ex-ante disclosure). The disclosure may be made in Form 10-Q or 10-K, or 
by means of a press release or Form 8-K. A firm also must issue a public announcement disclosing 
any material modifications to a share repurchase program. 
Beginning in January 2004, the SEC requires a firm to disclose its share repurchase 
























At the settlement 
Adjust price 
and settle in 
cash or shares 
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disclosure). The disclosure must include the number of shares purchased, the average price paid 
per share, the cumulative number of shares purchased as part of an announced share repurchase 
program and the maximum number of shares (or approximate dollar value) that may yet be 
repurchased under the program, regardless of the methods used to make those repurchases.  
In addition to the ex-ante disclosure of its share repurchase program and the ex-post 
disclosure of its monthly share repurchase activities, a firm must satisfy varying disclosure 
requirements before implementing its share repurchase program each time, depending on the 
repurchase method to be used. OMRs usually entail no specific disclosure requirements before 
their commencement under current regulations. In other words, a firm can keep silent before 
repurchasing its shares in the open market. In contrast, ASRs entail much more disclosure 
requirements and thus are highly visible. Because an ASR agreement constitutes a material 
definitive agreement, a firm must disclose the details of an upcoming ASR transaction via Form 
8-K or a press release within four business days after it enters into the agreement. Therefore, an 
ASR will be known to the market instantly and well before it is completed.2 A firm usually repeats 
its ASR disclosure in Form 10-Qs and 10-Ks for consecutive accounting periods while the ASR 
lasts. The final delivery date is reported in a later Form 10-Q or 10-K when it is determined. A firm 
also may include the actual ASR agreement in Exhibit 10 to Form 8-K, 10-Q or 10-K. A firm 
usually discloses the name of the investment bank, the ASR initiation date, the ASR contract period, 
the dollar value of the ASR transaction, the number of shares delivered at the inception of the ASR 
transaction and the repurchase price adjustment method. A firm may also disclose the initial price 
it pays, which is usually the closing price on the ASR initiation date. 
                                                 
2 The mean (median) days between the ASR announcement date and the ASR initiation date are 0.14 (0) 
days in my sample of 365 ASRs announced between 2004 and 2013. 
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2.4 Difference between ASRs and OMR 
Because ASRs and OMRs are most commonly used to implement a share repurchase 
program and both involve repurchasing share in the open market, they are the main alternatives 
for repurchasing shares. Thus, I mainly compare ASRs and OMRs. ASRs differ from OMRs in 
two important ways. The first is the ability to take advantage of the flexibility inherent in a share 
repurchase program. Typically, a share repurchase program authorizes a firm to make repurchases 
from time to time over years using one or a combination of four available methods. However, the 
firm has no legal obligation to repurchase any shares under the authorization and can modify, 
suspend or discontinue the program for no reasons and without notice. Thus, a share repurchase 
program effectively contains a “flexibility option”. A firm may announce a share repurchase 
program but not carry it out subsequently. Bonaimé (2015) indicates that firms complete only 77.9 
percent of announced repurchase programs from 1998 to 2007 on average.3 OMRs make the best 
use of such flexibility because OMRs permit a firm to quietly repurchase shares in small 
increments in the open market without any binding arrangement. A firm can determine the timing 
and size of any repurchase increment, subject to cash availability and market conditions. In contrast, 
a firm effectively gives up the flexibility option if using ASRs to implement its share repurchase 
program. This is because ASRs oblige a firm by contract to repurchase an announced number of 
shares in a pre-agreed period (four months on average) through an investment bank.4 Thus, ASRs 
represent a more credible commitment to repurchase shares than OMRs. 
                                                 
3 Bonaimé (2015) indicates that the completion rate is rising, possibly due to the 2003 modification to the 
SEC Rule 10b-18 that requires firms to disclose monthly share repurchase activities in Form 10-Qs and 10-
Ks beginning in January 2004. 
4 Although an ASR agreement stipulates several default events (such as extraordinary dividend distribution 
and merger and acquisition) that may trigger early termination and cancellation, it is very rare that an ASR 
transaction ends up being cancelled. Only three out of 474 ASRs during 2004–2013 were cancelled because 
repurchasing firms were acquired. 
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The second difference lies in the speed of stock delivery. Although an ASR transaction 
takes four months to complete on average, it usually involves a large number of shares to be 
repurchased, almost all of which are delivered immediately on the first day of the transaction. This 
is the “accelerated” part of an ASR transaction. In contrast, a firm may otherwise take a number 
of quarters to repurchase the same amount of common stock through a series of smaller OMRs. 
This is because a firm usually conducts OMRs in a manner that avails itself of the Rule 10b-18’s 
safe harbor protection (Atkins 2013). This rule sets forth conditions for the manner, timing, price 
and volume of repurchases. Specifically, the volume condition requires that aggregate repurchases 
on any given day not exceed 25 percent of the average daily trading volume during the preceding 
four weeks. Based on the World Bank’s data, this daily limit is translated to 0.12 percent of 
outstanding shares on average while an average ASR repurchases 5.2 percent of outstanding shares 
instantly on the initiation date of the ASR.5 Therefore, ASRs accelerate stock deliveries compared 
to OMRs. 
                                                 
5 The World Bank reports that the annual stock trading turnover ratio in the United States is 124.6 percent 
for the period from 2011 to 2015 (see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR). Therefore, the 




Chapter 3  
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I review the extant research that is relevant to my dissertation. The first part 
of the review (Section 3.2) introduces the emerging literature on ASRs and its main research 
question. This section concludes with a discussion of the void in the extant research on ASRs. The 
second part of the review (Section 3.3) introduces a long line of literature in accounting and finance 
that studies corporate events in which managers have incentives to affect stock prices and the tools 
available to managers to do so. This section also discusses why ASRs provide a better setting to 
examine strategic behaviors of managers around share repurchases than OMRs. The third part of 
the review (Section 3.4) begins with a discussion of commonly cited motivations for share 
repurchase programs. Because ASR is an innovative way to implement a share repurchase program 
and my dissertation is intended to study managers’ strategic choices in corporate press releases and 
financial reporting around ASRs, those initial motivations for share repurchase programs may play 
a role in shaping managers’ behaviors around ASRs. The fourth and final part of the review 
(Section 3.5) introduces the literature on the association between pre-event earnings management 
and post-event operating performance and stock price performance. 
This chapter is intended to provide a review of main themes my dissertation is related to. 
In subsequent chapters, I may introduce additional research that is related to specific details being 
discussed in those particular chapters. 
3.2 Recent Literature on ASRs 
Several research papers specifically study ASRs, most notably Bargeron et al. (2011). 
Given potential goals for a share repurchase program, Bargeron et al. (2011) argue that a firm uses 
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an ASR to implement a portion of its share repurchase program because the ASR portion enables 
the firm to more credibly and quickly achieve those goals, namely, the firm benefits from the 
enhanced credibility and immediacy. On the other hand, an ASR suggests less flexibility that the 
firm retains on whether and when to repurchases its shares in response to subsequent market 
conditions. If the benefits of enhanced credibility and immediacy outweigh the costs of less 
flexibility, the firm will include an ASR in its share repurchase program. They find evidence that 
the benefits of enhanced credibility and immediacy and the costs of lost flexibility are important 
determinants of ASR adoption. 
Akyol et al. (2014) argue that the enhanced credibility and immediacy make ASRs a better 
device to defend against takeover threats than OMRs. They find that ASR firms are subject to 
significantly more takeover rumors than OMR firms. The takeover probability is significantly 
lower for both ASR and OMR firms when compared with the pre-announcement level, but the 
decrease for ASR firms is more pronounced. 
Chemmanur et al. (2010) examine firms’ rationale for using ASRs rather than OMRs to 
implementing share repurchase programs. They find that firms using ASRs have lower pre-
announcement valuations, stronger positive announcement abnormal returns and better post-
announcement operating and stock return performance than those using OMRs. They conclude 
that the intent to signal undervaluation drives firms to use ASRs instead of OMRs. 
Marquardt et al. (2009) recognize that ASRs provide greater financial reporting advantages 
than OMRs. The number of outstanding shares for the calculation of EPS is reduced upon share 
deliveries in share repurchases. An ASR usually involves a large number of shares to be delivered 
instantly at the commencement of the ASR. As a result, for the same number of shares that would 
otherwise be repurchased using OMRs from time to time, ASRs can significantly accelerate the 
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EPS boosting effect. Marquardt et al. (2009) find that firms are more likely to use ASRs rather 
than OMRs when repurchases are accretive to EPS, when bonuses of chief executive officers 
(CEOs) are tied to EPS performance, when CEOs voluntarily leave the firm after the ASR and 
when CEOs are more entrenched. They conclude that short-term financial reporting benefits are a 
significant determinant in the decision to use ASRs. 
The extant research provides mixed evidence on firms’ rationale to use ASRs. For example, 
Bargeron et al. (2011) find that the average abnormal return prior to ASR announcements is 
indistinguishable from zero but is significant and negative for only-OMR announcements, an 
evidence that is inconsistent with ASRs being used to signal undervaluation as argued by 
Chemmanur et al. (2010). Michel, Oded, and Shaked (2010) also find that ASR firms exhibit poor 
stock price performance over the nine months following the repurchase, inconsistent with ASRs 
being more effective to signal undervaluation. Both Bargeron et al. (2011) and Chemmanur et al. 
(2010) challenge Marquardt et al. (2009) on the EPS-boosting motivation.6 Kurt (2014) argue that 
these studies, collectively, do not provide consistent evidence on the rationale of ASRs. He finds 
that both the signaling undervaluation motivation and the EPS-boosting motivation explain the 
data. 
 Although the extant studies on ASRs noticeably differ, they generally share the main 
research question, that is, why firms use ASRs to implement its share repurchase program. 
However, another research question “what happens next” is largely ignored in the extant research 
on ASRs. My dissertation fills the void by examining how the ASR adoption decision subsequently 
affects corporate press releases and financial reporting choices around ASRs. 
                                                 
6 As Bargeron et al. (2011) suggest, both Marquardt et al. (2009) and Chemmanur et al. (2010) classify 
firms as conducting an OMR-only repurchase program versus conducting an ASR-only repurchase program, 
which is inconsistent with the fact that both ASRs and OMRs can be used to complete a portion of a share 
repurchase program, and that it is not uncommon that firms choose to use them alternatively. 
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3.3 Incentives for Managers to Affect Stock Prices 
There is a long line of literature in accounting and finance that examines various capital 
market settings where managers have incentives to affect stock prices strategically, including but 
not limited to OMRs (Brockman et al. 2008; Gong et al. 2008; Rodríguez and Yue 2008), Dutch-
auction tender offers (Louis and White 2007), stock-for-stock mergers (Louis 2004; Ahern and 
Sosyura 2014), employee stock option awards and reissues (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Coles et 
al. 2006), seasoned public offerings (Lang and Lundholm 2000; Shivakumar 2000; Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010), and insider trading (Cheng and Lo 2006). 
The common theme of this literature is that managers intend to affect stock prices 
strategically. One tool that managers use to affect stock prices in the accounting literature is 
through voluntary disclosures. Brockman et al. (2008) examine management forecasts, a 
representative voluntary disclosure, around share repurchase programs (primarily through OMRs). 
They find that managers increase the frequency and magnitude of bad news forecast 
announcements during 30 days before the start of share repurchase programs, and that managers 
also, to a less extent, increase the frequency and magnitude of good news forecast announcements 
during 30 days after the completion of share repurchase program. They conclude that managers 
actively manipulate voluntary disclosures before share repurchases to secure lower repurchase 
prices. Other examples include: Cheng and Lo (2006) find managers increase the number of bad 
news forecasts to reduce the purchase price before they plan to purchase shares of their firms. 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that CEOs change the timing of voluntary disclosures around 




Unlike the accounting literature that largely examines voluntary disclosures in the form of 
management forecasts, the recent finance literature tends to examine a wider range of corporate 
disclosures including any firm-generated news appearing in public media, and to analyze 
qualitative characteristics of corporate disclosures such as linguistic tone (Solomon 2012; Ahern 
and Sosyura 2014; Edmans, Goncalves-Pinto, Wang, and Xu 2014; Huang, Teoh, and Zhang 2014). 
This growing literature suggests that firms can originate and disseminate corporate news to the 
public media to influence their stock prices prior to corporate events. For example, Ahern and 
Sosyura (2014) find that bidders in stock-for-stock mergers originate and disseminate corporate 
news strategically to increase their stock prices during the period when the stock exchange ratio is 
negotiated. The short-lived run-up of stock prices helps bidders to secure more favorable 
transaction terms. Edmans et al. (2014) show that CEOs strategically reallocate positive corporate 
news into months when their equity vests and away from prior and subsequent months. The altered 
news flow generates favorable media coverage and temporary run-up of stock prices and market 
liquidity, an effect that CEOs can take advantage of to cash out. Huang et al. (2014) find that 
managers manipulate the tone of earnings press releases to mislead investors about firm 
fundamentals prior to corporate events such as seasoned equity offerings, mergers and acquisitions 
and stock option grants. Solomon (2012) finds that firms influence their stock prices by engaging 
investor relations firms to increase the coverage of good news relative to bad news. 
The other tool that managers use to affect stock prices in the accounting literature is through 
earnings management. Current accounting standards afford managers the flexibility and discretion 
in financial reporting. Prior studies find that firms manage reported earnings through discretionary 
accruals prior to corporate events. For example, Gong et al. (2008) find evidence of downward 
accrual-based earnings management prior to OMRs to reduce repurchase prices. Shivakumar 
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(2000) find evidence of accrual-based earnings management around seasoned equity offerings, but 
argue that this merely reflect firms’ rational response to anticipated market reaction. Coles et al. 
(2006) find that firms report negative abnormal accruals during the period from the announcement 
of the cancellation of employee stock options through the time those options are reissued, but 
investors and analysts are not misled by such apparent manipulation. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
find that firms use real, as well as accrual-based, earnings management around seasoned equity 
offerings, and that firms trade off real versus accrual-based earnings management based on firm 
characteristics. 
Of this literature, Brockman et al. (2008) and Gong et al. (2008) are most closely linked to 
my dissertation. However, a few concerns have been raised about the setting used by Brockman et 
al. (2008). Specifically, most share repurchase programs in their sample are implemented using 
OMRs. Those share repurchase programs spread over a period of several quarters or even years 
from the start to completion. In fact, the average repurchasing period of their sample is 510 days. 
But they only focus on a short period (i.e., 30 days) before the start of a share repurchase program. 
Nain and Vijh (2016) challenge whether a downward-biased management forecast (i.e., bad news) 
during 30 days before the start of a share repurchase program can suppress stock prices for long 
enough to allow for continuous share repurchases at reduced stock prices. This challenge can be 
alleviated in the setting of ASRs. An ASR can be considered as a sub-program of the parent share 
repurchase program. It involves repurchasing a large number of shares within a pre-agreed period, 
and almost all those shares are delivered instantly at the very beginning of the sub-program. The 
average contract period is four months, which enhances the likelihood that the deflated stock price 
immediately prior to the start of an ASR is sustained to reduce the final repurchase price (i.e., the 
average stock price during the contract period). Even if the deflated stock price before the start of 
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an ASR cannot be sustained during a large portion of the contract period, the ASR firm still may 
benefit because the lower price at initial delivery results in a higher number of shares being 
delivered up front, helping managers to achieve original goals of share repurchases more quickly 
(i.e., enhanced benefits of immediacy). Therefore, I argue that ASRs provide a cleaner setting to 
examine whether managers affect stock prices strategically than a setting mainly consisting of 
OMRs. My dissertation also differs from Brockman et al. (2008) and Gong et al. (2008) in that I 
examine a richer set of voluntary disclosures (i.e., firm-generated news through all media outlets) 
as well as earnings management prior to actual share repurchases. In contrast, Brockman et al. 
(2008) only examine management forecasts, and Gong et al. (2008) only focus on earnings 
management. However, as Ahern and Sosyura (2014) argue, the current regulatory environment 
affords managers great flexibility to use firm-generated news to influence stock prices. 
3.4 Motivations for Share Repurchase Programs 
Prior finance studies review commonly cited motivations for share repurchase programs in 
general. Many studies examine the popular notion that firms use share repurchase programs to 
convey their belief in undervaluation and signal better future prospects (e.g., Comment and Jarrell 
1991). Grullon and Michaely (2004) investigate a second motivation, that is, firms use share 
repurchase programs to return capital to shareholders to mitigate the potential over-investment by 
management. Third, firms may use share repurchase programs to increase their leverage ratios and 
achieve the desired capital structure (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001). Fourth, because share 
repurchases reduce the number of shares used to calculate EPS, firms may use share repurchase 
programs to enhance EPS to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson 2006) 
or secure EPS-based bonus (Cheng, Harford, and Zhang 2015). Lastly, prior literature examines 
the motivation of share repurchase programs being used as a device to defend against takeover 
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threats (Billett and Xue 2007). Because managers’ behavior may differ for alternative motives, I 
consider the effect of these alternative motives in my research design. 
As ASR is just one method to implement a share repurchase program, the extant ASR 
literature explores the rationale for ASRs by examining those motivations generally cited for share 
repurchase programs. Because ASRs have a higher level of commitment and a faster share delivery, 
the extant ASR literature discussed in Section 3.2 concludes that ASRs can achieve those goals 
more credibly and quickly. 
3.5 The Association between Pre-Event Earnings Management and Post-Event 
Operating Performance and Stock price performance 
The extant literature on earnings management around specific corporate events studies the 
association between pre-event earnings management and post-event operating performance and 
stock price performance. This line of literature typically finds evidence of earnings management 
prior to specific corporate events and attributes pre-event earnings management to managerial 
opportunism. Furthermore, the extant literature typically finds reversals in operating performance 
(usually measured by return-on-assets) following those corporate events if managers use abnormal 
accruals to shift earnings between now and the future. However, the extant literature differs in 
whether there exists a negative association between pre-event earnings management and post-
event stock price performance. 
In the setting of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), Rangan (1998) finds that SEO firms use 
positive abnormal accruals to manage earnings upward during the year of the SEO, and that these 
accruals predict both earnings reversals and poor market-adjusted stock returns in the following 
year. He interprets these findings as investors being misled by upward earnings management, 
overvaluing SEO firms temporarily and subsequently being disappointed by declines in earnings. 
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Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) find similar evidence and their interpretation is the same as the one 
offered by Rangan (1998). Shivakumar (2000) also examine earnings management around SEOs 
and, consistent with Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998), he finds that accruals are abnormally 
high before SEOs and that these accruals explain subsequent declines in net income. However, he 
does not find the negative relation between pre-SEO abnormal accruals and post-SEO stock price 
performance, as documented by Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998). Instead, he finds that pre-
SEO abnormal accruals predict two-day negative price reaction to SEO announcements. He 
interprets these findings as investors being able to disentangle earlier earnings management and 
undo its effects at SEO announcements. He concludes that SEO firms’ earnings management is 
not designed to mislead investors, but merely reflects SEO firms’ rational response to anticipated 
stock market reaction at SEO announcements. He attributes the finding of negative relation 
between pre-SEO abnormal accruals and post-SEO stock price performance in Rangan (1998) and 
Teoh et al. (1998) to test misspecification. 
In the setting of employee stock option reissuances, Coles et al. (2006) find evidence of 
downward accrual-based earnings management in the period following the announcement of the 
cancellation of employee stock options up to the time the options are reissued. However, because 
employee stock option reissuances involve a setting where incentives for mangers to manage 
earnings and stock prices are obvious ex-ante, analysts and investors are not misled by downward 
earnings management. Specifically, they find that pre-reissue abnormal accruals have little power 
in explaining pre- and post-reissue stock price performance and analysts’ forecast errors. 
In the context of OMR events, Lie (2005) documents improved operating performance 
following announcements of open market share repurchase programs over 1981–2000. Gong et al. 
(2008) and Rodríguez and Yue (2008) find evidence of downward accrual-based earnings 
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management prior to OMRs. Gong et al. (2008) find a significantly negative association between 
pre-OMR abnormal accruals and either post-OMR operating performance improvement or post-
OMR long-term abnormal returns. They suggest that post-OMR superior stock price performance 
of OMR firms is driven by post-OMR realized earnings growth exceeding expectations formed 
based on pre-OMR managed earnings. Rodríguez and Yue (2008) find that investors do not unravel 
earlier earnings management when a repurchase program is announced. 
In sum, the extant literature typically finds evidence of accrual-based earnings management 
around specific corporate events, and links pre-event earnings management to post-event operating 
performance and stock price performance. However, there is disagreement as to whether investors 
are misled by pre-event earnings management and whether they can correct for pre-event earnings 
management at event announcements. As the extant literature suggests, this may depend on 




Chapter 4  
News Management and Earnings Management Prior to ASRs 
4.1 Hypothesis Development (Hypotheses 1–2) 
In this section, I develop the first two hypotheses of my dissertation. I first discuss why 
managers have incentives to deflate stock prices prior to ASRs. Then I discuss the two available 
methods that managers can use to deflate stock prices. This section concludes with the formal 
expression of the first two hypotheses. 
4.1.1 Incentives for Managers to Deflate Stock Prices Prior to ASRs 
I posit that, in general, managers have incentives to deflate stock prices prior to the 
inception of an ASR. As discussed in Chapter 2, ASRs differ from OMRs in the level of 
commitment and the speed of share delivery. The advantages of ASRs over OMRs are the 
immediacy and the enhanced credibility of the share repurchase program. The greater the number 
of shares delivered upon entering into an ASR contract, the more salient the advantages are. In an 
ASR, the total dollar value of shares to be repurchased are determined at the signing of the contract, 
and the number of shares to be delivered upon entering into the contract is based on the stock price 
on the initiation date (the initial price). Therefore, deflating the initial price can accelerate the share 
delivery at the front end and help reap the full advantages of ASRs over OMRs. 
Second, Chapter 3 discusses several common goals that may motivate a firm to pursue a 
share repurchase program. Although ASRs permit a firm to achieve those goals more rapidly and 
credibly, they entail a higher opportunity cost than OMRs otherwise do, and may incentivize the 
firm to minimize the opportunity cost by reducing the final repurchase price. Dittmar and Field 
(2015) and Ben-Rephael, Oded, and Wohl (2014) find that the flexibility option embedded in share 




repurchase shares at a significantly lower price than the average market price. Dittmar and Field 
(2015) report that the actual repurchase price paid by the median firm is 2.3 percent lower than the 
average closing price in the month of and six months following the repurchase, suggesting that the 
flexibility option has significant economic value. In contrast, ASRs forego the flexibility option 
and eliminate a firm’s ability to actively time the market. The firm now passively pays the average 
stock price during the contract period, even if the stock price rises during that period. Although 
ASRs permit a firm to repurchase shares at a pre-agreed discount, the discount rate is almost half 
of what the firm otherwise would achieve through OMRs, as noted by Dittmar and Field (2015). 
Furthermore, firms have to retain investment banks and outside legal counsel in ASRs, which 
usually incur extra costs such as contract negotiation and legal fees compared to in-house OMRs.7 
Because the final repurchase price of an ASR is contingent on the average stock price during the 
contract period, to the extent that the deflated initial price can persist in the contract period, the 
attempt to deflate stock prices prior to an ASR will help reduce the final repurchase price and 
thereby the opportunity cost of the ASR. 
Third, reducing the repurchase price effectively transfers wealth from leaving shareholders 
to remaining shareholders. The wealth transfer can benefit managers directly if managers have 
equity holdings in the firm, or indirectly by pleasing remaining shareholders who determine job 
security and compensation of mangers in the long run (Gong et al. 2008). To the extent that the 
deflated initial price can persist in the contract period, the attempt to deflate stock prices prior to 
an ASR will benefit managers through the wealth transfer effect. 
                                                 
7 In ASRs in early years, a firm could pay a premium to the investment bank for acting as the firm’s proxy 
to repurchase shares in the open market. The premium constitutes another extra cost. More recently, ASR 
firms no longer pay any premium to the bank. Instead, the bank offers a small discount to the firm. The 
bank makes profit by buying shares in the open market when the price is low and then selling the shares to 
the firm at a hopefully higher average stock price during the contract period (net of discount). In other 




The method for determining the final repurchase price (as the average price during the 
contract period) in ASRs also provides firms incentives to deflate stock prices during the contract 
period. However, the incentives to deflate stock prices during the ASR contract period may be 
weaker than prior to the ASR. First, the disclosure requirements for ASRs discussed in Chapter 2 
suggest that the market will be aware of an ASR transaction as soon as a firm enters into the ASR 
contract and well before the completion of the ASR. Thus, the firm will be subject to heightened 
scrutiny during the contract period. In contrast, the firm has more latitude to affect stock prices 
quietly and strategically prior to the ASR announcement. Second, it takes 126 days on average for 
a firm to complete an ASR transaction. To reduce the average stock price during the contract period, 
a firm may have to suppress stock prices for a prolonged period, which may be perceived by the 
market as a negative signal about the firm. Third, certain embedded features such as collars or 
floors in ASRs may prevent firms from suppressing stock prices during the contract period. A collar 
or floor specifies the minimum repurchase price that a firm should pay, even if the stock price 
declines further. A review of ASR contracts reveals that the floor of allowable repurchase prices 
will easily be hit if the stock price drops by only 2.8 percent.8 Therefore, a firm may not benefit 
significantly from stock price deflation if a collar or floor is present in an ASR. 
4.1.2 Two Methods to Deflate Stock Prices Prior to ASRs 
I start this chapter with a discussion that managers have incentives to deflate stock prices 
prior to an ASR. Now I discuss two methods managers can use to deflate stock prices prior to an 
                                                 
8 The cap and floor are specified at a percentage of the average stock price within a sub-period of the ASR 
contract period (on average the first 20 days following the initiation date). Like the pre-agreed discount, the 
cap and floor percentages is usually redacted for confidentiality. Of 25 ASRs that explicitly disclose caps 
and floors, the median cap and floor are 110 and 96 percent of the average price during the specified period 
respectively, suggesting that the upper and lower bound of the final repurchase price are not symmetric 
around the reference price, and that the lower bound is tighter than the upper bound. Recall that the median 
discount rate is 1.2 percent, thus the upper and lower bound of the final repurchase price will be hit if the 




ASR. Following the extant literature discussed in Chapter 3, the first method I examine is through 
voluntary corporate disclosures. But I do not limit corporate disclosures only to management 
forecasts because corporate disclosures are very extensive by nature, from nonfinancial 
information such as customer acquisition and product development to financial information such 
as management forecasts. To examine a richer set of corporate disclosures, I follow the approach 
of the recent finance literature that examines a full spectrum of firm-generated news appearing in 
news outlets (Solomon 2012; Ahern and Sosyura 2014; Edmans et al. 2014; Huang et al. 2014). 
Generally, this literature examines two disclosure attributes that are largely ignored by using 
numerical information in financial statements and management forecasts. The first attribute is 
press coverage or press attention (e.g., Ahern and Sosyura 2014) and the second attribute is 
linguistic tone (e.g., Huang et al. 2014). My dissertation examines whether managers alter the 
timing, coverage and tone of firm-generated news prior to an ASR, which I refer to as firm-
generated news management. Managers can deflate stock prices by increasing the coverage of 
firm-generated negative news in a targeted period of time. I focus on firm-generated news because 
news produced by outsiders (e.g., analysts and journalists) often contains analysis that firms cannot 
fully control. In contrast, firms retain substantial discretion on the timing, coverage and content of 
news generated by themselves. Ahern and Sosyura (2014) provide a complete analysis of the U.S. 
legal framework of corporate disclosures. They find that firm-generated news management is 
either permitted by current laws and regulations, or effectively not subject to legal control, making 
it a convenient and viable method for deflating stock prices prior to an ASR. 
The other method for deflating stock prices is earnings management explored in the 
accounting literature. Although prior literature finds that firms alter real activities to manage 




argue that managers may not resort to real earnings management to deflate stock prices prior to an 
ASR. First, real earnings management changes the timing and/or structuring of real transactions 
(e.g., increase research and development expenditures to deflate earnings), which may require 
valuable economic resources and have a lasting effect on future performance. Because ASRs are 
usually completed in a short period of time, managers presumably prefer a strategy that only has 
temporary effects. Second, managers do not have perfect control over the outcome of real earnings 
management because of uncertainty in altering real transactions (Zang 2012).9 
4.1.3 Hypotheses 
Based on my discussion, I express my predictions in the first two hypotheses: 
H1: Managers use news management prior to an ASR to deflate stock prices. Specifically, 
managers increase the coverage of firm-generated negative news prior to an ASR. 
H2: Managers use earnings management prior to an ASR to deflate stock prices. Specifically, 
managers use negative accounting accruals to deflate earnings prior to an ASR. 
4.2 Sample Selection and Research Design 
4.2.1 ASR Sample 
Because ASRs were rare before 2004 (Bargeron et al. 2011), I hand-collect ASRs 
announced during 2004–2013. I first use Capital IQ’s built-in function “Transaction Screen” and 
set the search criteria as “Buyback–Accelerated Share Repurchase”. This produces a list of ASRs 
with a synopsis for each ASR. To verify and complement ASRs collected from Capital IQ, I use 
the full-text search provided by Morningstar Document Research database to search for ASRs in 
Form 8-K, 10-Q and 10-K and their exhibits during my sample period.10 My search identifies a 
                                                 
9 I perform a formal test for real earnings management in Section 7.1, and indeed find no evidence of real 
earnings management prior to ASRs. 
10  The keywords used in the full-text search are: (accelerated share repurchase) or (accelerated stock 




total of 474 ASRs. I drop three ASRs that were subsequently cancelled because the ASR firms 
were acquired before the pre-agreed completion date. I further drop 106 ASRs in the financial 
industry (Fama-French 44–47 or SIC 6000–6999) because the discretionary accruals model later 
used for measuring earnings management is not applicable to the financial industry that faces a 
different financial reporting and regulatory environment. For the final sample of 365 ASRs, I glean 
details of ASR transactions from Capital IQ synopses, SEC filings and actual ASR contracts, if 
available. I obtain financial data, stock prices and trading volume and analysts’ forecasts of ASR 
firms from COMPUSTAT, CRSP and I/B/E/S, respectively. 
4.2.2 Firm-Generated News Sample 
I examine corporate press releases, the major source of firm-generated news for which 
firms have full control over the timing, coverage and content. Corporate press releases have a 
particular advantage of reaching the market rapidly and widely using the evolving information 
dissemination technology. The current regulatory environment for corporate press releases is very 
lenient, affording managers great flexibility in the content of corporate press releases and the way 
to “spin” them in terms of timing and coverage (Ahern and Sosyura 2014). All those factors make 
corporate press releases particularly suitable for active firm-generated news management. 
Following several studies on press coverage (Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm 2010; 
Bushee and Miller 2012; Ahern and Sosyura 2014), I retrieve news articles from Factiva for each 
firm of the ASR sample. I utilize a firm’s Intelligent Indexing Code assigned by Factiva to retrieve 
daily news articles related to the firm under the subject category “Press Releases” during the 
following four periods: (1) the benchmark period, defined as the 25 weeks that spans from week 
                                                 
or (overnight stock repurchase) or (overnight share buyback) or (overnight stock buyback) or (forward 
repurchase transaction) or (discounted share repurchase) or (discounted share buyback) or (discounted stock 




−35 week to −11 week prior to the ASR initiation date; (2) the pre-ASR period, defined as the 10 
weeks immediately prior to the ASR initiation date; (3) the ASR contract period, from the ASR 
initiation date through the ASR completion date; and (4) the post-ASR period, defined as the 10 
weeks following the ASR completion date. I designate press releases coming from newswire 
services as firm-generated press releases, since newswire services usually transmit corporate press 
releases without additional edits. The list of sources that I designate as newswires includes: PR 
Newswire (U.S.), Business Wire, M2 Presswire, ENP Newswire, Dow Jones Institutional News, 
GlobeNewswire, Dow Jones Newswires, Canada NewsWire, PR Newswire Europe, Regulatory 
News Service, PrimeNewswire, Thomson Reuters ONE, Business Wire Regulatory Disclosure, 
AAP MediaNet Press Releases, PrimeZone Media Network, Hugin Press Release, PR Newswire 
Asia, PR Newswire European TODWire, PR.com (press releases) and PR Newswire UK 
Disclosure. To make sure that news articles from those sources are indeed generated by the ASR 
firm, I remove (1) press releases that cover more than five firms and/or do not list the ASR firm as 
the first two covered firms;11 (2) press releases that are tagged by Factiva as recurring pricing and 
market data; and (3) press releases with a title suggesting that they are not firm-generated press 
releases (e.g., analysts’ notes). I include duplicates, reprints or highly similar articles from 
alternative news outlets, which means that my count of press releases measures the breadth of 
news coverage across multiple news outlets rather than unique news articles. This is a crucial 
design for my research because I consider news coverage as an important dimension of firm-
generate news management, and including duplicates, reprints or highly similar articles from 
multiple news outlets permits me to measure how widely press releases are circulated, a dimension 
                                                 
11 Factiva provides a list of covered firms for each news article. I randomly select 100 news articles to check 
if they are firm-generated press releases. I find that if a news article covers more than five firms, it is 
typically a note or alert issued by analysts or credit rating agencies. Also, if an ASR firm is not the first two 




that a count of unique press releases cannot measure. This approach is also used by Ahern and 
Sosyura (2014) who study corporate press releases during merger negotiations and Soltes (2009) 
who studies the impact of news dissemination on market trading activities. When a firm wants to 
distribute a document as a press release to the market, the firm can select one or more newswires 
services and send the document to them for distribution. Thus, managers have discretions on the 
number of news outlets that will carry the press release (i.e., the news coverage). 
I use the negative words as a percentage of total non-numerical words as the measure of 
the tone of each firm-generated press release. This tone measure is used in Liu and McConnell 
(2013) and implicitly assumes that non-negative words are uninformative. As noted by Liu and 
McConnell (2013), this assumption is supported by a large body of literature in psychology which 
argues that negative information is more thoroughly processed than non-negative information. To 
classify negative words, I use the negative word list developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
because the word list is comprehensive and specifically built for financial text. Kearney and Liu 
(2014) note in their survey paper that the Loughran and McDonald’s word lists have become 
predominant in recent studies (page 175). Examples of negative words include: adverse, breach, 
detrimental, erode, penalties, terminate, threaten, unexpected and unsuccessful. I delete from each 
firm-generated press release boilerplate paragraphs that are less informative and usually ignored 
by investors (Li 2010). The two most common examples of boilerplate paragraphs are forward-
looking statement disclaimer and generic company business description at the end of a firm-
generated press release.12 Some firms include those boilerplate paragraphs and others do not. The 
                                                 
12 The boilerplate paragraphs contain certain textual patterns. The forward-looking statement disclaimer 
usually starts with a heading of “Forward-Looking Statements” and/or the leading paragraph usually starts 
with “This release contains ‘forward-looking statements’ within the meaning of Section 27A of Securities 
Act of 1933.” The generic company description usually starts with a heading of “About <company name>”. 
I write a Python script to search for these textual patterns using Python’s regular expression capability. I 




removal of boilerplate paragraphs ensures that the tone measure will not be biased by the inclusion 
of boilerplate paragraphs, a practice that varies among firms. 
I construct a measure, NEGNEWS, to capture both coverage and negative tone of firm-
generated press releases. NEGNEWS is the sum of the negative tone of each firm-generated press 
release in a particular week: 






where i is the ASR firm index and t is the week index. N is the count of firm-generated press 
releases in week t, and j refers to the j-th press release in that week. For example, if there are two 
firm-generated press releases in a week, and one contains 0.5 percent negative words and the other 
contains 0.2 percent negative words, then NEGNEWS for that week is 0.7 percent. Therefore, 
NEGNEWS is a composite measure of the coverage and negative tone of firm-generated press 
releases. It measures the total coverage of negative news. By definition, it increases with more 
press releases and/or proportionally more negative press releases.13 
4.2.3 Measurement of News Management 
In spirit of Lang and Lundholm (2000), Ahern and Sosyura (2014), and Huang et al. (2014), 
I decompose NEGNEWS into a normal component, which is justified by newsworthy events and 
firms’ operating performance, and an abnormal component, which is a proxy for discretionary 
news management. To estimate the normal component in NEGNEWS, I use an event study 
approach that uses a firm as its own control. Specifically, for each ASR, I use the data from the 
                                                 
13 Larger firms usually have more press releases than smaller firms. Thus, there may be a concern that larger 
firms may have a higher NEGNEWS anyway. I discuss this concern in more detail in Section 7.3. In short, 
although there is a strong positive correlation between the firm size and NEGNEWS, the measure of news 
management in this research is not weighted more heavily towards larger firms. Furthermore, the regression 




benchmark period (25 weeks) and regress NEGNEWS on several determinants identified in prior 
studies: 
𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐴𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (2) 
where t is the week index. NEGNEWS is the sum of negative tone of each firm-generated press 
release in week t. EA (AGM) is a dummy variable that equals one if there is an earnings 
announcement (annual general meeting) in week t, and zero otherwise. ΔAF is the change in 
analysts’ consensus forecast of annual EPS from week t-1 to week t, scaled by the end-of-week 
stock price, and is used to control for the change in a firm’s operating performance.14 VOL is the 
trading volume in week t divided by the end-of-week number of outstanding shares, and is used to 
control for other events that may affect NEGNEWS (Ahern and Sosyura 2014).15  Using the 
estimated coefficients, I predict NEGNEWS for each week in the pre-ASR period, the ASR contract 
period, and the post-ASR period. Both the pre-ASR period and the post-ASR period include 10 
weeks, while the contract period of the ASR sample varies from two to 62 weeks. The difference 
between the actual NEGNEWS and its predicted value is the abnormal NEGNEWS for a particular 
week, which I use as the measure of firm-generated news management and denote as NM. By 
definition, NM becomes more positive with the increase in firm-generated news management. 
4.2.4 Measurement of Earnings Management 
I use quarterly abnormal accruals as the proxy for earnings management. Following Louis 
(2004), I use the discretionary current accruals model to estimate quarterly abnormal accruals 
because manipulation of long-term accruals such as depreciation has long-term consequences 
                                                 
14 I use analysts’ consensus forecast of annual EPS rather than reported earnings to control for firms’ 
operating performance because reported earnings (annual or quarterly) have less variations in firm-specific 
ordinary least squares regressions based on weekly data. 
15 ASR announcements may result in higher trading volume thereafter. However, this possibility would bias 




while ASR firms only need to deflate stock prices temporarily. Furthermore, investors traditionally 
rely more on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to value a firm. For 
each calendar quarter and Fama-French 48 industry, I estimate the following model using all non-
financial firms (Fama-French 44–47 or SIC 6000–6999) in COMPUSTAT: 
𝐶𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑖
4
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽5(∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 
 
(3) 
where i is the firm index. CA is current accruals (the difference between quarterly income before 
extraordinary items and quarterly operating cash flows less depreciation and amortization expense). 
Qj is a dummy variable that equals one for fiscal quarter j, and zero otherwise. ΔSALE is the 
quarterly change in sales. ΔAR is the quarterly change in accounts receivable. All variables, 
including the fiscal quarter dummy variables, are scaled by the beginning-of-quarter total assets. I 
require at least 20 observations for each regression. The residuals from each regression represent 
quarterly abnormal current accruals. 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) suggest that performance-matched abnormal accruals 
enhance the reliability of the earnings management test. Their detailed simulation evidence 
indicates that performance-matched abnormal accruals are well specified and powerful under most 
circumstances. By controlling for similar performance characteristics, researchers are able to 
attribute the differences between the abnormal accruals of event firms and those of control firms 
to the treatment event of interest with more confidence. Therefore, I adjust the estimated abnormal 
accruals for performance. Following Louis and White (2007), Gong et al. (2008), Louis, Robinson, 
and Sbaraglia (2008), for each calendar quarter and Fama-French 48 industry, I create five 
portfolios by sorting COMPUSTAT firms into quintiles based on return-on-assets from the same 




matched abnormal accruals for a given firm are the abnormal accruals for that firm minus the 
median abnormal accruals for the portfolio to which that firm belongs. Gong et al. (2008) suggest 
that the portfolio matching approach controls for performance as well as random effects resulting 
from other events that could influence accruals, such as executive compensation and insider 
trading. I use performance-matched abnormal accruals for a particular quarter as the measure of 
earnings management and denote it as EM. By definition, EM becomes more negative with the 
increase in downward earnings management. To be consistent with NM and for expositional 
convenience, I multiply EM by −1 so that hereafter both NM and EM become more positive with 
the increase in news management and earnings management activities. 
4.2.5 Regression Models for Testing Hypotheses 1–2 
Using an event study approach described in Section 4.2.3, I estimate the abnormal level of 
negative news coverage for each week during the period from week −10 before the ASR initiation 
date through week +10 after the ASR completion date. I subsequently split the entire period into 
five sub-periods: (1) week −10 to week −6 before the ASR initiation date, I denote this sub-period 
as NMPRE2; (2) week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation date, which I denote as NMPRE1; 
(3) the first five weeks of the ASR contract period, which I denote as NMDUR1; (4) the sixth week 
to the last week of the ASR contract period, which I denote as NMDUR2; and (5) week +1 to week 
+10 after the ASR completion date, which I denote as NMPOST. The third (NMDUR1) and the 
fourth (NMDUR2) sub-periods constitute the ASR contract period. Because the contract period of 
the ASR sample varies from two to 62 weeks, the fourth (NMDUR2) sub-period may include up 
to 57 weeks for an ASR. There are several reasons that I split the entire period in this manner. First, 
news management, if perfectly employed, should be used to deflate stock prices within a short-




negative news coverage until that short time window starts, and am particularly interested in the 
five weeks immediately before the ASR initiation date. Second and more importantly, my 
dissertation is intended to shed light on how and when managers use news management versus 
earnings management. On average, the preceding earnings announcement leads the ASR initiation 
date by 33 days. Thus, I use five weeks in an attempt to examine the period in which ASR firms 
decide to use either earnings management or firm-generated news management, or both.16 Third, 
I am also interested in the first five weeks of the ASR contract period in an attempt to examine 
whether there is a negative news shifting from the five weeks after the ASR initiation date to the 
five weeks before. Lastly, because I have no predictions for the post-ASR period, I treat the 10 
weeks after the ASR completion date homogeneously and do not split those 10 weeks any further. 
To test Hypothesis 1, I use the following regression model: 
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the week index. NM is the abnormal negative news in week 
t. Higher values of NM represent more price-deflating news management. NMPRE1 is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the week falls in the period from week −5 to week −1 before the ASR 
initiation date, and zero otherwise.17 NMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the week 
falls in the first five weeks of the ASR contract period, and zero otherwise. NMDUR2 is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the week falls in the period from the sixth week to the last week of the 
ASR contract period, and zero otherwise.18 NMPOST is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
                                                 
16 As a robustness test for this design choice, I use other pre-ASR news management windows from one 
week up to 10 weeks prior to ASRs. In short, the results are robust to the design choice. See more details 
in Section 7.4. 
17 I define week −1 as the seven-day period immediately before the ASR initiation date. All other weeks 
are defined relative to week −1. 
18 Because of the varying duration of contract period, the number of observations with NMDUR2 = 1 varies 
across ASRs. To mitigate the concern about the effect of the varying duration of contract period on the 




week falls in the period from week +1 to week +10 after the ASR completion date, and zero 
otherwise. The regression model enables me to use all available weeks so as to increase the 
statistical power of the test. I include firm fixed effects that capture any time-invariant 
characteristic of the firm, which can alleviate the concern that omitted firm characteristics may 
explain a firm’s abnormal level of negative news coverage. I also include year fixed effects to 
account for time-varying changes in overall market sentiment. Lastly, I use White standard errors 
adjusted to account for the possible correlation within the firm cluster (Petersen 2009).19 α0 is 
interpreted as the average of weekly abnormal negative news during the period from week −10 to 
week −6 before the ASR initiation date. If managers use news management to deflate stock prices 
prior to an ASR as I predict in Hypothesis 1, I should expect α1 > 0 in Equation (4). 
To test Hypothesis 2, I first use the approach described in Section 4.2.4 to estimate the 
performance-matched abnormal accruals for each quarter during the period from quarter −3 before 
the ASR initiation date through quarter +3 after the ASR completion date.20 Using a similar 
approach in the test of Hypothesis 1, I subsequently split the entire period into five sub-periods: 
(1) quarter −3 to quarter −2 before the ASR initiation date, which I denote as EMPRE2; (2) quarter 
−1 before the ASR initiation date, which I denote as EMPRE1; (3) the first quarter of the ASR 
                                                 
remove the ASRs whose contract period is less than 10 weeks. Next, for each ASR included in the 
regressions, I remove the weeks which start after the 10th week of the contract period. As a result, each 
ASR included in the regressions has 10 weeks observations for the contract period (i.e., five observations 
with NMDUR1 = 1 and the other five observations with NMDUR2 = 1). The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged for the regressions in Table 5 and Table 9. 
19 The EM and NM in Equation (4) and Equation (5) are generated variables in that they are constructed 
based on estimates obtained from other regressions in Equations (2) and Equation (3). Thus, they carry with 
them sampling variability not accounted for when they are used as dependent variables in other regressions. 
This may cause them to generate heteroskedasticity in the estimated regressions. In addition, the residuals 
of a given firm may be correlated across periods for a given firm. I thank Tony Wirjanto and Mikal Skuterud 
from the University of Waterloo for pointing this out and suggesting that I correct the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity and within-cluster dependence. 
20 I define quarter −1 as the fiscal quarter for which the earnings were last announced before the ASR 




contract period, which I denote as EMDUR1; (4) the second quarter to the last quarter of the ASR 
contract period, which I denote as EMDUR2; and (5) quarter +1 to quarter +3 after the ASR 
completion date, which I denote as EMPOST. Because the contract period of the ASR sample 
varies from zero to three quarters, the fourth (EMDUR2) sub-period may include up to two quarters 
for an ASR.21 I am particularly interested in the fiscal quarter before the ASR initiation date and 
the quarter after. The regression model used to test Hypothesis 2 is: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the quarter index. EM is the abnormal current accruals in a 
particular quarter, multiplied by −1. That way, higher values of EM represent more price-deflating 
earnings management, consistent with NM. EMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
quarter is quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date, and zero otherwise. EMDUR1 is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the quarter is the first quarter during the ASR contract period, and zero 
otherwise. EMDUR2 is a dummy variable that equals one if the quarter is any other quarter than 
the first one during the ASR contract period, and zero otherwise. EMPOST is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the quarter is quarter +1, +2, or +3 after the ASR completion date, and zero 
otherwise. I include firm and year fixed effects and control for heteroskedasticity. If managers use 
earnings management to deflate stock prices prior to an ASR as I predict in Hypothesis 2, I should 
expect β1 > 0 in Equation (5). 
                                                 
21 Because of the varying duration of contract period, the number of observations with EMDUR2 = 1 varies 
across ASRs. To mitigate the concern about the effect of the varying duration of contract period on the 
regression results, I rerun the regressions using the fixed duration of contract period. Specifically, I first 
remove the ASRs whose contract period is less than 2 quarters. Next, for each ASR included in the 
regressions, I remove the quarters which start after the second quarter of the contract period. As a result, 
each ASR included in the regressions has two quarters observations for the contract period (i.e., one 
observations with EMDUR1 = 1 and the other observations with EMDUR2 = 1). The results remain 




4.3 Empirical Analysis 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of ASR Sample 
Table 1 Panel A reports the frequency of ASRs by year. The number of ASRs increases 
steadily each year since 2004 and reaches a peak of 69 in 2007. ASR transactions dropped sharply 
during 2008–2009, which Bargeron et al. (2011) attribute to the increased variability of stock 
prices during the financial crisis over that period. The value of the flexibility option, which ASRs 
forgo, is increasing in the volatility of ASR firms’ stock prices. Therefore, greater stock market 
volatility makes ASRs less attractive over that period. ASR transactions starts to rebound strongly 
in 2010. Table 1 Panel B reports the frequency of ASRs by industry. I identify at least six ASRs in 
each industry of the Fama-French 12 industry classification. Business equipment, wholesale and 
retail and healthcare are top three frequently represented industries. Table 1 Panel C reports the 
characteristics of ASR structure and timeline. The average size of ASRs is $575 million, or 5.2 
percent of the total outstanding equity. For those firms that select ASRs to implement their share 
repurchase programs, 43.2 percent of a share repurchase program is completed through ASRs on 
average, suggesting that ASRs are clearly significant share repurchase events. The average contract 
period is 126 days. 26 percent of ASRs incorporate additional features such as collars, caps, or 
floors. ASR firms usually redact the discount rate applied to the repurchase price if they disclose 
the actual ASR contracts. The average discount rate is 1.3 percent based on 24 ASRs that disclosed 
their discount rates. A review of actual ASR contracts reveals that the vast majority of ASRs do 





Table 1: ASR Sample 
 
Panel A: ASR by Year 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
ASRs 14 27 31 69 19 5 29 54 42 75 365 
 
Panel B: ASR by Industry 
 Number of ASRs Percentage 
Business equipment 85 23.3 
Wholesale, retail, and some services 63 17.3 
Healthcare, medical equipment, and drug 48 13.2 
Manufacturing 41 11.2 
Utilities 32 8.8 
Consumer non-durables 19 5.2 
Telephone and television transmission 18 4.9 
Chemicals and allied products 12 3.3 
Consumer durables 7 1.9 
Oil, gas, and coal extraction and products 6 1.6 
Other 34 9.3 
 365 100 
 
Panel C: ASR Characteristics 
 N Mean Median Min Max 
Amount ($ million) 365 575 250 1.7 12,852 
Percentage of equity 365 5.2% 4.0% 0.3% 31.2% 
Percentage of announced program 365 43.2% 36.8% 0.6% 100% 
Days of contract period 365 126 106 15 437 
ASR with collar, cap, or floor 365 0.26 0 0 1 
Discount rate 24 1.3% 1.2% 0.2% 3.8% 
 
Note: Table 1 includes 365 ASRs announced by non-financial firms from 2004 through 2013. Panel A 
reports the frequency of announced ASRs by year. Panel B reports the frequency of announced ASRs by 
industry. Panel C reports the ASR size in million dollars, the percentage of outstanding shares repurchased 
in the ASR, the percentage of prevailing repurchase program implemented through the ASR, the days of 
contract period, the frequency of ASRs with features such as a collar, cap, and/or floor, and the discount 
rate to repurchase price. 
 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Generated Press Releases 
I search in Factiva press releases generated by ASR firms from week −35 before the ASR 
initiation date through week +10 after the ASR completion date and end up with a large-scale 
dataset of 37,265 press releases. Table 2 Panel A presents the number of press releases by media 
outlets. The two dominant outlets are PR Newswire (U.S.) and Business Wire, through which 33.8 




Newswire (10.9 percent) and M2 Presswire (10.6 percent). Table 2 Panel B indicates that the 
average non-numeric word count of those press releases is 517, and the average percentage of 
negative words is 0.73 percent.22 I compare the percentage of negative words across the benchmark 
period (week −35 to week −11 before the ASR initiation date), the pre-ASR period (week −10 to 
week −1 before the ASR initiation date), the ASR contract period (varying number of weeks) and 
the post-ASR period (week +1 to week +10 after the ASR completion date). Table 2 Panel C 
indicates that press releases in the earlier five weeks of the pre-ASR period (week −10 to week −6) 
contain a very similar percentage of negative words to the benchmark period. However, the later 
five weeks of the pre-ASR period (week −5 to week −1) contains a significantly higher percentage 
of negative words than the benchmark period (or 8.8 percent higher than the benchmark period). 
Going forward, there is a drop in the percentage of negative words during the first five weeks of 
the ASR contract period (or 10.5 percent lower than the benchmark period). The subsequent 
periods, including the sixth week up to the last week of the contract period and the post-ASR 
period (week +1 to week +5 and week +6 to week +10 separately), again contain a very similar 
percentage of negative words to the benchmark period. Table 2 Panel C suggests there is a run-up 
of the percentage of negative words (or negative tone in the extant literature) in a short window 
before the ASR initiation date and a run-down in a short window after (both up and down are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level). The percentage of negative words in other periods, 
however, is statistically indistinguishable from that in the benchmark period. Those statistics 
suggest that ASR firms may manage negative tone of press releases around ASR commencement. 
  
                                                 
22  The percentage of negative words in my sample is lower than 1.19 percent for the earnings 
announcements sample in Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012). It is not uncommon that the percentage of 
negative words varies with disclosure outlets, which Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) attribute to the 




Table 2: Firm-Generated Press Releases 
 
Panel A: Firm-Generated Press Releases by Media Outlets 
 Number of Press Releases Percentage 
PR Newswire (U.S.)  12,590 33.8 
Business Wire 9,671 26.0 
ENP Newswire 4,062 10.9 
M2 Presswire 3,938 10.6 
Dow Jones Institutional News 3,043 8.2 
GlobeNewswire 1,041 2.8 
Canada NewsWire 749 2.0 
PR Newswire Europe 644 1.7 
Regulatory News Service 479 1.3 
PR.com (Press Releases) 399 1.1 
AAP MediaNet Press Releases 315 0.9 
Other 334 0.7 
 37,265 100 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Firm-Generated Press Releases 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. 5% 95% 
Word count 37,265 517 410 476 111 1,241 
Percentage of negative words 37,265 0.73% 0.42% 1.02% 0 2.63% 
 
Panel C: Percentage of Negative Words around ASRs 
 Benchmark Pre-ASR During ASR Post-ASR 
 Week 
−35 to −11 
Week 
−10 to −6 
Week 
−5 to −1 
Week 
+1 to +5 
Week 
+6 to last 
Week 
+1 to +5 
Week 
+6 to +10 
N 13,552 2,772 3,189 2,868 9,211 2,839 2,834 
Mean 0.716% 0.718% 0.780% 0.641% 0.731% 0.717% 0.734% 
Diff. from 
benchmark  0.002% 0.064% -0.075% 0.015% 0.001% 0.018% 
 
Note: Table 2 includes 37,265 press releases generated by ASR firms during the following periods: (1) the 
benchmark period, defined as the 25 weeks from week −35 to week −11 before the ASR initiation date; (2) 
week −10 to week −6 before the ASR initiation date; (3) week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation 
date; (4) the first 5 weeks of the ASR contract period; (5) the 6th week to the last week of the ASR contract 
period; (6) week +1 to week +5 after the ASR completion date; (7) week +6 to week +10 after the ASR 
completion date. Because the contract period of the ASR sample varies from 2 to 62 weeks, the “week +6 
to last” period may include up to 57 weeks for an ASR. 
 
Panel A reports the frequency of firm-generated press releases by media outlets. Panel B reports statistics 
of firm-generated press releases. Word count is the number of non-numeric words after deleting boilerplate 
disclaimer and company description in press releases. Percentage of negative words is based on Loughran 
and McDonald’s (2011) word classification. Panel C reports the percentage of negative words in each of 





4.3.3 Estimation of Weekly Abnormal Negative News 
I use an event study approach to estimate the abnormal component of weekly negative 
news coverage, the main measure of firm-generated news management.23 Table 3 Panel A reports 
the mean of coefficients and adjusted R2 estimated from Equation (2) using the data within the 
benchmark period (25 weeks) for each ASR. t-statistics (untabulated) are calculated using standard 
errors of the coefficients across individual regressions. The mean coefficients are statistically 
significant with the predicted sign. The mean adjusted R2 (0.152) is comparable to 0.148 in Davis 
and Tama-Sweet (2012) and higher than 0.044 in Huang et al. (2014). Table 3 Panel B reports the 
average of weekly abnormal negative news for each five-week period on the timeline from week 
−10 before the ASR initiation date to week +10 after the ASR completion date, except that I group 
the sixth week up to the last week of the ASR contract period into an individual. Specifically, Table 
3 Panel B reports the average of weekly abnormal negative news during six periods: (1) week −10 
to week −6 before the ASR initiation date; (2) week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation date; 
(3) the first five weeks of the ASR contract period; (4) the sixth week up to the last week of the 
ASR contract period; (5) week +1 to week +5 after the ASR completion date; (6) week +6 to week 
+10 after the ASR completion date. Figure 3 is a graphic presentation of Table 3 Panel B. The 
abnormal negative news increases to 0.24 percent (p-value = 0.001) within the five weeks before 
the ASR initiation date, and then decreases to −0.11 percent (p-value = 0.020) within the five weeks 
after. In any other period, the abnormal negative news is not statistically significant different from 
                                                 
23 I retain as many observations as possible and do nothing about outliers, because each event study 
regression uses a relatively small sample and the number of observations would be important. In addition, 
outliers are not necessarily bad data points based on the calculation procedure described in Section 4.2.3. 
As a robustness check, I truncate the dependent variable, NEGNEWS, at 1 and 99 percentiles and find that: 
(1) the correlation of the measure of news management before and after truncation are very high (0.942); 
and (2) the results in Table 5 and Table 9 remain qualitatively unchanged. These findings suggest that 




zero. The results shown in Table 3 Panel B and Figure 3 is consistent with the firm-generated news 
management hypothesis. 
Table 3: Estimation of Weekly Abnormal Negative News (Measure of News Management) 
 
Panel A: Estimation of Weekly Normal Negative News 
 Predicted Sign                 Coef. 
Intercept  0.574*** 
EA + 0.555### 
AGM + 0.108### 
ΔAF − -0.380### 
VOL + 0.528### 
Mean Adj. R2  0.152*** 
Mean number of obs.  25*** 
Number of regressions  365*** 
 
Panel B: Weekly Abnormal Negative News around ASRs 
 Pre-ASR During ASR Post-ASR 
 Week 
−10 to −6 
Week*** 
−5 to −1*** 
Week*** 
+1 to +5*** 
Week 
+6 to last 
Week 
+1 to +5 
Week 
+6 to +10 
N 1,821 1,815*** 1,790*** 4,592 1,750 1,747 
Mean -0.02% 0.24%*** -0.11%*** 0.02% 0.03% 0.01% 
 
Note: Table 3 reports estimation results for weekly abnormal negative news, the measure of news 
management. Panel A reports coefficient estimates in the following model for each ASR using data during 
the benchmark period, defined as the 25 weeks from week −35 to week −11 before the ASR initiation date:
  
𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐴𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where t is the week index. NEGNEWS is the sum of negative tone of all firm-generated press releases in 
week t. EA (AGM) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an earnings announcement (annual general 
meeting) in week t, and 0 otherwise. ΔAF is the change in analysts’ consensus forecast of annual EPS from 
week t-1 to week t, scaled by the end-of-week stock price. VOL is the trading volume in week t divided by 
the end-of-week number of outstanding shares. The reported coefficients are the mean of coefficients across 
individual regressions. t-statistics are calculated using standard errors of the coefficients across individual 
regressions. The adjusted R2 (number of observations) is the mean of adjusted R2 (number of observations) 
across individual regressions. 
 
Panel B is the tabular presentation of Figure 3, and reports the average of weekly abnormal negative news 
during the following periods: (1) week −10 to week −6 before the ASR initiation date; (2) week −5 to week 
−1 before the ASR initiation date; (3) the first 5 weeks of the ASR contract period; (4) the 6th week to the 
last week of the ASR contract period; (5) week +1 to week +5 after the ASR completion date; (6) week +6 
to week +10 after the ASR completion date. Because the contract period of the ASR sample varies from 2 
to 62 weeks, the “week +6 to last” period may include up to 57 weeks for an ASR. * (#), ** (##), and *** 









Note: Figure 3 presents the average of weekly abnormal negative news during the following periods: (1) 
week −10 to week −6 before the ASR initiation date; (2) week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation 
date; (3) the first 5 weeks of the ASR contract period; (4) the 6th week up to the last week of the ASR 
contract period; (5) week +1 to week +5 after the ASR completion date; (6) week +6 to week +10 after the 
ASR completion date. Because the contract period of the ASR sample varies from 2 to 62 weeks, the “+6 
to last” period may include up to 57 weeks for an ASR. 
 
Weekly abnormal negative news is residuals from the following model: 
𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐴𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where t is the week index. 𝛽0–𝛽4 are estimated using data from the benchmark period, defined as the 25 
weeks from week −35 to week −11 before the ASR initiation date. NEGNEWS is the sum of negative tone 
of all firm-generated press releases in week t. EA (AGM) are a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an 
earnings announcement (annual general meeting) in week t, and 0 otherwise. ΔAF is the change in analysts’ 
consensus forecast of annual EPS, scaled by the stock price. VOL is the weekly trading volume divided by 
the number of outstanding shares. 
 
Note that Table 2 Panel C differs from Table 3 Panel B. Although they compare the same 
six sub-periods from week −10 before the ASR initiation date to week +10 after the ASR 
completion date, Table 2 Panel C reports the average negative tone of firm-generated press releases 
in each sub-period. In contrast, Table 3 Panel B reports the average of weekly abnormal negative 
news in each sub-period, which captures not only the negative tone of firm-generated press release 




abnormal negative news is the measure of news management (i.e., NM) in this research. It is 
designed to capture the discretionary portion of both coverage and negative tone of firm-generated 
press releases. The coverage and negative tone are two dimensions of press releases that firms can 
manage prior to an ASR. 
4.3.4 Estimation of Quarterly Abnormal Accruals 
I use the discretionary current accruals model to estimate quarterly abnormal accruals, 
adjusted for performance using the procedure described by Kothari et al. (2005).24 Table 4 Panel 
A reports the estimated coefficients in Equation (3). There are 1,773 industry-quarters during the 
sample period. On average, each industry-quarter regression uses 162 observations. The reported 
coefficients (adjusted R2) are the mean of the coefficients (adjusted R2) across individual 
regressions, and t-statistics (untabulated) are calculated using standard errors of the coefficients 
across individual regressions. The mean adjusted R2 is 0.376, which is comparable with that from 
discretionary accruals models in prior studies (e.g., Zang 2012). Table 4 Panel B reports 
performance-matched abnormal accruals during three quarters prior to the ASR initiation date 
(quarter −3, −2 and −1), the first quarter during the ASR contract period, other quarters in the 
contract period and three quarters after the ASR completion date (quarter +1, +2 and +3). Figure 
4 is a graphic presentation of Table 4 Panel B. The results are consistent with the earnings 
management hypothesis. Specifically, performance-matched abnormal accruals are significantly 
negative in quarter −1 (p-value = 0.010), and quarter −2 also shows lower than normal accruals 
(p-value = 0.053). In other quarters, performance-matched abnormal accruals are not significantly 
difference from zero. Figure 4 plots performance-matched abnormal accruals from quarter −3 to 
                                                 
24 Following Louis and White (2007), Gong et al. (2008), Louis et al. (2008), I truncate continuous variables 




quarter +3, showing a significant dip in quarter −1. Figure 4 suggests that, on average, firms deflate 
reported earnings in the quarter immediately prior to an ASR. 
Table 4: Estimation of Quarterly Abnormal Current Accruals (Measure of Earnings 
Management) 
 
Panel A: Estimation of Normal Current Accruals 
                 Coef. 
Intercept  -0.034*** 
ΔSALE − ΔAR  -0.137*** 
Q1  0.786*** 
Q2  0.918*** 
Q3  -0.318*** 
Q4  -0.913*** 
Mean Adj. R2  0.376*** 
Mean number of obs.  162*** 
Number of regressions  1,773*** 
 
Panel B: Quarterly Abnormal Current Accruals around ASRs 

















N 345 342* 346*** 285 154 343 338 332 
Mean -0.0021 -0.0028* -0.0051*** -0.0018 -0.0028 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0020 
 
Note: Table 4 reports estimation results for quarterly abnormal current accruals, the measure of earnings 
management. Panel A reports coefficient estimates in the following model using all firms in COMPUSTAT 
for each calendar quarter and Fama-French 48 industry:  
𝐶𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑖
4
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽5(∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 
where i is the firm index. CA is current accruals (the difference between quarterly income before 
extraordinary items and quarterly operating cash flows less depreciation and amortization expense). Qj is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for fiscal quarter j, and 0 otherwise. ΔSALE (ΔAR) is the quarterly change in 
sales (accounts receivable). All variables, including fiscal quarter dummy variables, are scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the quarter. The reported coefficients are the mean of coefficient estimates across 
individual regressions. The adjusted R2 (number of observations) is the mean of adjusted R2 (number of 
observations) across individual regressions. 
 
Panel B is the tabular presentation of Figure 4, and reports the average of quarterly abnormal current 
accruals, adjusted for performance (Kothari et al. 2005), in the following quarters: (1) quarter −3, −2, and 
−1 before the ASR initiation date; (2) the first quarter of the ASR contract period; (3) the second quarter to 
the last quarter of the ASR contract period; (4) quarter +1, +2, and +3 after the ASR completion date. 
Because the contract period of the ASR sample varies from 0 to 3 quarters, the “quarter +2 to last” period 
may include up to 2 quarters for an ASR. *, **, and *** indicate two-tail significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, 









Note: Figure 4 presents the average of quarterly abnormal current accruals, adjusted for performance 
(Kothari et al. 2005), in the following quarters: (1) quarter −3, −2, and −1 before the ASR initiation date; 
(2) the first quarter of the ASR contract period; (3) the second quarter up to the last quarter of the ASR 
contract period; (4) quarter +1, +2, and +3 after the ASR completion date. Because the contract period of 
the ASR sample varies from 0 to 3 quarters, the “+2 to last” period may include up to 2 quarters for an 
ASR. 
 
Quarterly abnormal current accruals are residuals from the following model: 
𝐶𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑖
4
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽5(∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 
where i is the ASR firm index. 𝛽0–𝛽5 are estimated using all firms in COMPUSTAT for each calendar 
quarter and Fama-French 48 industry. CA is current accruals (the difference between quarterly income 
before extraordinary items and quarterly operating cash flows less depreciation and amortization expense). 
Qj is a dummy variable that equals 1 for fiscal quarter j, and 0 otherwise. ΔSALE (ΔAR) is the quarterly 
change in sales (accounts receivable). All variables, including fiscal quarter dummy variables, are scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of the quarter. The estimated quarterly abnormal current accruals are 
adjusted for performance following Kothari et al. (2005). 
 
4.3.5 Results of Testing Hypotheses 1–2 
The time-series pattern of weekly abnormal negative news and quarterly abnormal accruals 
shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2. Now I use the multivariate 




Table 5 reports the results of the test of Hypothesis 1 with Equation (4). The coefficient on 
NMPRE1 is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the abnormal negative news during 
week −5 to week −1 is higher than that during week −10 to week −6. In addition, the value of the 
coefficient on NMPRE1 is much greater than the value of the intercept, indicating that the increase 
in the abnormal negative news during week −5 to week −1 is statistically significant in magnitude. 
The coefficient on NMDUR1 is negative, indicating the abnormal negative news during the first 
five weeks of the ASR contract period is lower than that during week −10 to week −6. However, 
the coefficient on NMDUR1 is only marginally significant in a one-tail test. The p-values of 
coefficients on NMDUR2 and NMPOST indicate that the abnormal negative news during other 
weeks of the ASR contract period and the post-ASR period is not significantly different from that 
during week −10 to week −6. In sum, the regression results provide evidence that managers 
increase the negative news coverage prior to an ASR. 
Table 5: News Management Prior to ASRs 
 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.012 0.001 
NMPRE1 + 0.270 0.005 
NMDUR1  -0.089 0.283 
NMDUR2  0.038 0.627 
NMPOST  0.019 0.796 
Firm fixed effect  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.106  
N  13,515  
 
Note: Table 5 reports the results of the following regression using data from week −10 before the ASR 
initiation date through week +10 after the ASR completion date:  
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the week index. NM is abnormal negative news in week t. Higher 
values of NM represent more price-deflating news management. NMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if week t falls in the period from week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. 
NMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t falls in the first 5 weeks of the ASR contract period, 
and 0 otherwise. NMDUR2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t falls in the period from the 6th week 
to the last week of the ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. NMPOST is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if week t falls in the period from week +1 to week +10 after the ASR completion date. Firm and year fixed 




firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. 
p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail otherwise. 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the test of Hypothesis 2 with Equation (5). The coefficient on 
EMPRE1 is positive, suggesting an increase in abnormal negative accruals in quarter −1 versus 
quarter −3 and −2. In addition, the value of the coefficient on EMPRE1 indicates that such increase 
is large in magnitude, although the coefficient on EMPRE1 is only marginally significant in a one-
tail test. Thus, it provides limited evidence that managers use negative current accruals to deflate 
earnings prior to an ASR. The p-values of coefficients on EMDUR1, EMDUR2 and EMPOST 
indicate that abnormal accruals during the quarters within the ASR contract period and post-ASR 
period are not significantly different from those in quarter −3 and −2. 
Table 6: Earnings Management Prior to ASRs 
 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.192 0.000 
EMPRE1 + 0.236 0.091 
EMDUR1  -0.024 0.906 
EMDUR2  0.198 0.499 
EMPOST  -0.055 0.733 
Firm fixed effect  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.208  
N  2,485  
 
Note: Table 6 reports the results of the following regression using data from quarter −3 before the ASR 
initiation date through quarter +3 after the ASR completion date:  
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the quarter index. EM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in 
quarter t, multiplied by −1. Higher values of EM represent more downward accrual-based earnings 
management. EMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter −1 before the ASR initiation 
date, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is the first quarter during the 
ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is any other 
quarter than the first one during the ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMPOST is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter +1, +2, or +3 after the ASR completion date. Firm and year fixed effects 
are included and White standard errors adjusted to account for the possible correlation within the firm 
cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. 




Chapter 5  
The Association between ASR Motivations and Pre-ASR 
News/Earnings Management 
5.1 Hypothesis Development (Hypotheses 3–4) 
Firms can use ASRs and OMRs alternatively to achieve certain goals of share repurchase 
programs. On one hand, firms prefer ASRs to OMRs because those goals can be better met with 
rapid completion and enhanced credibility. On the other hand, the particular goal of an ASR also 
can influence whether and how a firm attempts to deflate stock prices prior to the ASR. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss five commonly cited motivations for share repurchase programs: (1) 
signal undervaluation; (2) return capital to shareholders to reduce agency costs; (3) improve capital 
structure; (4) increase EPS; and (5) defend against takeover threats. I group the first and the last as 
price-boosting motivations because the goal of the planned share repurchases is to increase the 
repurchasing firm’s stock price, thereby conveying managers’ private information about the firm’s 
good prospect to the market or deterring potential unfriendly buyers. Because the initial goals of 
these share repurchase programs are inconsistent with deflating stock prices in the first place, I 
posit that news management and earnings management are less likely prior to an ASR motivated 
by undervaluation concerns and takeover defense. In addition, news management and earnings 
management are expected to have different consequences on EPS. Specifically, news management 
can deflate stock prices without hurting EPS, while downward earnings management will deflate 
both stock prices and EPS. Therefore, I posit that earnings management is less likely prior to an 
ASR motivated by increasing EPS, but such motivation should not mute news management 




H3: Managers use less news management and earnings management prior to an ASR to 
deflate stock prices if the ASR is motivated by signaling undervaluation and 
defending against takeover threats. 
H4: Managers use less earnings management prior to an ASR to deflate stock prices if the 
ASR is motivated by increasing EPS. 
5.2 Research Design 
5.2.1 Identification of Motivations for ASRs 
Motivations for ASRs are not directly observable. I review 104 press releases concerning 
share repurchase programs or ASRs. Although some firms state motivations for their upcoming 
ASRs, I find that most of them use boilerplate language such as “create shareholder value” and 
may not reveal their real intent. Therefore, I follow prior literature to use the following variables 
to make an inference about the motivation for an ASR. Those variables, unless otherwise stated, 
are measured at the end of quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date. 
5.2.1.1 Signal Undervaluation 
If a firm is undervalued prior to an ASR, I expect that the firm likely conducts the ASR to 
signal undervaluation. I use the firm-specific misvaluation measure in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, 
and Viswanathan (2005) as the measure of undervaluation. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) emphasize 
the difference between industry-wide and firm-specific misvaluation by decomposing the market-
to-book ratio into three components: firm-specific misvaluation, industry-wide misvaluation and 
long-term value-to-book ratio. The firm-specific misvaluation is the error that arises when the firm-
specific market value deviates from the value derived from the contemporaneous industry-wide 
multiples. It measures the over- or under-valuation of a firm relative to its industry peers and 




industry. The firm-specific misvaluation is more relevant for signaling undervaluation, because a 
firm may not be urged to combat undervaluation if the undervaluation is common for the entire 
industry.25 The industry-wide misvaluation is the error that arises when the contemporaneous 
industry-wide multiples deviate from the long-run steady industry-wide multiples. This captures 
the concept that the industry could be overheated, and thus firms in the industry could share a 
common misvaluation component. The last component is the ratio of the value derived from the 
long-run steady industry-wide multiples and the book value. It is the true value-to-book ratio 
implied by long-run growth opportunities and is supposedly the error-free market-to-book ratio if 
the firm is perfectly valued. 
For each calendar quarter and Fama-French 48 industry, I regress the firm-level market 
value on firms’ fundamentals using all firms in COMPUSTAT. The regression rests on the 
valuation model that expresses the market value as a linear function of the book value and the net 
income (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 2001): 
𝑀𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (6) 
where i is the firm index, MV is the market value, BV is the book value, and NI is the net income. 
To account for the right-skewness in accounting data, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) suggest using a 
logarithm transformation: 
ln (𝑀𝑉𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝐵𝑉𝑖) + 𝛽2ln (|𝑁𝐼𝑖|) + 𝛽3𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖 × ln(|𝑁𝐼𝑖|) + 𝜀𝑖 (7) 
where |NI| is the absolute value of net income and NEG is a dummy variable that equals one if net 
income is negative, and zero otherwise. The residual from each regression, MISVAL, stands for the 
                                                 
25 Other features of the firm-specific misvaluation are noteworthy: (1) it is easy to estimate, since it does 
not require particular assumptions and forward-looking financial statement data as in the residual income 
model (e.g., D’Mello and Shroff 2000; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 2006); and (2) it is based 
on a vector of multiples rather than on a single multiple (e.g., price-to-sales in Chemmanur et al. (2010)) 




firm-specific misvaluation. A negative MISVAL at the fiscal quarter before an ASR suggests that a 
firm is undervalued relative to its industry peers before the ASR. The more negative MISVAL is, 
the more the firm is undervalued relative to its industry peers. 
5.2.1.2 Return Capital to Shareholders 
Agency theory predicts that a firm likely conducts an ASR to return capital to shareholders 
if the firm has large free cash flows and faces declining investment opportunities prior to the ASR 
(Dittmar 2000; Grullon and Ikenberry 2000). I calculate operating cash flows scaled by total assets 
(OCF) and market-to-book ratio (MB) of each ASR firm at the fiscal quarter before an ASR. 
Operating cash flows are used as a proxy for free cash flows, and market-to-book ratios are used 
as a proxy for investment opportunities in prior research (e.g., Collins and Kothari 1989). 
OCFDIFF is the firm-specific operating cash flows (scaled by total assets) minus the industry 
median operating cash flows (scaled by total assets). MBDIFF is the firm-specific market-to-book 
ratio minus the industry median market-to-book ratio. If an ASR firm has higher operating cash 
flows and a lower market-to-book ratio at the fiscal quarter before the ASR (i.e., OCFDIFF > 0 
and MBDIFF < 0), I expect that return of capital is the motivation for the ASR. 
5.2.1.3 Improve Capital Structure 
The further a firm is below its targeted leverage ratio prior to an ASR, the more likely 
capital structure adjustment is to be the motivation for the ASR. To model the targeted leverage 
ratio, I follow Flannery and Rangan (2006) and run the pooled cross-sectional regression of actual 
leverage ratios on a set of firm characteristics using quarterly data of all non-financial firms in 
COMPUSTAT during the sample period: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅&𝐷𝑖 






where i is the firm index. LEV is the actual leverage ratio (the sum of long-term debt and debt in 
current liabilities, divided by the sum of long-term debt, debt in current liabilities and market value 
of equity). EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes. MB is market-to-book ratio. DEPN is 
depreciation expense. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. PPE is net property, plant and 
equipment. R&D is research and development expense. R&D_DUM is a dummy variable equal to 
one for firms with missing RD. LIML is the lagged median leverage ratio of the same Fama-French 
48 industry. RATED is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a public debt rating, and zero 
otherwise. All variables, except SIZE and those expressed as a ratio or dummy variable, are scaled 
by total assets. I include firm fixed effects to account for relatively stable, unobserved factors that 
affect the targeted leverage ratio. The residual from the regression, LEV_DIFF, stands for the 
distance between the actual leverage ratio and the targeted one. A negative LEV_DIFF at the fiscal 
quarter before an ASR suggests that the actual leverage ratio is below the targeted leverage ratio 
before the ASR. The more negative LEV_DIFF is, the further the actual leverage ratio is below its 
targeted leverage ratio. 
5.2.1.4 Increase EPS 
Following Marquardt et al. (2009) and Chemmanur et al. (2010), I assume that an ASRs is 
likely motivated by the desire to increase EPS if top executives’ bonus is directly tie to EPS. I 
review the executive compensation section in the latest definitive proxy statement filed by each 
ASR firm before an ASR. I define EPSBONUS as a dummy variable that equals one if the section 
reveals that top executives’ bonus is directly tied to EPS, and zero otherwise. 
5.2.1.5 Defend Against Takeover Threats 
Akyol et al. (2014) examine whether a firm is the target of a takeover rumor during the 12-




for takeover rumors using Capital IQ’s “Key Development–Potential Transactions and M&A 
Rumors and Discussions” screening function. I define TAKEOVER as a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firms appear in this database during the preceding 12 months, and zero otherwise. 
5.2.2 Regression Models for Testing Hypotheses 3–4 
I classify the sample of ASRs into three categories: (1) ASRs that have price-boosting 
motivations, that is, signaling undervaluation and defending against takeover threats; (2) ASRs 
that have the motivation of increasing EPS; and (3) all other ASRs. I make the classification based 
on motivation variables described in Section 5.2.1. To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, I use the following 
regression models: 
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛼6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼7𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼9𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼11𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼13𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼14𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(9) 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡  
= 1 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽11𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(10) 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the week/quarter index. PRICEUP is a dummy variable that 




takeover threats, and zero otherwise. EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that equals one if the ASR 
is likely to be motivated by increasing EPS, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined the 
same as in Equation (4) and Equation (5). I include firm and year fixed effects and control for 
heteroskedasticity. If managers use news management and earnings management to a less extent 
prior to an ASR motivated by signaling undervaluation and defending against takeover threats as 
predicted by Hypothesis 3, I should expect α1 > 0, α7 < 0, β1 > 0 and β7 < 0 in Equation (9) and 
Equation (10). If managers use earnings management to a less extent prior to an ASR motivated 
by increasing EPS as predicted by Hypothesis 4, I should expect β1 > 0 and β11 < 0 in Equation 
(10), but there exists no similar pattern for α1 and α11 in Equation (9). 
5.3 Empirical Analysis 
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Motivation Variables 
Table 7 Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the variables that are used to infer 
motivations for an ASR. MISVAL is the firm-specific misvaluation derived from the model 
developed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Interestingly, descriptive statistics show that the average 
ASR firm is not undervalued relative to its industry peers, inconsistent with the popular belief that 
a repurchase program is used to signal undervaluation. OCFDIFF (MBDIFF) is the distance 
between an ASR firm’s operating cash flows (market-to-book ratio) and the industry median. On 
average, ASR firms generate higher operating cash flows than their industry peers, indicating ASR 
firms may have more available cash. As agency theory predicts that firms with positive OCFDIFF 
and negative MBDIFF use share repurchases to return capital to shareholders, I define 
RETURNCASH as a dummy variable that equals one if OCFDIFF > 0 and MBDIFF < 0, and zero 
otherwise. LEVDIFF is the difference between the actual leverage ratio and the targeted leverage 




targeted level, perhaps consistent with ASRs being motivated by the desire to increase leverage 
ratios. I define HIGHLEV as a dummy variable that equals one if LEVDIFF > 0, and zero otherwise. 
Descriptive statistics also show that 30.1 percent ASR firms have top executives’ bonus tied with 
the EPS metric, and 12.3 percent ASR firms are rumored to be a takeover target within 12 months 
prior to ASRs. 
Table 7 Panel A indicates that the sum of the mean of motivation variables are greater than 
one, suggesting that those motivations may coexist. This is consistent with the observation in 
reviewing the actual announcements of share repurchase programs. Table 7 Panel B reports 
correlations of the five motivation variables. UNDERVAL is positively and significantly correlated 
with RETURNCASH, perhaps because firms with declining investment opportunities are more 
likely to be undervalued by the market. 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Motivation Variables 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Motivation Variables 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. P5 P95 
MISVAL 348 0.110 0.068 0.373 -0.422 0.796 
OCFDIFF 363 0.025 0.015 0.040 -0.020 0.111 
MBDIFF 363 0.260 0.070 0.954 -0.837 2.118 
LEVDIFF 362 -0.014 -0.006 0.069 -0.115 0.094 
UNDERVAL 348 0.397 0 0.490 0 1 
HIGHCASH 363 0.339 0 0.474 0 1 
HIGHLEV 365 0.449 0 0.498 0 1 
EPSBONUS 365 0.301 0 0.459 0 1 
TAKEOVER 365 0.123 0 0.329 0 1 
 
Panel B: Correlations of Motivation Variables 
 UNDERVAL HIGHCASH HIGHLEV EPSBONUS TAKEOVER 
UNDERVAL 1.000***     
HIGHCASH 0.419*** 1.000***    
HIGHLEV 0.061*** 0.138*** 1.000   
EPSBONUS 0.005*** -0.016*** -0.065 1.000* 
 
TAKEOVER 0.027*** -0.004*** 0.013 -0.101* 1.000 
 
Note: Table 7 Panel A reports descriptive statistics of variables that are used to proxy for motivations of 






Motivation Variable Definition 
Signal undervaluation If the ASR firm is undervalued relative to its industry peers (based on the 
Fama-French 48 industry classification) before an ASR, the ASR is likely to 
be motivated by signaling undervaluation. MISVAL is the firm-specific 
misvaluation derived from Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) model. A negative 
MISVAL suggests that the firm is undervalued relative to its industry peers. 
UNDERVAL is a dummy variable that equals 1 if MISVAL < 0, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Return capital to 
shareholders 
If the ASR firm has higher operating cash flows and less investment 
opportunities than its industry peers before an ASR, the ASR is likely to be 
motivated by return of capital to shareholders. OCFDIFF is the distance 
between the firm-specific operating cash flows (scaled by total assets) and the 
industry median operating cash flows (scaled by total assets). A positive 
OCFDIFF suggests that the firm has higher operating cash flows than its 
industry peers. MBDIFF is the distance between the firm-specific market-to-
book ratio (a proxy for investment opportunities) and the industry median 
market-to-book ratio. A negative MBDIFF suggests that the firm has less 
investment opportunities than its industry peers. HIGHCASH is a dummy 




If the ASR firm has a higher than target leverage ratio before an ASR, the ASR 
is likely to be motivated by the desire to reduce the leverage ratio to the optimal 
level. LEVDIFF is the distance between the actual leverage ratio and the target 
leverage ratio. The target leverage ratio is estimated from Flannery and 
Rangan’s (2006). A positive LEVDIFF suggests that the firm has a higher than 
target leverage ratio. HIGHLEV is a dummy variable that equals 1 if LEVDIFF 
> 0, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Increase EPS If bonuses of top executives are directly tie to EPS, the ASR is likely to be 
motivated by the desire to increase EPS. EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the latest definitive proxy statement before the ASR indicates that 




If the ASR firm faces takeover threats before an ASR, the ASR is likely to be 
motivated by takeover defense. TAKEOVER is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
firm is the target of takeover rumors during the 12-month period before the 
ASR, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel B reports correlations of motivation variables. *, **, and *** indicate two-tail significance levels of 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
5.3.2 Results of Testing Hypothesis 3–4 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 examine whether news management and earnings management vary 
with motivations for ASRs in the predicted manner. I first report the results of the univariate 




using each inferred motivation as the partitioning variable. Since the results reported in Table 5 
and Table 6 provides evidence of news management over the period from week −5 to week −1 and 
earnings management in quarter −1, I measure the firm-specific pre-ASR news management at the 
average weekly abnormal negative news over the period from week −5 to week −1 (denoted as 
PRENM), and measure the firm-specific pre-ASR earnings management at abnormal current 
accruals in quarter −1 (multiplied by −1 and denoted as PREEM). Higher values of PRENM and 
PREEM represent more price-deflating news management and earnings management prior to 
ASRs. In Table 8 Panel A, I partition the sample into 138 ASRs that are most likely motivated by 
signaling undervaluation and 210 ASRs that are not. The results show that both PRENM and 
PREEM are significantly positive in the non-undervalued subsample but are insignificant in the 
undervalued subsample, consistent with Hypothesis 3 that firms use less news management and 
earnings management prior to ASRs when undervaluation is the concern to begin with. Similarly, 
Table 8 Panel E partitions the sample into 45 ASRs that are most likely motivated by takeover 
defense and 320 that are not. The results are also consistent with Hypothesis 3 that managers use 
less news management and earnings management prior to ASRs when takeover threat is the 
concern to begin with. For ASRs that are most likely motivated by the desire to increase EPS, the 
results in Table 8 Panel D show that PRENM is significantly positive while PREEM is 
indistinguishable from zero, perhaps because only news management allows managers to deflate 
stock prices in a manner that will not hurt EPS. In contrast, for ASRs that are not likely motivated 
by the desire to increase EPS, both PRENM and PREEM are significantly positive. This is not 
surprising since both news management and earnings management have no undesired effect in this 
context. The results reported in Table 8 Panel D provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 4 that 




first place, and suggest that firms weigh alternative available price-deflating tools and select the 
one that serves their purpose best. Lastly, for completeness, I also report the results of sample 
partition based on the return of capital motivation and the capital structure improvement 
motivation, although I have no priori predictions on these partition schemes. 
Table 8: News/Earnings Management Prior to ASRs under Various Motivations 
 
Panel A: Signal Undervaluation 
 UNDERVAL = 1 UNDERVAL = 0 
 Mean p-value N Mean p-value N 
PRENM 0.0013 0.347 138 0.0043 0.008 210 
PREEM 0.0019 0.650 138 0.0071 0.000 210 
 
Panel B: Return Capital to Shareholders 
 HIGHCASH = 1 HIGHCASH = 0 
 Mean p-value N Mean p-value N 
PRENM 0.0021 0.270 123 0.0034 0.010 240 
PREEM 0.0128 0.007 123 0.0009 0.591 240 
 
Panel C: Improve Capital Structure 
 HIGHLEV = 1 HIGHLEV = 0 
 Mean p-value N Mean p-value N 
PRENM 0.0031 0.091 163 0.0029 0.027 200 
PREEM 0.0078 0.011 163 0.0029 0.272 200 
 
Panel D: Increase EPS 
 EPSBONUS = 1 EPSBONUS = 0 
 Mean p-value N Mean p-value N 
PRENM 0.0025 0.070 110 0.0034 0.015 255 
PREEM 0.0016 0.541 110 0.0067 0.012 255 
 
Panel E: Defend against Takeover 
 TAKEOVER = 1 TAKEOVER = 0 
 Mean p-value N Mean p-value N 
PRENM 0.0021 0.452 45 0.0032 0.006 320 
PREEM 0.0018 0.849 45 0.0056 0.002 320 
 
Note: Table 8 reports the univariate analysis of cross-sectional variation in pre-ASR news management and 
earnings management under various motivations. PRENM is the average weekly abnormal negative news 
from week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation date. PREEM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in 
quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date (multiplied by −1). Higher values of PRENM and PREEM 
represent more price-deflating news management and earnings management prior to ASRs. UNDERVAL is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm-specific misvaluation derived from Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) 
model is negative, and 0 otherwise. HIGHCASH is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has higher 




the industry median. HIGHLEV is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the actual leverage ratio is greater than 
the target leverage ratio. The target leverage ratio is estimated from Flannery and Rangan’s (2006) model. 
EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bonuses of top executives are directly tied to EPS, and 0 
otherwise. TAKEOVER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is the target of takeover rumors during 
the 12-month period before the ASR, and 0 otherwise. All variables, unless stated otherwise, are measured 
at the end of quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date. Two-tail p-values are reported. 
 
In addition to the univariate analysis, I use the multivariate regression models in Equation 
(9) and Equation (10) to test Hypothesis 3 and 4. Table 9 reports the results of the effects of various 
motivations on news management. Like the results reported in Table 5, the coefficient on NMPRE1 
is significantly positive, and the value of the coefficient on NMPRE1 is much greater than the value 
of the intercept, providing evidence of a large magnitude of news management during week −5 to 
week −1. In addition, after I separate out ASRs that are motivated by undervaluation concerns and 
takeover defense (i.e., price-boosting motivations) or by the desire to increase EPS, the coefficient 
on NMPRE1 is almost doubled compared to the same coefficient in Table 5 (both coefficients have 
a p-value less than 0.01), indicating a stronger evidence of news management for the remaining 
ASRs. The coefficient on NMPRE1×PRICEUP is significantly negative, suggesting that news 
management is reduced during week −5 to week −1 if the ASR is motivated by undervaluation 
concerns and takeover defense. The further F-test indicates that the sum of the coefficients on 
NMPRE1 and NMPRE1×PRICEUP is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that there 
appears to be no news management for ASRs that are motivated by undervaluation concerns and 





Table 9: News Management Prior to ASRs under Various Motivations 
 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.064 0.002 
NMPRE1 + 0.481 0.007 
NMDUR1  -0.019 0.893 
NMDUR2  -0.047 0.689 
NMPOST  0.061 0.596 
PRICEUP  0.034 0.821 
EPSBONUS  -0.196 0.266 
NMPRE1×PRICEUP − -0.426 0.013 
NMDUR1×PRICEUP  -0.104 0.536 
NMDUR2×PRICEUP  -0.088 0.598 
NMPOST×PRICEUP  -0.199 0.117 
NMPRE1×EPSBONUS  -0.071 0.716 
NMDUR1×EPSBONUS  -0.083 0.640 
NMDUR2×EPSBONUS  0.040 0.415 
NMPOST×EPSBONUS  0.143 0.301 
Firm fixed effect  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.108  
N  13,515  
F-test    
PRE1 + PRE1×PRICEUP = 0  F = 0.22 0.638 
 
Note: Table 9 reports the results of the following regression using data from week −10 before the ASR 
initiation date through week +10 after the ASR completion date:  
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛼6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼7𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼9𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼11𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼13𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼14𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the week index. NM is abnormal negative news in week t. Higher 
values of NM represent more price-deflating news management. NMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if week t falls in the period from week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. 
NMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t falls in the first 5 weeks of the ASR contract period, 
and 0 otherwise. NMDUR2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t falls in the period from the 6th week 
to the last week of the ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. NMPOST is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if week t falls in the period from week +1 to week +10 after the ASR completion date. PRICEUP is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the ASR is likely to be motivated by the desire to increase stock prices 
(either signaling undervaluation or defending against takeover). EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the ASR is likely to be motivated by the desire to increase EPS, that is, bonuses of top executives 
are directly tie with EPS. Firm and year fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to 
account for the possible correlation within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted 





Table 10 reports the result of the effects of different motivations on earnings management. 
Like the results reported in Table 6, the coefficient on EMPRE1 is significantly positive, providing 
evidence of earnings management in quarter −1. In addition, Table 10 shows an increase in both 
magnitude and significance level of the coefficient on EMPRE1, after I separate out ASRs that are 
motivated by undervaluation concerns and takeover defense (i.e., price-boosting motivations) or 
by the desire to increase EPS, indicating stronger evidence of accrual-based earnings management 
for the remaining ASRs. The coefficient on EMPRE1×PRICEUP is negative, consistent with the 
conjecture that managers are less likely to use earnings management before an ASR with price-
boosting motivations, although the coefficient on EMPRE1×PRICEUP is not statistically 
significant. The coefficient on EMPRE1×EPSBONUS is significantly negative, consistent with the 
conjecture that managers are less likely to use downward earnings management prior to an ASR 
motivated by the desire to increase EPS, since downward earnings management would have an 
undesired consequence. Using the F-test, I find that neither the sum of the coefficients on EMPRE1 
and EMPRE1×PRICEUP nor the sum of the coefficients on EMPRE1 and EMPRE1×EPSBONUS 
is statistically different from zero. Thus, there appears to be no earnings management for ASRs 
that are motivated by undervaluation concerns and takeover defense or by the desire to increase 
EPS. Given that only the coefficient on EMPRE1×EPSBONUS is significantly negative, the 
muting effect of the EPS-boosting motivation on downward earnings management appears to be 
stronger. In sum, the empirical results presented in Table 9 and Table 10 largely provide support 





Table 10: Earnings Management Prior to ASRs under Various Motivations 
 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.154 0.000 
EMPRE1 + 0.521 0.014 
EMDUR1  -0.186 0.559 
EMDUR2  -0.032 0.928 
EMPOST  0.003 0.988 
PRICEUP  0.038 0.892 
EPSBONUS  0.057 0.866 
EMPRE1×PRICEUP − -0.296 0.255 
EMDUR1×PRICEUP  -0.130 0.759 
EMDUR2× PRICEUP  0.555 0.382 
EMPOST×PRICEUP  0.021 0.934 
EMPRE1×EPSBONUS − -0.466 0.072 
EMDUR1×EPSBONUS  0.068 0.767 
EMDUR2×EPSBONUS  -0.082 0.911 
EMPOST×EPSBONUS  -0.207 0.399 
Firm fixed effect  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.211  
N  2,485  
F-test    
PRE1 + PRE1×PRICEUP = 0  F = 0.25 0.619 
PRE1 + PRE1×EPSBONUS = 0  F = 0.02 0.879 
 
Note: Table 10 reports the results of the following regression using data from quarter −3 before the ASR 
initiation date through quarter +3 after the ASR completion date:  
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽11𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the quarter index. EM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in 
quarter t, multiplied by −1. Higher values of EM represent more downward accrual-based earnings 
management. EMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter −1 before the ASR initiation 
date, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is the first quarter during the 
ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is any other 
quarter than the first one during the ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMPOST is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter +1, +2, or +3 after the ASR completion date. PRICEUP is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the ASR is likely to be motivated by the desire to increase stock prices (either 
signaling undervaluation or defending against takeover). EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the ASR is likely to be motivated by the desire to increase EPS, that is, bonuses of top executives are 
directly tie with EPS. Firm and year fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to account 
for the possible correlation within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied 





Chapter 6  
The Association between Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management and 
Operating/Stock Price Performance 
6.1 The Association between Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management and Pre-ASR 
Stock Price Performance 
6.1.1 Hypothesis Development (Hypothesis 5) 
If managers deflate stock prices successfully prior to ASRs through news management and 
earnings management, I should expect a negative association between pre-ASR news/earnings 
management and pre-ASR stock price performance. This section examines the efficacy of pre-
ASR news management and earnings management. Note, however, that a necessary condition for 
managers to take actions to deflate stock prices is merely their belief that these actions can deflate 
stock prices, not necessarily that these actions end up being successful. 
Few prior studies examine the relation between pre-event managers’ behaviors and pre-
event stock price performance, although these studies argue that pre-event managers’ behaviors 
aim at swaying pre-event stock prices in the desired direction (e.g., Brockman et al. 2008; Gong 
et al. 2008). An exception is Coles et al. (2006). They examine earnings management around 
cancellations and subsequent reissues of employee stock options. They find evidence of 
abnormally low accruals in the period following announcements of cancellations of employee 
stock options up to the time the options are reissued with the strike price set at the then-current 
(reissue day) stock price. However, they find that abnormal accruals do not predict stock price 
performance over that period. They argue that investors do not respond to abnormal accruals 




apparent at options cancellation announcements that investors fully anticipate and correct for 
subsequent earnings manipulation. 
Section 2.3 discusses the disclosure requirements for ASRs. Although firms usually 
announce ASRs in a timely manner, investors will not be aware of an upcoming ASR until the ASR 
announcement date that is almost identical to the ASR initiation date. Because the intent of 
managers to deflate stock prices prior to an ASR is not transparent during the pre-ASR period, I 
expect investors to be, at least in part, misled by pre-ASR news management and earnings 
management. Therefore, I expect a negative association between pre-ASR news/earnings 
management and pre-ASR stock price performance. I express my prediction in the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: Pre-ASR stock price performance is negatively associated with pre-ASR news 
management and earnings management. 
6.1.2 Regression Models for Testing Hypothesis 5 
To examine the efficacy of news management and earnings management, I examine 
contemporary stock returns over the period when managers use news management and earnings 
management. Specifically, I examine cumulative abnormal returns from trading day −25 to −3 
prior to ASR announcements. This period, approximately from week −5 to week −1, is consistent 
with the window for detecting news management and the average leading period of the last 
earnings announcement before ASR announcements. I exclude trading day −2 and −1 to avoid the 
possible run-up of stock prices prior to ASR announcements. Abnormal returns are measured at 
the market-adjusted stock returns, that is, raw stock returns minus CRSP index value-weighted 
returns.26 To test Hypothesis 5, I use the following regression models: 
                                                 
26 The empirical results remain qualitatively unchanged if I use the cumulative abnormal returns calculated 




𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (11) 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (12) 
where i is the ASR firm index. PRECAR is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns from 
trading day −25 to −3 prior to ASR announcements. PRENM and PREEM measure the firm-
specific pre-ASR news management and earnings management, respectively. PRENM is the 
average weekly abnormal negative news over the period from week −5 to week −1 before the ASR 
initiation date. PREEM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in quarter −1 before the ASR 
initiation date (multiplied by −1). Higher values of PRENM and PREEM represent more news 
management and earnings management prior to ASRs. I include the following control variables 
suggested by prior literature: SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book-
to-market ratio. OCF is operating cash flows divided by total assets. SIZE, BM and OCF are 
measured at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding trading day −25. PRIORRET is cumulative 
market-adjusted abnormal returns from trading day −70 to −31. SIZE and BM are the most 
commonly used firm characteristics in explaining variation in stock returns (Bessembinder and 
Zhang 2013). Coles et al. (2006) find that operating cash flows are positively associated with pre-
event abnormal returns. PRIORRET is included to control for stock return momentum (Shivakumar 
2000; Kahle 2002; Bargeron et al. 2011; Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko 2012). I include 
Fama-French 12 industry and year fix effects and use White robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. I expect α1 < 0 and β1 < 0 in Equation (11) and Equation (12). 
6.1.3 Results of Testing Hypothesis 5 
Table 11 Panel A indicates that the average cumulative abnormal return over the period 
from trading day −25 to −3 prior to ASR announcements is 0.33 percent but not statistically 
                                                 
252 trading days to 44 trading days before ASR announcements using the CRSP value-weighted return as 




significant at a conventional level. This does not necessarily contradict Hypothesis 5. But if the 
hypothesis holds, firms engaging in more news management and earnings management activities 
should have lower cumulative abnormal returns than firms engaging in less such activities. Table 
11 Panel B compares pre-ASR stock returns for firms with the lowest versus the highest level of 
pre-ASR news management and earnings management. First, I sort ASR firms into quartiles based 
on the firm-specific pre-ASR news management (PRENM) and earnings management (PREEM), 
and calculate pre-ASR cumulative abnormal returns for the lowest quartile versus the highest 
quartile. Table 11 Panel B indicates that ASR firms ranked in the lowest quartile of pre-ASR news 
management (i.e., the least news management) experience 0.89 percent contemporary abnormal 
returns. In contrast, ASR firms ranked in the highest quartile of pre-ASR news management 
experience −0.82 percent contemporary abnormal returns. The difference between the lowest 
versus the highest quartile is 1.71 percent (one-tail p-value = 0.068). In addition, ASR firms ranked 
in the lowest (highest) quartile of pre-ASR earnings management experience 1.26 (−1.73) percent 
contemporary abnormal returns. The difference is 2.99 percent (one-tail p-value = 0.010). The 
results in Table 11 Panel B are consistent with the notion that firms engaging in more news 
management and earnings management activities have lower cumulative abnormal returns than 
firms engaging in less such activities. The results also indicate the economic significance of using 
news management and earnings management prior to ASRs. The highest level of news (earnings) 
management can deflate stock prices by 1.71 (2.99) percent over the five weeks prior to ASRs. 
Similarly, Ahern and Sosyura (2014) find that active news management can raise stock prices 
temporarily by 5.17 percent during the negotiation period (65 days on average) of a fixed exchange 




Table 11 Panel C reports the results of the regressions of pre-ASR contemporary abnormal 
returns on pre-ASR news management and earnings management. After controlling for firm size, 
book-to-market ratio, operating cash flows, and prior stock price performance, the coefficients on 
pre-ASR news management (PRENM) and earnings management (PREEM) are negative and 
statistically significant. The results show a negative association between pre-ASR news/earnings 
management and contemporary stock returns, suggesting that news management and earnings 
management, at least in part, successfully deflate stock prices prior to ASRs, since the market is 
not aware of the upcoming ASR and simply responds to negatives news and negative accruals 
observed during the pre-ASR period. 
Table 11: Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management and Pre-ASR Stock Price Performance 
 
Panel A: Pre-ASR Stock Price Performance 
PRECAR 0.33% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.220 
N 365 
 



















PRECAR 0.89% -0.82% -1.71% 1.26% -1.73% -2.99% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.130 0.163 0.068 0.066 0.038 0.010 
N 91 90  87 86  
 
Panel C: Regression of Pre-ASR Stock Price Performance on Pre-ASR NM and EM 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  -0.034 0.485 -0.013 0.802 
PRENM − -0.534 0.033   
PREEM −   -0.285 0.005 
SIZE  0.003 0.452 0.001 0.928 
BM  0.020 0.280 0.019 0.349 
OCF  0.097 0.499 0.270 0.142 
PRIORRET  -0.005 0.928 -0.010 0.856 
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.112  0.108  





Note: Table 11 Panel A reports the average cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return from trading day 
−25 to −3 before ASR announcements, using the CRSP index value-weighted return as the market return. 
Panel B reports the average cumulative abnormal return from trading day −25 to −3 in the lowest quartile 
versus the highest quartile of pre-ASR news/earnings management, with the lowest quintile representing 
the least pre-ASR news/earnings management. Panel C reports the results of the following regressions: 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index. PRECAR is cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns from trading day 
−25 to −3 prior to ASR announcements. PRENM is the average weekly abnormal negative news from week 
−5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation date. PREEM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in quarter −1 
before the ASR initiation date (multiplied by −1). SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. BM 
is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. OCF is operating cash flows divided by 
total assets. SIZE, BM and OCF are measured at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding trading day −25. 
PRIORRET is cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns from trading day −70 to −31. Fama-French 12 
industry and year fixed effects are included and White robust standard errors are used to control for 
heteroskedasticity. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail otherwise. 
 
6.2 The Association between Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management and ASR 
Announcement Returns 
6.2.1 Hypothesis Development (Hypothesis 6) 
This section investigates whether ASR announcements cause investors to correct for earlier 
news management and earnings management. Shivakumar (2000) examines the similar research 
question around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). He finds evidence of upward accrual-based 
earnings management prior to SEOs. In addition, he finds that pre-SEO abnormal accruals predict 
two-day negative price reaction to SEO announcements. He interprets his findings as investors 
being able to disentangle earlier earnings management activities and undo their effects at SEO 
announcements. 
Due to the disclosure requirements for ASRs discussed in Section 2.3, investors will be 
aware of the upcoming ASR once the firm enters into an ASR contract. The mean (median) days 
between the ASR announcement date and the initiation date are 0.14 (0) days in my sample of 365 
ASRs announced between 2004 and 2013. Given that the announcement of an ASR may alert 




previous valuation once the ASR is announced, and thus react positively to the ASR announcement. 
This argument suggests a positive association between pre-ASR news/earnings management and 
market reaction to ASR announcements. In addition, if the market is completely efficient, the 
valuation adjustment should be completed at the ASR announcement date, and there should be no 
association between pre-ASR news/earnings management and post-ASR stock price performance. 
However, whether investors can disentangle pre-ASR news management and earnings 
management, or whether they can fully correct for them, is an empirical question. Prior studies 
find that investors fail to fully undo the effects of pre-event earnings management at event 
announcements and thus pre-event earnings management is associated with post-event abnormal 
returns (e.g., Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998; Louis 2004). As Gong et al. (2008) suggest, as long 
as investors are uncertain about managers’ incentives, they may not be able to anticipate pre-event 
earnings management and reconstruct unmanaged earnings to correctly adjust the valuation. In the 
ASR setting, one source of such uncertainty may come from the difficulty in telling whether 
managers use an ASR to signal undervaluation or defend against takeover threats. Managers who 
are concerned about undervaluation and takeover threats are less likely to deflate stock prices prior 
to an ASR. Because managers’ real intent is not directly observable, the incentives of managers 
prior to an ASR are not sufficiently apparent to investors, which may prevent investors from 
disentangling earlier news management and earnings management and undoing their effects when 
the ASR is announced. Because of these conflicting arguments, I express my hypothesis in the null 
form and leave it to the subsequent empirical test. 
H6: Market reaction to ASR announcements is not associated with pre-ASR news 




6.2.2 Regression Models for Testing Hypothesis 6 
To examine whether ASR announcements cause investors to correct for pre-ASR news 
management and earnings management, I examine cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns 
from trading day −2 to +2 around the ASR announcements date, using the CRSP value-weighted 
return as the market return.27 To test Hypothesis 6, I use the following regression models: 
𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛼6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛼10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(13) 
𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(14) 
where i is the ASR firm index. ANNCAR is the cumulative abnormal returns over the five days 
around the ASR announcement date. SIZE and BM are defined the same as in Equation (11) and 
Equation (12), and are measured at the end of quarter −1. PRIORRET is the cumulative market-
adjusted abnormal returns over the period from trading day −45 to −6 before ASR announcements. 
To control for ASR characteristics, I include ASR size and motivations variables (see discussion 
in Section 5.2). ASR size (ASRSIZE) is defined as the number of shares to be repurchased divided 
by the number of outstanding shares at the end of quarter −1. MISVAL, OCFDIFF, MBDIFF, 
LEVDIFF, EPSBONUS and TAKEOVER are motivation variables as defined in Section 5.2. I 
include Fama-French 12 industry and year fix effects and use White robust standard errors to 
                                                 
27 Trading day 0 is the ASR announcement date, or the next trading day if the ASR announcement date is 
not a trading day. The empirical results remain qualitatively unchanged if I use the cumulative abnormal 
returns calculated using the standard market model. The parameters of the market model are estimated over 
the period from 252 trading days to 44 trading days before ASR announcements using the CRSP value-




control for heteroskedasticity. If investors correct earlier mispricing at the ASR announcement 
date, I should observe a positive coefficient for both pre-ASR news management and earnings 
management in these regressions. Otherwise, an insignificant coefficient suggests that investors 
fail to adjust the valuation for news management and earnings management prior to an ASR when 
the ASR is announced. 
6.2.3 Results of Testing Hypothesis 6 
Table 12 Panel A reports the average five-day cumulative abnormal return around ASR 
announcements. The average announcement return is 1.44 percent and statistically significant 
(one-tail p-value < 0.001). The result is consistent with prior studies and suggests that ASR 
announcements are value-increasing events. Bargeron et al. (2011) report the average three-day 
announcement return of 1.42 percent for ASRs during the period from 2004 to 2008. Chemmanur 
et al. (2010) calculate announcement returns over the 15-day window (from trading day −7 to 
trading day +7), and report the average announcement return of 2.04 percent for ASRs during the 
period from 2004 to 2007. Bonaimé (2012) report the average five-day announcement return of 
1.93 percent for OMR-only programs for the period 1988–2007, but it declines in recent years and 
is 1.19 percent during the period 2004–2007. 
Table 12 Panel B indicates that the average announcement return is 1.50 percent for ASR 
firms ranked in the lowest quartile of pre-ASR news management, versus 1.31 percent for ASR 
firms ranked in the highest quartile of pre-ASR news management. Both are statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level but the difference between the lowest and the highest quartile is not statistically 
significant. Similarly, ASR firms ranked in the lowest (highest) quartile of pre-ASR earnings 
management experience an announcement return of 1.44 (1.45) percent. The difference is again 




interpretation that investors fail to anticipate earlier news management and earnings management 
and undo their effects at the ASR announcement date. 
Table 12 Panel C reports the results from the regressions of firm-specific announcement 
returns on pre-ASR news management and earnings management. The coefficients on pre-ASR 
news management (PRENM) and earnings management (PREEM) are not statistically significant 
at a conventional level. Again, the insignificant coefficients suggest that investors fail to see 
through earlier news management and earnings management and respond accordingly at the ASR 
announcement date. Consistent with Bargeron et al. (2011), the coefficient on ASRSIZE is positive 
and significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that larger ASRs are associated with higher 
announcement returns. 
Table 12: Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management and ASR Announcement Returns 
 
Panel A: ASR Announcement Returns 
ANNCAR 1.44% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.000 
N 365 
 



















CAR 1.50% 1.31% -0.19% 1.44% 1.45% 0.01% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.002 0.000 0.381 0.001 0.003 0.493 






Panel C: Regression of Announcement Returns on Pre-ASR NM and EM 
  Dep. Var. = NM Dep. Var. = EM 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  -0.006 0.814 0.004 0.877 
PRENM ? -0.113 0.316   
PREEM ?   -0.061 0.363 
SIZE  0.002 0.521 0.001 0.755 
BM  0.008 0.641 0.010 0.557 
PRIORRET  -0.026 0.313 -0.023 0.369 
ASRSIZE  0.247 0.001 0.234 0.002 
MISVAL  0.009 0.276 0.011 0.224 
OCFDIFF  0.033 0.600 0.058 0.422 
MBDIFF  0.002 0.707 0.002 0.735 
LEVDIFF  0.051 0.284 0.046 0.321 
EPSBONUS  -0.006 0.293 -0.006 0.311 
TAKEOVER  -0.019 0.211 -0.019 0.209 
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.111  0.107  
N  345  344  
 
Note: Table 12 Panel A reports the average 5-day cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return from trading 
day −2 to +2 around ASR announcements, using the CRSP index value-weighted return as the market 
return. Panel B reports the average 5-day cumulative abnormal return around ASR announcements in the 
lowest quartile versus the highest quartile of pre-ASR news/earnings management, with the lowest quintile 
representing the least pre-ASR news/earnings management. Panel C reports the results of the following 
regressions: 
𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖
+ 𝛼7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖
+ 𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖
+ 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index. ANNCAR is 5-day cumulative abnormal returns from trading day −2 to +2 
around ASR announcements. PRENM is the average weekly abnormal negative news from week −5 to 
week −1 before the ASR initiation date. PREEM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in quarter −1 before 
the ASR initiation date (multiplied by −1). SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. SIZE and BM are measured at the end of quarter 
−1 before the ASR initiation date. PRIORRET is cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns from trading 
day −45 to −6 before the ASR initiation date. ASRSIZE is the number of shares to be repurchased divided 
by the number of outstanding shares at the end of quarter −1. MISVAL is the firm-specific misvaluation 
derived from Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) model. OCFDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific 
operating cash flows (scaled by total assets) and the industry median. MBDIFF is the difference between 
the firm-specific market-to-book ratio and the industry median. LEVDIFF is the difference between the 
firm-specific leverage ratio and the target leverage ratio derived from Flannery and Ragan’s (2006) model. 
MISVAL, OCFDIFF, MBDIFF, and LEVDIFF are measured at quarter −1. EPSBONUS is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if bonuses of top executives are tied to EPS, and 0 otherwise. TAKEOVER is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the ASR firm is the target of takeover rumors during the 12-month period before 




standard errors are used to control for heteroskedasticity. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is 
predicted and two-tail otherwise. 
 
To further corroborate the interpretation that investors cannot undo the effects of pre-ASR 
news management and earnings management at the ASR announcement date, I analyze earnings 
response coefficients around ASR announcements. If ASR announcements alert investors to the 
increased incentives for managers to use downward earnings management prior to ASRs, I should 
expect investors to react less to unexpected earnings after ASR announcements, because investors 
will perceive post-ASR earnings less value-relevant. In contrast, if investors cannot infer pre-ASR 
earnings management at the ASR announcement date and naively respond to unexpected earnings, 
I should observe no significant change in earnings response coefficients following ASR 
announcements. 
Following Shivakumar (2000), I estimate the earnings response coefficients using a pooled 
regression of earnings announcement returns on unexpected earnings for fiscal quarters from 
quarter −8 to quarter +8 around ASR announcements. 28  Earnings announcement returns are 
measured as the three-day cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements from trading day −1 to +1, using the CRSP index value-weighted return as the 
market return. Unexpected earnings for a particular quarter are measured as the difference between 
the actual EPS and the analysts’ consensus forecast, scaled by the end-of-quarter stock price.29 I 
                                                 
28 The empirical results remain qualitatively unchanged if I instead use fiscal quarters from quarter −4 to 
quarter +4. 
29 The analysts’ consensus forecast of EPS for a particular quarter is defined as the median of analysts’ 
forecasts of that quarter’s EPS issued within 90 days before that quarter’s earnings announcement. The 
measurement of unexpected earnings uses the analysts’ consensus forecast as the expected earnings. In an 
additional robustness check, I use the actual EPS in the same quarter of the previous fiscal year as the 
expected earnings, based on the assumption that EPS follows a seasonal random walk. The empirical results 




also include the logarithm of market value of equity to control for the firm size. Specifically, I use 
the following regression model: 
𝐸𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + +𝛼4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (15) 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the quarter index. EACAR is the three-day earnings 
announcement returns and UE is the unexpected earnings in the released quarterly earnings. POST 
is a dummy variable that equals one if quarter t is after the ASR announcement, and zero otherwise. 
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. I use White robust standard errors to control 
for heteroskedasticity. UE×POST is used to identify any changes in earnings response coefficients 
around ASR announcements. If ASR announcements cause investors to revise their earnings 
response in post-announcement quarters, I should expect α3 < 0; otherwise I should expect α3 to 
be not significantly different from zero. 
Table 13 reports the regression results. Earnings response coefficients in pre-announcement 
quarters are 0.17 and statistically significant (one-tail p-value < 0.001), suggesting that investors 
price unexpected earnings positively in these quarters. The coefficient on UE×POST is not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that earnings response coefficients do not decrease 
significantly in post-announcement quarters. This result is consistent with the interpretation that 
investors fail to infer earlier earnings management at the ASR announcement date and naively 
respond to unexpected earnings in post-announcement quarters. In sum, the empirical results from 
the announcement return analysis and the earnings response coefficient analysis consistently 
suggest that an ASR announcement is not a clear signal for investors to learn about earlier news 
management and earnings management, probably because the real motivation for the ASR is not 




announcement differently. For example, investors probably will not form a unanimous opinion 
about whether the ASR firm is undervalued. 
Table 13: Earnings Response Coefficients around ASR Announcements 
 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value 
Intercept  -0.009 0.353 
UE + 0.170 0.000 
POST  0.001 0.769 
UE×POST ? -0.011 0.726 
SIZE  0.001 0.441 
Adj. R2  0.016  
N  5,565  
 
Note: Table 13 reports earnings response coefficients using the following pooled regression of earnings 
announcement returns on unexpected earnings for fiscal quarters from quarter −8 to quarter +8 around ASR 
announcements: 
𝐸𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + +𝛼4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the quarter index. EACAR is 3-day cumulative market-adjusted 
abnormal returns from trading day −1 to +1 around earnings announcements, using the CRSP index value-
weighted return as the market return. UE is unexpected earnings in released quarterly earnings, defined as 
the difference between the actual EPS of quarter t and analysts’ consensus forecast of EPS for quarter t, 
scaled by the stock price at the end of quarter t. POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is after 
ASR announcements, and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of 
quarter t. White robust standard errors are used to control for heteroskedasticity. p-values are one-tail if the 
sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail otherwise. 
 
6.3 The Association between Pre-ASR Earnings Management and Post-ASR 
Operating Performance 
6.3.1 Hypothesis Development (Hypothesis 7) 
If managers use downward accrual-based earnings management to deflate stock prices 
prior to an ASR, using the reported operating performance prior to the ASR as a benchmark is 
likely to result in an improvement in the post-ASR reported operating performance. Furthermore, 
reversals of pre-ASR negative abnormal accruals in future periods are likely to fuel the post-ASR 
operating performance improvement. The more aggressively managers deflate earnings using 




operating performance there may be following the ASR. I express my prediction in the following 
hypothesis: 
H7: Post-ASR operating performance improvement is positively associated with pre-ASR 
earnings management. 
6.3.2 Measurement of Post-ASR Operating Performance and Regression Model for Testing 
Hypothesis 7 
Following Lie (2005) and Gong et al. (2008), I measure the post-ASR operating 
performance as the performance-matched quarterly return-on-assets (ROA) over one or two years 
after the ASR initiation date. ROA is the income before extraordinary items of a given quarter 
divided by total assets at the beginning of that quarter. I define the performance-matched ROA for 
a given firm as the firm-specific ROA minus the ROA of a matched firm with similar pre-ASR 
operating performance. 
I select matched firms following the procedure used by Lie (2005) and Gong et al. (2008). 
For each ASR firm, I select all non-ASR firms in the same two-digit SIC code with operating 
performance for quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date within ±20 percent or within ±0.01; the 
average of operating performance for quarter −4, −3, −2 and −1 within ±20 percent or within ±0.01; 
and pre-ASR market-to-book ratio within ±20 percent or within ±0.1. If no firm meets these criteria, 
I relax the industry criterion to one-digit SIC code. From all matching firms, I select the firm with 
the smallest sum of absolute values of ROA differences, defined as: 
 |ROAquarter −1, ASR firm − ROAquarter −1, matched firm| 
      + |ROAquarter −4, −3, −2 and −1, ASR firm − ROAquarter −4, −3, −2 and −1, matched firm| 
Untabulated results show that ASR firms and matched firms are similar in terms of pre-




percent (1.53 percent) for ASR firms and 1.88 percent (1.55 percent) for matched firms; the mean 
(median) quarterly ROA for quarter −4, −3, −2 and −1 is 1.87 percent (1.61 percent) for ASR firms 
and 1.83 percent (1.58 percent) for matched firms; and the mean (median) pre-ASR market-to-
book ratio is 3.47 (2.58) for ASR firms and 3.28 (2.40) for matched firms. 
The empirical results in Chapter 4 indicate that ASR firms deflate earnings in quarter −1 
before the ASR initiation date. Because the above matching procedure selects matched firms based 
on the ROA for quarter −1, the ROA of ASR firms includes the portion of managed earnings. This 
approach is consistent with Lie (2005) and Gong et al. (2008), and is appropriate for this research. 
If managers deflate earnings prior to ASRs, ASR firms that have an artificially low ROA are likely 
to be matched with firms that indeed have a low ROA. As a result, when the intentional deflation 
of earnings discontinues after the ASR initiation date, ASR firms will show a greater improvement 
in post-ASR operating performance than matched firms. Therefore, the matching procedure and 
the research design capture the driver of the operating performance improvement as predicted by 
Hypothesis 7. 
To test whether there is a positive association between pre-ASR earnings management and 
post-ASR improvement in operating performance, I use the following regression model: 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(16) 
where i is the ASR firm index. ∆ROA measures the post-ASR improvement in operating 
performance, defined as the average of performance-matched quarterly ROAs over one or two 
years after the ASR initiation date minus the performance-matched ROA in quarter −1. Other 




industry and year fix effects and use White robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. 
I expect β1 > 0 in Equation (16). 
6.3.3 Results of Testing Hypothesis 7 
Table 14 Panel A reports that the average increase in ROA is 0.37 percent for the one-year 
horizon and 0.56 percent for the two-year horizon following ASRs, and both are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level on a one-tail test. Table 14 Panel B indicates that ASR firms ranked in 
the lowest quartile of pre-ASR earnings management experience an increase in ROA by 0.18 
(−0.08) percent over the one-year (two-year) horizon following ASRs. In contrast, ASR firms 
ranked in the highest quartile of pre-ASR earnings management experience an increase in ROA by 
0.83 (0.79) percent over the one-year (two-year) horizon following ASRs. The difference between 
the lowest and the highest quartile is 0.65 (0.87) percent over the one-year (two-year) horizon 
following ASRs and is statistically significant on a one-tail test. The results in Table 14 Panel B 
suggest a positive association between pre-ASR earnings management and post-ASR 
improvement in operating performance for one or two years after the ASR initiation date. 
Table 14 Panel C reports the results from the regression of firm-specific post-ASR 
improvement in operating performance on pre-ASR earnings management. Consistent with my 
expectation, the coefficient on pre-ASR earnings management (PREEM) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level on a one-tail test for both one-year and two-year horizons. 
The results provide further evidence that pre-ASR earnings management predicts the post-ASR 





Table 14: Pre-ASR Earnings Management and Post-ASR Operating Performance 
 
Panel A: Post-ASR Improvement in Operating Performance 
 1 Year 2 Year 
∆ROA 0.37% 0.56% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.006 0.009 
N 365 365 
 
Panel B: Post-ASR Improvement in Operating Performance in Lowest versus Highest Pre-ASR 
EM 



















∆ROA 0.18% 0.83% 0.65% -0.08% 0.79% 0.87% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.209 0.018 0.076 0.368 0.062 0.060 
N 87 86  87 86  
 
Panel C: Regression of Post-ASR Improvement in Operating Performance on Pre-ASR EM 
  1 Year 2 Year 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.027 0.025 0.025 0.052 
PREEM + 0.171 0.044 0.238 0.041 
SIZE  -0.002 0.019 -0.002 0.171 
BM  -0.010 0.287 -0.024 0.030 
OCF  0.018 0.629 0.041 0.441 
PRIORRET  0.009 0.206 0.016 0.122 
ASRSIZE  -0.053 0.313 -0.095 0.154 
MISVAL  -0.001 0.786 -0.005 0.258 
OCFDIFF  0.009 0.679 0.007 0.850 
MBDIFF  0.002 0.487 0.004 0.337 
LEVDIFF  -0.001 0.921 0.004 0.704 
EPSBONUS  0.027 0.025 0.025 0.052 
TAKEOVER  0.171 0.145 0.238 0.142 
Industry fixed effect      
Year fixed effect      
Adj. R2  0.098  0.132  
N  344  344  
 
Note: Table 14 Panel A reports the average improvement in operating performance over 1-year and 2-year 
horizons after the ASR initiation date. The improvement in operating performance is defined as the 
performance-matched quarterly ROA averaged over 1-year or 2-year horizons minus the performance-
matched ROA for quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date. Panel B reports the improvement in operating 
performance over 1-year and 2-year horizons in the lowest quartile versus the highest quartile of pre-ASR 
earnings management, with the lowest quintile representing the least pre-ASR earnings management. Panel 
C reports the results of the following regressions: 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖





where i is the ASR firm index. ∆ROA is the improvement in operating performance over the 1-year or 2-
year horizon. PREEM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in quarter −1 prior to the ASR initiation date 
(multiplied by −1). SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity. SIZE and BM are measured at the end of quarter −1 before the ASR 
initiation date. PRIORRET is cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns from trading day −45 to −6 
before the ASR initiation date. ASRSIZE is the number of shares to be repurchased divided by the number 
of outstanding shares at the end of quarter −1. MISVAL is the firm-specific misvaluation derived from 
Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) model. OCFDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific operating cash 
flows (scaled by total assets) and the industry median. MBDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific 
market-to-book ratio and the industry median. LEVDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific 
leverage ratio and the target leverage ratio derived from Flannery and Ragan’s (2006) model. MISVAL, 
OCFDIFF, MBDIFF and LEVDIFF are measured at quarter −1. EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if bonuses of top executives are tied to EPS, and 0 otherwise. TAKEOVER is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the ASR firm is the target of takeover rumors during the 12-month period before the ASR, 
and 0 otherwise. Fama-French 12 industry and year fixed effects are included and White robust standard 
errors are used to control for heteroskedasticity. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted 
and two-tail otherwise. 
 
6.4 The Association between Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management and Post-ASR 
Stock Price Performance 
6.4.1 Hypothesis Development (Hypothesis 8) 
If the market fails to disentangle pre-ASR news management and earnings management, 
or fails to fully correct for their effects at the ASR announcement date, I should expect a positive 
association between pre-ASR news/earnings management and post-ASR abnormal returns. This is 
because the effects of news management and earnings management will be revealed eventually. 
For example, if the pre-ASR earnings is artificially lowered by downward earnings management, 
an ASR firm will likely surprise the market with a faster than expected earnings growth rate in 
future earnings announcements, leading to positive abnormal returns following the ASR. The 
extent of pre-ASR news management and earnings management should be able to predict the post-
ASR stock price performance. I express my prediction in the following hypothesis: 
H8: Post-ASR stock price performance is positively associated with pre-ASR news 




6.4.2 Measurement of Post-ASR Stock Price Performance and Research Design for Testing 
Hypothesis 8 
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) summarize two methods 
that have been widely used to measure long-term abnormal returns after corporate events. The first 
is the buy-and-hold abnormal return method based on the difference between buy-and-hold returns 
of event firms and buy-and-hold returns of control firms or reference portfolios (e.g., a market 
index). Barber and Lyon (1997) document that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns benchmarked 
to control firms yield well-specified test statistics while the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
benchmarked to reference portfolios yield severely mis-specified test statistics. The second 
approach to measuring long-term abnormal returns is the calendar-time portfolio method that 
focuses on the mean abnormal time series returns of event firm portfolios. Fama (1998) advocates 
the calendar-time portfolio method because it eliminates biases arising from the cross-sectional 
dependence across events. In the existent literature, both the buy-and-hold abnormal return method 
and the calendar-time portfolio method are subject to criticism. In this research, I employ both the 
control-firm buy-and-hold abnormal return method and the calendar-time portfolio method to test 
Hypothesis 8 and assess the consistency of results across these two methods. I do not use the 
reference-portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal return method due to its mis-specified test statistics 
(Barber and Lyon 1997). 
6.4.2.1 Control-Firm Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return Method 
Following Barber and Lyon (1997) and several other studies using the control-firm buy-
and-hold return method (Shivakumar 2000; Louis 2004; Babenko et al. 2012), I calculate the post-
ASR stock price performance as the difference between the raw buy-and-hold return of an ASR 




with a market value of equity between 70 percent and 130 percent of that of the ASR firm. Among 
all matching firms, I choose the firm that has the closest book-to-market ratio to that of the ASR 
firm. All variables for the matching are measured at the end of quarter −3 before the ASR initiation 
date to leave out the effect of pre-ASR stock price deflation. I calculate buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for ASR firms over one-year and two-year horizons, starting the day after the ASR initiation 
date. 
To examine whether there is a positive association between pre-ASR news/earnings 
management and post-ASR stock price performance, I use the following regression models: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛼6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛼10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(17) 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(18) 
where i is the ASR firm index. BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns over one or two years 
following the ASR initiation date.30 Other variables are defined the same as in Equation (13) and 
Equation (14). I include Fama-French 12 industry and year fix effects and use White robust 
standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. If the effects of pre-ASR news management and 
earnings management unfolds eventually, I should expect α1 > 0 and β1 > 0 in Equation (17) and 
Equation (18). 
                                                 
30 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) point out that the duration of the holding period is somewhat arbitrary and 
various holding period horizons are often analyzed in prior literature. I follow this approach and use one-





6.4.2.2 Calendar-Time Portfolio Method 
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) point out that statistical 
inferences are influenced by the choice of return metrics and methodology. Thus, I use the 
calendar-time portfolio method as an alternative to the control-firm buy-and-hold abnormal return 
method. Specifically, for each month, I form an equal-weighted portfolio of all ASR firms that 
have conducted an ASR in the past one or two years. I compute the monthly excess returns of the 
formed portfolios over the risk-free rate, which yields a time series of monthly excess returns.31 
Then I regress the time series of monthly excess returns on the time series of Fama-French three 
factors, namely, the market excess return over the risk-free rate factor, the small-minus-big 
capitalization factor, and the high-minus-low book-to-market factor (Fama and French 1993): 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (19) 
where Rt is the monthly return of an equal-weighted portfolio in month t. This portfolio includes 
all ASR firms that have conducted an ASR in the past one or two years. Rft is the return on one-
month T-bills in month t, representing the risk-free rate. Rmt is the return on a market index in 
month t. SMBt is the difference in the returns of a portfolio of small and big stocks in month t. 
HMLt is the difference in the returns of a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-
to-market stocks in month t. The estimated intercept from this regression is the average monthly 
abnormal return over one or two years following the ASR initiation date. 
Unlike the control-firm buy-and-hold abnormal return method, the calendar-time portfolio 
method generates a single monthly abnormal return (the estimated intercept) that is averaged 
across ASR firms. As a result, I cannot obtain a firm-specific abnormal return metric for a 
                                                 
31 The earliest ASR in my sample commenced in March 2004 and the latest ASR commenced in December 
2013. As a result, the calendar-time portfolio method spans 129 (141) months from March 2004 to 
November 2014 (November 2015) for the one-year (two-year) horizon with the average month containing 




multivariate regression analysis to examine whether there is a positive association between pre-
ASR news/earnings management and post-ASR abnormal. As an alternative, I form quartiles for 
each month by sorting all ASR firms that have conducted an ASR in the past one or two years 
based on pre-ASR news management (PRENM) or earnings management (PREEM). PRENM and 
PREEM are defined as in Equation (11) and Equation (12). The equal-weighted returns are then 
calculated for each month and quartile, and the intercept in Equation (19) is then estimated for 
each quartile using the time series equal-weighted returns (in excess of the risk-free rate). If there 
is a positive association between pre-ASR news/earnings management and post-ASR abnormal 
returns, I should observe a monotonic increase in the estimated intercept from the lowest quartile 
to the highest quartile. For this purpose, I report the estimated intercept for each of the four 
quartiles. 
6.4.3 Results of Testing Hypothesis 8 
6.4.3.1 Results of the Control-Firm Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return Method 
I test if pre-ASR news management and earnings management predicts post-ASR stock 
returns over one-year and two-year horizons after the ASR initiation date. This section presents 
the results using the control-firm buy-and-hold abnormal return method. Table 15 Panel A reports 
a post-ASR buy-and-hold abnormal return of 3.30 percent for the one-year horizon and 14.69 
percent for the two-year horizon, which are both statistically significant and are equivalent to a 
monthly abnormal return of 0.27 percent and 0.57 percent, respectively. Table 15 Panel B indicates 
that ASR firms ranked in the highest quartile of pre-ASR earnings management have superior post-
ASR buy-and-hold abnormal returns to ASR firms ranked in the lowest quartile, that is, 9.69 
percent versus −5.64 percent for the one-year horizon, and 32.11 percent versus −1.29 percent for 




lowest quartiles of pre-ASR earnings management are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
However, I do not find similar results in the highest versus the lowest quartile of pre-ASR news 
management. t-tests indicate that the one-year and two-year return differences between the highest 
and the lowest quartiles of pre-ASR news management are indistinguishable from zero. These 
findings suggest that pre-ASR earnings management, but not pre-ASR news management, has 
power in explaining post-ASR long-term stock returns. 
Table 15 Panel C reports the results from the regressions of firm-specific post-ASR buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (over one or two years) on pre-ASR news management. The 
coefficients on pre-ASR news management (PRENM) are not statistically different from zero, 
suggesting the absence of the positive association between pre-ASR news management and post-
ASR long-term stock returns. Table 15 Panel D reports the results from the regressions of firm-
specific post-ASR buy-and-hold abnormal returns (over one or two years) on pre-ASR earnings 
management. In contrast to the insignificant coefficients on pre-ASR news management (PRENM) 
obtained from the previous regressions, the coefficients on pre-ASR earnings management 
(PREEM) are significantly positive with either one-year or two-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns as the dependent variable. The results suggest that pre-ASR earnings management is 
positively associated with post-ASR long-term stock returns as expected. Again, these results of 
multivariate regressions confirm that pre-ASR earnings management, but not pre-ASR news 
management, can predict post-ASR long-term stock returns. 
Table 15: Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management and Post-ASR Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHAR) 
 
Panel A: Post-ASR BHAR 
 1 Year 2 Year 
BHAR 3.30% 14.69% 
Equivalent monthly return 0.27% 0.57% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.058 0.000 





Panel B: Post-ASR BHAR in Lowest versus Highest Pre-ASR NM and EM 



















BHAR 5.41% 3.72% -1.69% -5.64% 9.69% 15.33% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.081 0.172 0.379 0.045 0.021 0.004 
N 91 90  87 86  
       



















BHAR 18.03% 17.92% -0.11% -1.29% 32.11% 33.40% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.001 0.003 0.495 0.415 0.000 0.000 
N 91 90  87 86  
 
Panel C: Regression of Post-ASR BHAR on Pre-ASR NM 
  1 Year 2 Year 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.025 0.923 0.096 0.807 
PRENM + -0.741 0.251 -0.490 0.386 
SIZE  0.016 0.419 0.027 0.388 
BM  -0.040 0.780 -0.030 0.889 
OCF  0.118 0.602 0.233 0.501 
PRIORRET  -0.020 0.973 0.662 0.460 
ASRSIZE  0.004 0.961 -0.109 0.439 
MISVAL  0.835 0.236 1.206 0.264 
OCFDIFF  -0.040 0.252 -0.015 0.780 
MBDIFF  0.666 0.065 1.582 0.004 
LEVDIFF  0.039 0.454 0.008 0.922 
EPSBONUS  -0.039 0.599 -0.050 0.662 
TAKEOVER  0.025 0.923 0.096 0.807 
Industry fixed effect  Yes    
Year fixed effect  Yes    
Adj. R2  0.067  0.086  






Panel D: Regression of Post-ASR BHAR on Pre-ASR EM 
  1 Year 2 Year 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  -0.019 0.941 -0.021 0.957 
PREEM + 2.249 0.015 4.754 0.002 
SIZE  0.022 0.270 0.042 0.169 
BM  -0.020 0.887 0.001 0.997 
OCF  0.147 0.509 0.292 0.391 
PRIORRET  0.080 0.891 0.869 0.331 
ASRSIZE  -0.075 0.437 -0.263 0.075 
MISVAL  0.320 0.668 0.118 0.918 
OCFDIFF  -0.020 0.560 0.022 0.674 
MBDIFF  0.746 0.037 1.707 0.002 
LEVDIFF  0.042 0.412 0.018 0.816 
EPSBONUS  -0.034 0.644 -0.044 0.695 
TAKEOVER  -0.019 0.941 -0.021 0.957 
Industry fixed effect  Yes    
Year fixed effect  Yes    
Adj. R2  0.083  0.114  
N  344  344  
 
Note: Table 15 Panel A reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 1-year and 2-year horizons 
after the ASR initiation date. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is defined as the raw buy-and-hold return 
of an ASR firm minus the raw buy-and-hold return of a control firm, matched by size and book-to-market 
ratio. The control firm is chosen from all firms with a market value of equity between 70% and 130% of 
that of the ASR firm, and has the closest book-to-market ratio to that of the ASR firm. Size and book-to-
market ratio for the matching are measured at the end of quarter −3 before the ASR initiation date. Panel B 
reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 1-year and 2-year horizons in the lowest quartile 
versus the highest quartile of pre-ASR news/earnings management, with the lowest quintile representing 
the least pre-ASR news/earnings management. Panel C and Panel D reports the results of the following 
regressions, respectively: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖
+ 𝛼7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖
+ 𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index. BHAR is buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 1-year and 2-year horizons 
after the ASR initiation date. PRENM is the average weekly abnormal negative news from week −5 to week 
−1 before the ASR initiation date. PREEM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in quarter −1 before the 
ASR initiation date (multiplied by −1). SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book 
value of equity divided by the market value of equity. SIZE and BM are measured at the end of quarter −1 
before the ASR initiation date. PRIORRET is cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns from trading 
day −45 to −6 before the ASR initiation date. ASRSIZE is the number of shares to be repurchased divided 
by the number of outstanding shares at the end of quarter −1. MISVAL is the firm-specific misvaluation 
derived from Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) model. OCFDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific 
operating cash flows (scaled by total assets) and the industry median. MBDIFF is the difference between 
the firm-specific market-to-book ratio and the industry median. LEVDIFF is the difference between the 
firm-specific leverage ratio and the target leverage ratio derived from Flannery and Ragan’s (2006) model. 




variable that equals 1 if bonuses of top executives are tied to EPS, and 0 otherwise. TAKEOVER is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the ASR firm is the target of takeover rumors during the 12-month period before 
the ASR, and 0 otherwise. Fama-French 12 industry and year fixed effects are included and White robust 
standard errors are used to control for heteroskedasticity. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is 
predicted and two-tail otherwise. 
 
6.4.3.2 Results of the Calendar-Time Portfolio Method 
This section reports the results using the alternative calendar-time portfolio method. Table 
16 Panel A reports a post-ASR monthly calendar-time abnormal return of 0.29 percent (one-tail 
p-value = 0.091) for the one-year horizon and 0.44 percent (one-tail p-value = 0.005) for the two-
year horizon. Compared to the control-firm buy-and-hold abnormal return method, the calendar-
time portfolio method yields a lower average monthly abnormal return for the two-year horizon 
and lower significance levels for both one-year and two-year horizons. Table 16 Panel B reports 
monthly calendar-time abnormal returns for quartiles 1–4 based on pre-ASR news management 
(PRENM). No pattern is discernable across these quartiles and the return difference between the 
highest and the lowest quartiles is not statistically significant. This suggests that pre-ASR news 
management cannot predict post-ASR long-term stock returns. In contrast, Table 16 Panel C shows 
a monotonic increase in the monthly calendar-time abnormal return from the lowest quartile to the 
highest quartile based on pre-ASR earnings management (PREEM) for the two-year horizon. For 
the one-year horizon, the monthly abnormal return is also monotonically increasing up to the third 
quartile. The significance level of estimated abnormal returns is largely improved for the higher 
quartiles for both one-year and two-year horizons. In addition, the difference in monthly abnormal 
returns between the highest and the lowest quartiles is 0.69 percent for the one-year horizon and 
0.68 percent for the two-year horizon (equivalent to a holding return of 8.60 percent for the one-
year horizon and 17.66 percent for the two-year horizon), both of which are significant on a one-




lowest quartile can yield a monthly profit of 0.69 percent or 0.68 percent after controlling for 
Fama-French three risk factors. The findings in Table 16 Panel C are consistent with the conjecture 
that pre-ASR earnings management is positively associated with post-ASR long-term stock returns. 
Table 16: Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management and Post-ASR Calendar-Time Abnormal 
Returns (CTAR) 
 
Panel A: Post-ASR CTAR 
 1 Year 2 Year 
Monthly CTAR 0.29% 0.44% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.091 0.005 
 
Panel B: Post-ASR CTAR for Quartiles Formed Based on Pre-ASR NM 
















Monthly CTAR 0.28 % 0.26% 0.71% 0.12% -0.16% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.210 0.205 0.094 0.369 0.308 
      
















Monthly CTAR 0.50% 0.43% 0.01% 0.58% 0.08% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.020 0.019 0.497 0.014 0.485 
 
Panel C: Post-ASR CTAR of Quartiles Formed Based on Pre-ASR EM 
















Monthly CTAR -0.11% -0.01% 0.67% 0.58% 0.69% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.365 0.499 0.079 0.074 0.061 
      
















Monthly CTAR 0.23% 0.27% 0.36% 0.91% 0.68% 
p-value (one-tail) 0.166 0.123 0.164 0.002 0.049 
 
Note: Table 16 Panel A reports the average calendar-time abnormal returns over 1-year and 2-year horizons 
after the ASR initiation date. The calendar-time abnormal return is the estimated intercept from the 
following Fama-French 3-factor model (Fama and French 1993): 




where Rt is the monthly return of an equal-weighted portfolio in month t. This portfolio includes all ASR 
firms that have conducted an ASR in the past 1 or 2 years. Rft is the return on 1-month T-bills in month t, 
representing the risk-free rate. Rmt is the return on a market index in month t. SMBt is the difference in the 
returns of a portfolio of small and big stocks in month t. HMLt is the difference in the returns of a portfolio 
of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks in month t. White robust standard errors are 
used to control for heteroskedasticity. Panel B reports the calendar-time abnormal returns over 1-year and 
2-year horizons for each quartile that are formed for each month by sorting all ASR firms that have 
conducted an ASR in the past 1 or 2 years based on pre-ASR news management, with the lowest quintile 
representing the least pre-ASR news management. Panel C reports the calendar-time abnormal returns over 
1-year and 2-year horizons for each quartile that are formed for each month by sorting all ASR firms that 
have conducted an ASR in the past 1 or 2 years based on pre-ASR earnings management, with the lowest 
quartile representing the least pre-ASR earnings management. 
 
I note that both the control-firm buy-and-hold abnormal return method and the calendar-
time portfolio method yield similar results. However, the calendar-time portfolio method yields 
smaller abnormal returns and lower significance levels of test statistics. This is consistent with 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) who argue that the calendar-time portfolio method has low power to 
detect long-term abnormal returns. 
6.4.3.3 Further Discussion on the Association between Pre-ASR News Management and Post-
ASR Stock Price Performance 
I hypothesize that post-ASR stock price performance is positively associated with pre-ASR 
news management and earnings management. However, the empirical results presented in Section 
6.4.3.1 and Section 6.4.3.2 show that post-ASR stock price performance is only positively 
associated with pre-ASR earnings management, but not news management. One interpretation is 
that pre-ASR earnings management is reversed in the long term while pre-ASR news management 
is reversed quickly and thus has no long-term effects on post-ASR stock price performance. This 
interpretation appears to be consistent with the patterns shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. In Figure 
3, the pre-ASR news management appears to be reversed in the first five week after the ASR 
initiation date; whereas in Figure 4 I do not observe a quick reversal of pre-ASR earnings 




surprises relative to the earnings expectation based on the deflated pre-ASR earnings will persist 
in the long run (as shown in Section 6.3.3). Because investors naively respond to unexpected 
earnings (as shown in Section 6.2.3), the positive association between pre-ASR earnings 
management and post-ASR stock price performance should exist in the long run. If pre-ASR news 
management is reversed quickly and investors naively respond to post-ASR unexpected positive 
news as they naively respond to post-ASR unexpected earnings, I should expect a positive 
association between pre-ASR news management and post-ASR stock price performance in a short 
window. 
To test this conjecture, I regress the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns during 
the period from trading day +3 to +25 after the ASR initiation date on pre-ASR news management. 
This period coincides with week +1 to week +5 following the ASR initiation date. I exclude trading 
day +1 and +2 to avoid the possible run-up of stock prices in the ASR announcement window. I 
control for other variables in Equation (13) and Equation (14). The evidence of a positive 
coefficient on pre-ASR news management (PRENM) will be consistent with my conjecture. 
Table 17 reports the regression results. As expected, the coefficient on PRENM is 
significantly positive (one-tail p-value = 0.058). I also regress the cumulative market-adjusted 
abnormal returns during the period from trading day +3 to +25 on pre-ASR earnings management 
(PREEM). Untabulated results show an insignificant coefficient on PREEM, further providing 
evidence that the pace of reversals in pre-ASR news management and earnings management 






Table 17: Pre-ASR News Management and Post-ASR 5-Week Stock Price Performance 
 
 Predicted Sign   Coef. p-value 
Intercept    -0.051 0.121 
PRENM +   0.168 0.058 
SIZE    0.004 0.196 
BM    0.026 0.174 
OCF    -0.008 0.828 
PRIORRET    -0.005 0.944 
ASRSIZE    0.004 0.764 
MISVAL    -0.041 0.688 
OCFDIFF    0.001 0.902 
MBDIFF    0.012 0.837 
LEVDIFF    0.015 0.037 
EPSBONUS    0.003 0.761 
TAKEOVER    -0.051 0.121 
Industry fixed effect    Yes  
Year fixed effect    Yes  
Adj. R2    0.091  
N    345  
 
Note: Table 17 reports the results of the regression of cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns from 
trading day +3 to +25 on pre-ASR news management: 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖
+ 𝛼7𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index. POSTCAR is cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns from trading day 
+3 to +25, using the CRSP index value-weighted return as the market return. PRENM is the average weekly 
abnormal negative news from week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation date. SIZE is the logarithm of 
the market value of equity. BM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. SIZE and 
BM are measured at the end of quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date. PRIORRET is cumulative market-
adjusted abnormal returns from trading day −45 to −6 before the ASR initiation date. ASRSIZE is the 
number of shares to be repurchased divided by the number of outstanding shares at the end of quarter −1. 
MISVAL is the firm-specific misvaluation derived from Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) model. OCFDIFF is 
the difference between the firm-specific operating cash flows (scaled by total assets) and the industry 
median. MBDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific market-to-book ratio and the industry median. 
LEVDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific leverage ratio and the targeted leverage ratio derived 
from Flannery and Ragan’s (2006) model. MISVAL, OCFDIFF, MBDIFF, and LEVDIFF are measured at 
quarter −1. EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bonuses of top executives are tied to EPS, and 
0 otherwise. TAKEOVER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ASR firm is the target of takeover rumors 
during the 12-month period before the ASR, and 0 otherwise. Fama-French 12 industry and year fixed 
effects are included and White robust standard errors are used to control for heteroskedasticity. p-values 
are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail otherwise. 
 
The results reported in Table 17 show that the price-deflation effect of news management 




lower repurchase price achieved by news management is not obvious, since the final repurchase 
price is determined by the average price during the contract period. However, the purpose of news 
management and earnings management is two-fold: first, to maximize the main benefit of ASRs, 
namely, immediacy. Bargeron et al. (2008) indicate that immediacy is an important determinant 
for the ASR decision. If firms elect to use ASRs, they should want the shares to be delivered fast; 
second, to minimize the opportunity cost of ASRs. News management may not do very well for 
the second purpose, but it helps to achieve the first purpose. Table 11 Panel B indicates that when 
sorting ASR firms into quartiles based on pre-ASR news management, the top quartile (firms with 
the most news management activities) achieve 1.7% lower abnormal returns prior to ASRs than 
the bottom quartile (i.e., firms with the least news management activities). 
With that said, Table 17 indicates that the price-deflation effect of news management 
persists for five weeks. The average contract period is 126 days. Thus, the price-deflation effect 
covers 28 percent of the entire contract period, which at least in part helps achieve the second 
purpose of reducing the repurchase price. Furthermore, I find support for the idea that firms 
coordinate available tools to best serve their interest in ASRs. News management and earnings 
management can be used together to maximize the benefit and minimize the cost of ASRs, even if 
one tool is better than the other at certain aspect. This research shows that when used collectively, 
news management and earnings management drive down the initial price and the effect is not 
entirely undone at ASR announcements and persist long term into the post-ASR. 
6.4.3.4 Further Discussion on Pre-ASR News Management  
In Section 4.3.5, I find evidence of pre-ASR news management. Specifically, I find that 
negative news in the five weeks before the ASR initiation date is abnormally high. This could be 




window before the ASR initiation date (the shifting hypothesis), or mangers creating negative news 
in the pre-ASR short window (the creating hypothesis). The empirical results thus far are more 
consistent with the shifting hypothesis. 
First, the pattern shown in Figure 3 appears to support the shifting hypothesis. There is a 
run-up of negative news in the five weeks before the ASR initiation date, followed by a run-down 
in the five weeks after. During all other periods, the levels of abnormal negative news are close to 
zero. Such pattern is more likely a result of strategically relocating negative news around the ASR 
initiation date. 
Second, the regression results in Table 5, which provide evidence of pre-ASR news 
management, show a positive coefficient on NMPRE1 and a negative coefficient on NMDUR1, 
both of which are significant on a one-tail test. The results conform to the pattern shown in Figure 
3. Furthermore, the shifting hypothesis predicts a zero sum of the two coefficients, while the 
creating hypothesis predicts a positive sum of the two coefficients. The F-test fails to reject the 
null that the sum of the two coefficients equals zero (p-value = 0.127), providing support for the 
shifting hypothesis.  
 Third, the empirical results in Section 6.2 largely suggest that the ASR announcement date 
do not alert investors to pre-ASR news management and earnings management. If investors 
naively respond to news released by ASR firms around the ASR initiation date, the shifting 
hypothesis predicts a negative association between pre-ASR news management and abnormal 
returns in the short window before the ASR initiation date, and a positive association between pre-
ASR news management and abnormal returns in the short window after the ASR initiation date, 
as a result of the strategic relocation of negative news. Instead, although the creating hypothesis 




predicts no positive association between pre-ASR news management and abnormal returns in the 
short window after the ASR initiation date, because the creating hypothesis predict no reversals of 
negative news. The empirical results reported in Section 6.4.3.3 supports the shifting hypothesis. 
In sum, although the above discussion may not be definitive, the pattern in abnormal 
negative news and the consequence of that pattern shown in this research are more consistent with 
the shifting hypothesis as if managers keep the total amount of negative news constant and simply 




Chapter 7  
Additional Analyses 
7.1 Real Earnings Management Prior to ASRs 
In Section 4.1.2, I conjecture that managers do not use real earnings management to deflate 
stock prices prior to ASRs. In this section, I formally test this conjecture. Following Zang (2012) 
and Roychowdhury (2006), I examine real earnings management measured as: 
(1) abnormal discretionary expenditures (ABDISX). Managers can increase selling, general 
and administrative expenses, research and development and advertising expenses at their 
discretion to deflate earnings, which leads to abnormally high discretionary expenses relative to 
sales and lower reported earnings; and 
(2) abnormal production costs (ABPROD). Roychowdhury (2006) argue that managers can 
temporally increase sales by offering excessive price discounts or decrease costs of goods sold by 
overproduction. With higher production levels resulting from overproduction, one unit of goods 
absorbs less fixed overhead costs, allowing firms to report lower costs of goods sold. Both 
excessive price discounts and overproduction lead to abnormally high production costs relative to 
sales. Although Roychowdhury (2006) examines managers’ attempt to manipulate earnings 
upward, theoretically this can go both ways.32 
                                                 
32 In this research, I follow Zang (2012) and do not use abnormal operating cash flows as a proxy for real 
earnings management activities, because abnormal operating cash flows may be influenced by other real 
earnings management activities in the opposite direction. For example, decreasing discretionary 
expenditures has a positive effect on contemporaneous operating cash flows, while increasing price 
discounts has a negative effect on operating cash flows. This inconsistency makes the net effect of real 




Other studies provide further evidence that these measures capture real earnings 
managements (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012). I also aggregate 
the two real earnings management measures into one measure by taking their sum (REMSUM). 
Following Roychowdhury (2006) and other studies, I express normal discretionary 
expenditures as a linear function of sales. For each calendar quarter and Fama-French 48 industry, 
I estimate normal discretionary expenditures from the following regression model using all non-
financial firms (Fama-French 44–47 or SIC 6000–6999) in COMPUSTAT: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑡
4
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
(20) 
where DISXt is discretionary expenditures in quarter t (i.e., the sum of quarterly selling, general 
and administrative expenses and research and development expenses).33 Qjt is a dummy variable 
that equals one if quarter t is fiscal quarter j (j = 1, 2, 3 or 4), and zero otherwise. SALEt−1 is sales 
in quarter t−1. All variables, including the fiscal quarter dummy variables Qjt, are scaled by total 
assets at the end of quarter t−1. I require at least 20 observations for each regression. The residuals 
from each regression represent quarterly abnormal discretionary expenditures (ABDISX). 
I estimate normal production costs using the following regression model for each calendar 
quarter and Fama-French 48 industry with at least 20 observations: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑡
4
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽6∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽7∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
(21) 
                                                 
33  Unlike prior literature that uses annual data, I exclude advertising expenses from the discretional 
expenditures (DISX) because COMPUSTAT Quarterly does not report quarterly advertising expenses. In 
addition, 55.7 percent of COMPUSTAT firms with non-missing quarterly selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses do not report quarterly research and development (R&D) expenses. I treat 
missing R&D expenses as zero, reasonably assuming that firms do not report R&D expenses when they are 
immaterial. In an additional robustness analysis (untabulated), I drop observations with missing R&D 




where PRODt is production costs in quarter t, that is, the sum of costs of goods sold in quarter t 
and the change in inventory from quarter t−1 to t. SALEt is sales in quarter t. ∆SALEt is the change 
in sales from quarter t−1 to t. ∆SALEt−1 is the change in sales from quarter t−2 to t−1. Qjt are 
defined the same as before. All variables, including the fiscal quarter dummy variables Qjt, are 
scaled by total assets at the end of quarter t−1. The residuals from each regression represent 
quarterly abnormal production costs (ABPROD). 
I multiply ABPROD by −1 so that higher values of ABDISX, ABPROD and REMSUM 
indicate more downward real earnings management. Finally, I run the regression in Equation (5) 
after replacing EM with ABDISX, ABPROD and REMSUM, respectively. If managers use real 
earnings management to deflate stock prices prior to ASRs, I should expect the coefficient on 
EMPRE1 is significantly positive in each regression. An insignificant coefficient on EMPRE1 is 
consistent with the conjecture of no real earnings management prior to ASRs. The regression 
model is: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (22) 
where EMPRE1, EMDUR1, EMDUR2 and EMPOST are defined the same as in Equation (5). 
DepVar represents ABDISX, ABPROD or REMSUM. I include firm and year fixed effects and use 
White standard errors adjusted to account for the possible correlation within the firm cluster. 
Table 18 presents the results. The coefficient on EMPRE1 is not significant at a 
conventional level in all three regressions.34 Thus, I cannot reject the null that ASR firms do not 
                                                 
34 The adjusted R2 of the three regressions are much higher than that of the regression in Table 6. First, I 
rule out the impact of outliers because I obtain qualitatively similar results if I truncate the dependent 
variable at 1 and 99 percentiles. Second, I include firm fixed effects in these regressions. If there are 
minimal variation in real earnings management for each firm across quarters around the ASR initiation date 
(as insignificant coefficients on EMPRE1, EMDUR1, EMDUR2 and EMPOST may suggest), the firm fixed 
effects will capture the flat level of real earnings management for each firm with a high degree of fitness. 




use downward real earnings management prior to ASRs using all three measures of real earnings 
management. The evidence collectively, at least in part, alleviates the concern that the insignificant 
coefficients may be due to the lack of power of the test. This evidence further supports my design 
choice in Section 4.2.4 to focus on accrual-based earnings management. 
Table 18: Real Earnings Management Prior to ASRs 
 
 DepVar = ABDISX DepVar = ABPROD DepVar = REMSUM 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept 4.579 0.000 2.683 0.423 1.847 0.296 
EMPRE1 -0.077 0.622 -0.015 0.937 -0.092 0.669 
EMDUR1 -0.123 0.574 -0.198 0.256 -0.308 0.294 
EMDUR2 -0.177 0.439 -0.370 0.228 -0.592 0.130 
EMPOST -0.320 0.157 -0.042 0.818 -0.396 0.200 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2 0.866  0.775  0.844  
N 2,535  2,392  2,392  
 
Note: Table 18 reports the results of the following regression using data from quarter −3 before the ASR 
initiation date through quarter +3 after the ASR completion date:  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the quarter index. DepVar represents 3 measures of real earnings 
management, that is, abnormal discretionary expenditures (ABDISX), abnormal production costs multiplied 
by −1 (ABPROD), and the sum of them (REMSUM). Higher values of ABDISX, ABPROD and REMSUM 
represent more downward real earnings management. EMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter 
t is quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if quarter t is the first quarter during the ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR2 is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if quarter t is any other quarter than the first one during the ASR contract period, and 
0 otherwise. EMPOST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter +1, +2, or +3 after the ASR 
completion date. Firm and year fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to account for 
the possible correlation within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied by 
100 for expositional convenience. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail 
otherwise. 
 
7.2 Cross-Sectional Variation in News Management and Earnings Management Prior 
to ASRs 
This section discusses a few sources of cross-sectional variation in pre-ASR news 
management and earnings management prior to ASRs. I start with two common sources that may 




same direction. Then I examine one source that may cause cross-sectional variation in pre-ASR 
news management and earnings management prior to ASRs in opposite directions. 
7.2.1 Sources of Cross-Sectional Variation in News Management and Earnings Management 
7.2.1.1 ASR Size and Managers’ Ownership 
I expect ASR size and managers’ ownership to cause cross-sectional variation in news 
management and earnings management in the same direction. First, I posit that managers’ 
incentives to use news management and earnings management prior to an ASR increase with the 
dollar value of the ASR (i.e., the ASR size), as a larger ASR size suggests more cost savings from 
deflating stock prices. Second, deflating stock prices benefits remaining shareholders. The larger 
ownership (including stock holdings and options) managers have prior to ASRs, the greater the 
direct benefit they receive as remaining shareholders from reduced repurchase prices. Thus, I posit 
that managers’ incentives to use price-deflating news management and earnings management prior 
to ASRs increase with their ownership. 
7.2.1.2 The Firm’s Need to Meet Earnings Targets 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) find that interviewed chief financial officers believe 
that meeting earnings targets is important for building creditability with capital market and their 
own career reputation, and that they are willing to sacrifice firm value and manage earnings or 
analysts’ expectations to guarantee that their earnings targets are met. Following this observation, 
I argue that reducing repurchase prices is a secondary consideration to meeting earnings targets. 
Because downward earnings management may hurt EPS, an undesired consequence particularly 
for firms with very small EPS buffer over analysts’ earnings forecasts in quarter −1, I posit that 
firms just meeting analysts’ earnings targets are less likely to use pre-ASR earnings management. 




7.2.2 Empirical Test Models and Predictions 
I formally test my conjectures using the following regression models: 
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (23) 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (24) 
where NM, EM, NMPRE1 and EMPRE1 are defined the same as in Equation (4) and Equation (5). 
I exclude other sub-period dummy variables for brevity because previous empirical tests find 
evidence of news management and earnings management only in the period immediately prior to 
ASRs.35  CondVar represents conditioning variables to proxy for the sources of cross-section 
variation in pre-ASR news management and earnings management. Specifically, I use the 
following conditioning variables: (1) ASRSIZE_DUM, which is a dummy variable that equals one 
if ASRSIZE is above its median, and zero otherwise. ASRSIZE is calculated as the number of shares 
to be repurchased divided by the total number of outstanding shares at the beginning of quarter −1; 
(2) CEOOWN_DUM, which is a dummy variable that equals one if CEOOWN is above its median, 
and zero otherwise. CEOOWN is calculated as CEO’s ownership divided by the total number of 
outstanding shares at the beginning of quarter −1.36 Due to the reporting frequency of executive 
compensation data, I use CEO’s ownership reported for the fiscal year ended before the beginning 
of quarter −1; and (3) Meet, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the actual EPS of an 
ASR firm for quarter −1 exceeds analysts’ consensus forecast within only two cents, and zero 
otherwise. 37  This follows Zang (2012) who define suspect firms just meeting a particular 
benchmark as firm-years with actual EPS less that benchmark between zero and two cents. 
                                                 
35 The results remain qualitatively unchanged if other sub-period dummy variables are included. 
36 CEO’s ownership is the sum of the number of shares (excluding stock options) and the number of stock 
options (exercisable and un-exercisable) held by CEO. As an additional check, I use the dollar value of 
CEO’s ownership to capture CEO’s stock-based wealth. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
37 I also use one cent and three cents cut-offs. Both yield similar results, except that the one-tail p-value of 




7.2.3 Empirical Analysis 
I first present the results of univariate analysis in Table 19 Panel A. The univariate analysis 
focuses on news management during the period from week −5 to week −1 and earnings 
management in quarter −1, since I find evidence of news management and earnings management 
in these periods in Chapter 4. I partition my sample into one subset of ASRs with an ASR size 
below the median and the other subset of ASRs with an ASR size above the median. Inconsistent 
with my conjecture, I do not observe an increase in pre-ASR news management (PRENM) from 
the below-median subset to the above-median subset. But pre-ASR earnings management 
(PREEM) increases with the ASR size. Overall, these results provide limited evidence of my 
conjecture about ASR size. Next, I parturition my sample into one subset of ASRs with CEO’s 
ownership below the median and the other subset of ASRs with CEO’s ownership above the 
median. In contrast to my conjecture, pre-ASR news management (PRENM) decreases, instead of 
increases, with CEO’s ownership, although pre-ASR earnings management (PREEM) shows an 
insignificant increase from the below-median subset to the above-median subset. Lastly, I partition 
my ASR sample into one subset where firms have a very small safety buffer to meet earnings 
targets (MEET = 1) and the other subset where firms have an EPS either well above or well below 
earnings targets (MEET = 0). The results show insignificant pre-ASR earnings management for 
ASRs in the subset of MEET = 1, but significant pre-ASR earnings management for ASRs in the 
subset of MEET = 0, suggesting that firms with a very small EPS safety buffer have an urge not to 
deflate earnings prior to ASRs. I also observe an increase in pre-ASR news management from the 
subset of MEET = 0 to the subset of MEET = 1, suggesting the substitution of news management 
for earnings management in a specific situation where firms are deterred from using earnings 




I then present the results of multivariate regression analyses on ASR size (Table 19 Panel 
B), managers’ ownership (Panel C), and the firm’s need to meet earnings targets (Panel D). The 
results in Panel B show a significantly positive coefficient on NMPRE1 with NM as the dependent 
variable, indicating the overall presence of news management prior to ASRs. The coefficient on 
NMPRE1×ASRSIZE_DUM is positive but not statistically significant, suggesting that the level of 
pre-ASR news management does not vary with the ASR size. When I run the regression with EM 
as the dependent variable, the coefficient on EMPRE1 is not positive at a conventional level any 
more. Instead, the coefficient on EMPRE1×ASRSIZE_DUM is positive and statistically significant 
(one-tail p-value = 0.016), suggesting that pre-ASR earnings management mainly exist in large 
ASRs. The results are consistent with those in the univariate analysis, and indicate that only pre-
ASR earnings management, but not news management, increases with ASR size. One possible 
explanation for the results is the ease of news management compared to earnings management. As 
Ahern and Sosyura (2014) point out, firm-generated news management is convenient and 
effectively is permitted by law and regulations. In contrast, prior literature (e.g., Marquardt and 
Wiedman 2004) discusses various costs related to earnings management, such as reduced future 
reporting flexibility, litigation risks and reputation losses. As a result, firms may use the handy 
news management tool regardless of the ASR size, but use the earnings management tool only 
when they can justify its costs with more savings for large ASRs. 
Table 19 Panel C presents the results on CEO’s ownership. The significantly positive 
coefficient on NMPRE1 with NM as the dependent variable is consistent with the notion that there 
is news management prior to ASRs. However, the coefficient on NMPRE1×CEOOWN_DUM is 
negative and statistically significant, a result contradicting my conjecture. The coefficients on 




significant at a conventional level. Overall, the results are similar to those in the univariate analysis, 
and provide little evidence that pre-ASR news management and earnings management increase 
with managers’ ownership. These findings, however, are somewhat consistent with Chen and 
Huang (2013) who document a significantly negative association between CEO’s equity holdings 
and downward earnings management prior to OMRs after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Chen and Huang (2013) attribute their results to heightened scrutiny following Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act that is supposed to curb managers’ self-serving behaviors such as news management and 
earnings management examined in my research. The sample period of my research is entirely in 
the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act era. I also expect the disclosure requirements of ASRs to strengthen 
the deterrence since managers cannot conduct ASRs silently. 
Table 19 Panel D presents the results on the firm’s need to meet earnings targets. As 
expected, the coefficients on NMPRE1 and EMPRE1 are positive and statistically significant at 
the 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. Furthermore, the coefficient on EMPRE1×MEET with EM as 
the dependent variable is negative and statistically significant (one-tail p-value = 0.086), while the 
coefficient on NMPRE1×MEET with NM as the dependent variable is positive and statistically 
significant (one-tail p-value = 0.034). These results support the notion that managers’ incentives 
to meet analysts’ earnings targets take precedence over their incentives to reduce repurchase costs. 
This analysis sheds light on a specific situation where managers rank their preferences and make 





Table 19: Cross-Sectional Variation in News/Earnings Management Prior to ASRs 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Cross-Sectional Variation in News/Earnings Management 
 ASRSIZE_DUM = 0 ASRSIZE_DUM = 1 
 Mean p-value N Mean p-value N 
PRENM 0.0031 0.054 183 0.0031 0.038 180 
PREEM 0.0018 0.384 173 0.0084 0.014 173 
       
 CEOOWN_DUM = 0 CEOOWN_DUM = 1 
 Mean p-value N Mean p-value N 
PRENM 0.0067 0.002 169 0.0003 0.760 168 
PREEM 0.0040 0.095 160 0.0055 0.123 159 
       
 MEET = 0 MEET = 1 
 Mean p-value N Mean p-value N 
PRENM 0.0019 0.108 256 0.0059 0.012 107 
PREEM 0.0056 0.013 241 0.0040 0.330 105 
 
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Variation in News/Earnings Management with ASR Size 













Intercept  0.020 0.009  0.333 0.000 
NMPRE1 + 0.239 0.042    
EMPRE1    + -0.224 0.149 
ASRSIZE_DUM  0.000 0.996  -0.164 0.254 
NMPRE1×ASRSIZE_DUM + 0.057 0.378    
EMPRE1×ASRSIZE_DUM    + 0.925 0.016 
Firm fixed effect  Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2  0.106   0.211  
N  13,515   2,485  
 
Panel C: Cross-Sectional Variation in News/Earnings Management with Managers’ Ownership 













Intercept  -0.067 0.010  0.115 0.000 
NMPRE1 + 0.588 0.001    
EMPRE1    + 0.055 0.414 
CEOOWN_DUM  0.071 0.331  0.169 0.635 
NMPRE1×CEOOWN_DUM + -0.621 0.001    
EMPRE1×CEOOWN_DUM    + 0.297 0.265 
Firm fixed effect  Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2  0.108   0.221  





Panel D: Cross-Sectional Variation in News/Earnings Management with the Firm’s Need to Meet 
Earnings Targets 













Intercept  -0.017 0.064  0.069 0.000 
NMPRE1 + 0.164 0.032    
EMPRE1    + 0.428 0.075 
MEET  0.136 0.375  0.270 0.362 
NMPRE1×MEET + 0.353 0.034    
EMPRE1×MEET    − -0.606 0.086 
Firm fixed effect  Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2  0.106   0.210  
N  13,515   2,485  
 
Note: Table 19 Panel A reports the univariate analysis of cross-sectional variation in pre-ASR 
news/earnings management with ASR size, managers’ ownership and the firm’s need to meet earnings 
target. PRENM is the average weekly abnormal negative news from week −5 to week −1 before the ASR 
initiation date. PREEM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date 
(multiplied by −1). Higher values of PRENM and PREEM represent more price-deflating news management 
and earnings management prior to ASRs. ASRSIZE_DUM is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ASRSIZE is 
above its median, and 0 otherwise. ASRSIZE is calculated as the number of shares to be repurchased divided 
by the total number of outstanding shares at the beginning of quarter −1. CEOOWN_DUM is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if CEOOWN is above its median, and 0 otherwise. CEOOWN is calculated as CEO’s 
ownership (shares excluding stock options plus exercisable and un-exercisable stock options held by CEO) 
divided by the total number of outstanding shares at the beginning of quarter −1. MEET is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the actual EPS of quarter −1 exceeds analysts’ consensus forecast within only 2 cents, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
Panel B reports the results of the regressions that examine cross-sectional variation in pre-ASR 
news/earnings management with various factors: 
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index. In the first regression, t is the week index. NM is the abnormal negative 
news in week t. NMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t falls in the period from week −5 to 
week −1 before the ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. In the second regression, t is the quarter index. 
EM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in quarter t, multiplied by −1. EMPRE1 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if quarter t is quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. CondVar represents 
ASRSIZE_DUM, CEOOWN_DUM and MEET, whose name appears at the respective row. Firm and year 
fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to account for the possible correlation within 
the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional 
convenience. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail otherwise. 
 
7.3 The Effect of Firm Size on the Measurement of News Management 
The measure of news management, NM, is derived from another measure, NEGNEWS, 




week. Because larger firms usually have more press releases than smaller firms, there may be a 
concern that larger firms may have higher NEGNEWS simply due to the larger quantity of firm-
generated press releases. Untabulated analysis indeed shows a positive correlation of 0.237 
(p-value < 0.001) between NEGNEWS and firm size (the logarithm of total assets measured at the 
end of quarter −1), primarily because the count of firm-generated press releases in a particular 
week is strongly correlated with firm size (correlation = 0.276 and p-value < 0.001). 
Despite the significantly positive correlation between NEGNEWS and firm size, the 
measure of news management, NM, is not necessarily weighted more heavily towards larger firms. 
NM is defined as the abnormal component of NEGNEWS, which is estimated using an event study 
approach. This approach uses each firm as its own control. As a result, NM leaves out the baseline 
of NEGNEWS, which is positively correlated with firm size, and only measures the deviation from 
the baseline of NEGNEWS, which is not necessarily correlated with firm size any more. In fact, 
untabulated analysis shows that there is no significant correlation between NM and firm size 
(correlation = 0.006 and p-value = 0.494). 
I include firm fixed effects in the main regressions in Table 5 and Table 9, which can 
mitigate the concern about the effect of firm size on the measurement of news management to 
some extent. In an additional robustness check (untabulated), I control for the firm size in the 
regressions in Table 5 and Table 9. The results remain qualitatively unchanged, and the coefficients 
on firm size in both regressions are indistinguishable from zero. 
7.4 The Robustness of the Choice of Pre-ASR Window for Testing News Management 
In Section 4.3.5, I choose to detect pre-ASR news management using the five-week 
window prior to ASRs. As a robustness test for this design choice, I use other pre-ASR news 




initiation date like in my main research design, I use a simplified version of Equation (4) for the 
robustness check: 
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (25) 
where NMDUR is a dummy variable that equals one if week t falls in the contract period, and zero 
otherwise. NMPOST is a dummy variable that equals one if week t falls in the period from week 
+1 to week +10 after the ASR completion date, and zero otherwise. NMPRE is a dummy variable 
that equals one if week t falls in a specified pre-ASR news management window, which alternates 
among 10 windows: one week, two weeks, three weeks, …, and 10 weeks prior to ASRs. The 
baseline is the five-week window, that is, the window of my main research design. For brevity, I 
only report the estimate and p-value of the coefficient on NMPRE, the variable of main interest. In 
the baseline regression, the estimate and p-value of the coefficient on NMPRE is nearly identical 
with those in Table 5, suggesting that the simplified version of the regression model is a good 
substitute and has similar power. Next, I alternate the pre-ASR window from one week to 10 weeks, 
which gives me 10 estimates of the coefficient on NMPRE. The results are presented in Table 20. 
The estimate of the coefficient is 0.417 for the one-week window. Then, starting from the two-
week window, the estimate of the coefficient is monotonically decreasing from 0.454 (for the two-
week window) to 0.134 (for the ten-week window). All the 10 estimates of the coefficient are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that the news management test is robust to 
the design choice of the pre-ASR window. In addition, the largely monotonic increase in the 
coefficient estimate strongly shows the run-up of negative news when the ASR initiation date is 
approaching. This is consistent with my argument that news management targets at a short-time 





Table 20: News Management Prior to ASRs Using Various Pre-ASR Windows 
 
Testing Window Coef. on NMPRE p-value 
1 week 0.417 0.004 
2 weeks 0.454 0.001 
3 weeks 0.386 0.001 
4 weeks 0.339 0.001 
5 weeks (baseline) 0.268 0.001 
6 weeks 0.222 0.002 
7 weeks 0.207 0.002 
8 weeks 0.170 0.004 
9 weeks 0.158 0.006 
10 weeks 0.134 0.009 
 
Note: Table 20 reports the estimate and p-value of the coefficient on NMPRE from the following regression 
using various pre-ASR windows:  
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the week index. NM is the abnormal negative news in week t. Higher 
values of NM represent more price-deflating news management. NMPRE is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if week t falls in a specified pre-ASR news management window, which alternates among 10 windows: 
1 week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, …, and 10 weeks prior to ASRs. NMDUR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
week t falls in the contract period, and 0 otherwise. NMPOST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t 
falls in the period from week +1 to week +10 after the ASR completion date. For each regression, firm and 
year fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to account for the possible correlation 
within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional 
convenience. p-values are one-tail as the sign of coefficient is predicted. 
 
7.5 Alternative Measures of Undervaluation 
When I identify the motivation of and ASR, I follow Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and use 
the computed firm-specific misvaluation as the measure of undervaluation. As a robustness check, 
I use alternative measures of undervaluation calculated using the method in Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004) and Chemmanur et al. (2010). Specifically, for each ASR firm in my sample, 
I identify a matched firm in the same industry-quarter with comparable sales and earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) margin. I match on industry, sales and 
EBITDA margin to ensure that matching firms have similar operating risks and profitability, and 
are close to ASR firms on fundamentals (Purnanandam and Swaminathan 2004). For each ASR 




French 48 industry at the end of quarter −1. Next, I sort these firms into three portfolios based on 
sales and then each sales portfolio into three portfolios based on EBITDA margin (defined as 
EBITDA divided by sales). Both sales and EBITDA in the matching procedure are measured at 
the average for the four consecutive quarters ended quarter −1. This procedure creates nine 
portfolios for each industry-quarter. I then match each ASR firm to the enclosing sales-EBITDA 
margin portfolio. From that portfolio, I select the firm with the closet sales as a match. 
For each ASR firm and matched firm, I calculate the price-to-sales ratio (P/S), price-to-
EBITDA ratio (P/EBITDA), and price-to-assets ratio (P/A), where price (P) is the market value of 
equity at the end of quarter −1. Sales and EBITDA are measured at the average for the four 
consecutive quarters ended quarter −1. Assets (A) is the book value of total assets at the end of 
quarter −1. I calculate P/S, P/EBITDA and P/A because sales and assets are commonly available 
and positive, and EBITDA is arguably less subject to accounting distortions. I do not use the 
popular price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) because earnings may be negative, and Dong et al. (2006) 
argue that P/E is a less accurate measure of misvaluation because short-term fluctuation in earnings 
will shift P/E even if the degree of misvaluation remains unchanged. I deem an ASR firm as 
undervalued if the selected ratio of the ASR firm is less than that of the matched firm. This gives 
me three alternative measures of undervaluation. Untabulated statistics show that the mean and 
median of the three ratios of ASR firms are greater than the mean and median of matched firms, 
which appears somewhat inconsistent with ASR firms being generally undervalued. 
Using alternative measures of undervaluation, I re-run the regressions in Equation (9) and 
Equation (10). Untabulated results indicate that NMPRE1×PRICEUP, EMPRE1×PRICEUP and 
EMPRE1×EPSBONUS enter each regression with a negative coefficient as expected, but not 




qualitatively unchanged as predicted. Therefore, the results of regressions in Equation (9) and 
Equation (10) appear sensitive to the method of undervaluation measurement. However, Rhodes-
Kropf et al.’s (2005) model rests on the valuation model that uses both book value of assets and 
net income as valuation inputs. It is essentially based on a vector of ratios rather than on a single 
ratio (e.g., price-to-assets), and thus makes the best use of accounting data and probably reduces 
measurement errors. 
7.6 The Effect of the Fourth Fiscal Quarter on Pre-ASR Earnings Management 
In Section 4.3.5, I find that managers use downward earnings management to deflate stock 
prices in quarter −1 prior to the ASR initiation date. This section examines the effects of quarter 
−1 being the fourth fiscal quarter on pre-ASR earnings management. First, unlike interim quarters, 
the fourth fiscal quarter requires the preparation of annual report that must be audited with more 
procedures to be performed and an audit opinion (and thus assurance on financial statements) to 
be issued.38 In fact, 98.6 percent of ASR firms in my sample are audited by Big 4 auditors who are 
considered to have high audit quality. The heightened scrutiny from auditors should reduce 
managers’ discretion and make earnings management harder in the fourth fiscal quarter. Thus, I 
expect to observe less earnings management if quarter −1 is the fourth fiscal quarter. 
Second, in Section 5.3.2, I find that managers use less downward earnings management in 
quarter −1 if their bonuses are directly tied to EPS. I am interested in whether such observation 
will be more pronounced if quarter −1 is the fourth fiscal quarter. Because bonus evaluation usually 
happens after the fourth fiscal quarter, and reversals of the fourth-quarter earnings deflation can 
only be reflected in the next year, I may observe that EPS-tied bonuses discourage pre-ASR 
                                                 
38 Although auditors may provide compilation or review on financial statements for interim quarters, they 





earnings management more strongly. On the other hand, this may not be true since bonus 
evaluation is usually based on the full-year EPS and managers may not hurt the full-year EPS 
target even if they deflate earnings in the fourth fiscal quarter. 
To examine the effects of the fourth fiscal quarter, I re-run the regression of Equation (10) 
in two subsets of the ASR sample. One subset consists of ASRs with quarter −1 being the fourth 
fiscal quarter, and the other subset consists of ASRs with quarter −1 being not the fourth fiscal 
quarter. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 21. The coefficient on EMPRE1 for 
the subset of ASRs with quarter −1 being the fourth fiscal quarter is indistinguishable from zero, 
while the coefficient on EMPRE1 for the subset of ASRs with quarter −1 being not the fourth fiscal 
quarter is positive and statistically significant (one-tail p-value = 0.040). The finding suggests that 
pre-ASR earnings management prevail only if quarter −1 is not the fourth fiscal quarter, which 
provides evidence for my first prediction. For the second empirical question, I find that 
EMPRE1×EPSBONUS enters the regression with a negative coefficient (one-tail p-value = 0.023) 
only for the subset of ASRs with quarter −1 being not the fourth fiscal quarter, suggesting that 
there is no evidence that EPS-tied bonuses discourage pre-ASR earrings management more 
strongly if quarter −1 is the fourth fiscal quarter.39 
  
                                                 
39  However, this finding may simply be due to the observation that there is no pre-ASR earnings 
management for ASRs with quarter −1 being the fourth fiscal quarter, as indicated by the coefficient on 




Table 21: Regressions of Earnings Management for ASRs with the Fourth Fiscal Quarter 
Prior to ASRs and for ASRs with Non-Fourth Fiscal Quarter Prior to ASRs 
 
  Quarter −1 is the 
fiscal year-end quarter 
Quarter −1 is not the 
fiscal year-end quarter 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.448 0.007 0.161 0.000 
EMPRE1 ? 0.018 0.974 0.550 0.079 
EMDUR1  -0.722 0.296 -0.314 0.451 
EMDUR2  0.655 0.434 -0.173 0.650 
EMPOST  -0.447 0.518 0.113 0.614 
PRICEUP  0.468 0.711 -0.148 0.609 
EPSBONUS  -0.643 0.571 0.209 0.451 
EMPRE1×PRICEUP ? 0.466 0.702 -0.408 0.461 
EMDUR1×PRICEUP  0.350 0.769 -0.004 0.994 
EMDUR2×PRICEUP  -0.124 0.943 0.574 0.416 
EMPOST×PRICEUP  -0.043 0.952 0.107 0.689 
EMPRE1×EPSBONUS ? 0.654 0.582 -1.061 0.046 
EMDUR1×EPSBONUS  2.399 0.011 0.399 0.419 
EMDUR2×EPSBONUS  1.291 0.576 -0.58 0.403 
EMPOST×EPSBONUS  0.597 0.478 -0.496 0.077 
Firm fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.211  0.171  
N  612  1,873  
 
Note: Table 21 reports the results of the following regressions in 2 subsets of the ASR sample. One subset 
consists of ASRs with quarter −1 being the fourth fiscal quarter, and the other subset consists of ASRs with 
quarter −1 being not the fourth fiscal quarter.  
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽11𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the quarter index. EM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in 
quarter t, multiplied by −1. Higher values of EM represent more downward accrual-based earnings 
management. EMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter −1 before the ASR initiation 
date, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is the first quarter during the 
ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is any other 
quarter than the first one during the ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMPOST is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter +1, +2, or +3 after the ASR completion date. PRICEUP is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the ASR is likely to be motivated by the desire to increase stock prices (either 
signaling undervaluation or defending against takeover). EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the ASR is likely to be motivated by the desire to increase EPS, that is, bonuses of top executives are 
directly tie with EPS. Firm and year fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to account 
for the possible correlation within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied 






7.7 The Causality between ASRs and Pre-ASR News/Earnings Management 
In this research, I find evidence of news management and earnings management prior to 
an ASR, and attribute this finding to managers’ attempt to reduce repurchase costs for the ASR 
(the strategic management explanation). However, an alternative explanation could be managers 
timing the ASR at the time stock prices are low due to the declining operating performance and 
reduced investment opportunities of the firm, and abnormal negatives news and abnormal negative 
accruals (i.e., my measures of news management and earnings management) simply capture the 
perceived bad prospect of the firm (the strategic timing explanation). To rule out the alternative 
explanation and establish the causality between ASRs and pre-ASR news/earnings management, 
I first draw on the evidence from several previous analyses and then perform a few additional 
analyses, all of which appear more consistent with the strategic management explanation. 
7.7.1 Previous Evidence in Favor of the Strategic Management Explanation 
First, in Section 7.6, I find that pre-ASR earnings management appears to exist in unaudited 
quarter −1 but not in audited quarter −1. A plausible explanation is that the heightened scrutiny 
from auditors reduces managers’ discretion and makes earnings management harder in audited 
quarter −1. However, such difference in earnings management between unaudited quarter −1 and 
audited quarter −1 should not be expected if abnormal accruals are unrelated to earnings 
management. 
Second, the pattern of pre-ASR news management shown in Figure 3 suggests that 
managers accelerate the release of negative news from the short window following the ASR 
initiation date to the short window preceding the ASR initiation date. The stark contrast of a run-




more likely a result of strategically manipulating the flow of negative news than merely a result of 
a timing decision. 
Third, in Section 5.3.2, I find that the variation in pre-ASR news management and earnings 
management under different motivations for ASRs is largely consistent with the predictions of the 
strategic management explanation. 
Fourth, the undervaluation measures I used in Section 5.3.2 and Section 7.5 indicate that 
the average ASR firm in my sample has higher valuation than its industry peer, which appears 
inconsistent with the strategic timing explanation. 
Lastly, if firms time ASRs at their bad times when abnormal negatives news and abnormal 
negative accruals merely capture bad news about prospects, the stock price deflation prior to ASRs 
(as I document in Section 6.1) should persist as it is driven by firms’ fundamentals. However, the 
stock performance reversals for one-year and two-year horizons shown in Section 6.4.3 contradict 
this prediction, but is consistent with the prediction of the strategic management explanation. 
7.7.2 Additional Analyses in Favor of the Strategic Management Explanation 
7.7.2.1 News/Earnings Management for 80 ASR Firms with Superior and Stable Pre-ASR 
Operating Performance 
To obtain more confidence in the strategic management explanation, I perform a few 
additional analyses. The first analysis is to examine a group of ASR firms for which the strategic 
timing explanation should be less plausible. Specifically, I select 80 ASR firms that have superior 
and stable operating performance for four consecutive quarters prior to ASRs. For this group of 
ASR firms, abnormal negative news and abnormal negative accruals are much less likely driven 




earnings management for this group of ASR firms, the evidence should strongly support the 
strategic management explanation. 
To select ASR firms with superior and stable operating performance, I sort all 
COMPUSTAT firms into quintiles based on quarterly return-on-assets (ROA) for each calendar 
quarter and Fama-French 48 industry. I select all ASR firms whose ROA in each of the four 
consecutive quarters ended quarter −1 (i.e., quarter −4, −3, −2 and −1) is ranked in the top two 
quintiles in each industry-quarter. From these ASR firms, I then select the ASR firms whose ROA 
in each of quarter −3, −2 and −1 are within ±0.01 of the ROA for quarter −4. This procedure gives 
me 80 ASR firms with superior and stable operating performance prior to ASRs. 
I re-run the regressions in Equation (4) and Equation (5) to test for news management and 
earnings management prior to ASRs, and report the results in Table 22 Panel A. Consistent with 
the results in Section 4.3.5, the coefficients on NMPRE1 and EMPRE1 are negative and 
statistically significant in both regressions. Because selected ASR firms have superior and stable 
operating performance prior to ASRs, I have more confidence to conclude that pre-ASR news 
management and earnings management is attributable to the ASR decision itself, rather than a 
merely result of the endogeneity (i.e., both ASR decision and abnormal negative news/accruals are 
the result of bad operating performance). These findings support the strategic management 
explanation. 
7.7.2.2 News/Earnings Management after Controlling for Operating Performance and 
Investment Opportunities 
Since the strategic timing explanation argues that abnormal negative news and abnormal 
negative accruals simply capture the declining operating performance and reduced investment 




should be able to rule out the possibility. In fact, I already control for operating performance in the 
measurement of news management and earnings management in previous analyses. For example, 
I use performance-matched abnormal accruals to measure earnings management; when I estimate 
abnormal negative news, I use changes in analysts’ forecasts as an explanatory variable to control 
for operating performance. In this section, I explicitly control for operating performance and 
investment opportunities in the regressions in Equation (4) and Equation (5) testing for pre-ASR 
news management and earnings management. If the strategic timing explanation is plausible, 
adding these controls should suppress the coefficients on EMPRE1 and NMPRE1. In contrast, the 
evidence of positive coefficients on EMPRE1 and NMPRE1 should support the strategic 
management explanation. 
I use return-on-assets (ROA) and market-to-book ratio (MB) to proxy for operating 
performance and investment opportunities, respectively. Both ROA and MB are measured for the 
contemporary quarter when NM or EM, the dependent variable, is measured. The regression results 
presented in Table 22 Panel B are consistent with previous analyses. The coefficients on NMPRE1 
and EMPRE1 are positive and statistically significant in both regressions. Furthermore, the 
coefficients on ROA and MB are largely positive and statistically significant, probably suggesting 
that good operating performance and growth opportunities give managers more room to manage 
news and earnings downward. 
7.7.2.3 Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts Prior to ASRs 
This section examines a specific type of voluntary disclosure, management forecasts.40 If 
managers also manipulate this type of voluntary disclosure around ASRs, management forecasts 
                                                 
40 Admittedly, the information content (negative or positive) in management forecasts may or may not be 
captured by my measure of news management in this research. The interpretation of the results in this 




issued prior to ASRs are more likely to fall short of the then-current analysts’ consensus forecast. 
Such “bad news” management forecasts are expected to deflate stock prices too. If the strategic 
timing explanation is plausible and managers simply time ASRs at the time stock prices are low, I 
would expect no changes in the likelihood of bad news management forecasts prior to ASRs. 
I use the following logit regression model to examine whether bad news management 
forecasts are more likely to be issued in the specified pre-ASR period: 
𝐵𝑁_𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐻𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛼6𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
(26) 
where i is the ASR firm index and j is the management forecast index. I use all management 
forecasts issued from 180 days before the ASR initiation date to 180 days after the ASR completion 
date. BN_MF is a dummy variable that equals one if management forecast j is below the then-
current analysts’ consensus forecast, and zero otherwise.41 BEFORE is a dummy variable that 
equals one if management forecast j is issued in the five weeks preceding the ASR initiation date, 
and zero otherwise. I follow Brockman et al. (2008) and include the following control variables, 
because prior literature provides evidence of the association between management forecasts and 
these control variables: SIZE if the logarithm of the market value of equity. MB is the market-to-
book ratio. HL is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in one of high-litigation-risk 
industries, and zero otherwise.42 Loss is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports a loss, 
and zero otherwise. SIZE, MB and LOSS are measured at the last quarter preceding the issuance 
date of management forecast j. EARNVOL is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 12 
consecutive quarters ended the last quarter preceding the issuance date of management forecast j. 
                                                 
41 Management forecasts and then-current analysts’ consensus forecast are obtained from I/B/E/S Guidance. 
I retain management forecasts of any metrics, of which EPS and sales forecasts accounts for 70 percent. 
42 High-litigation-risk industries refer to biotechnology (SIC 2833–2836 and 8731–8734), computers (SIC 




The results presented in Table 22 Panel C indicate that the management forecasts issued in 
the five weeks before the ASR initiation date are more likely to fall short of the then-current 
analysts’ consensus forecast; the coefficient on BEFORE is positive and statistically significant 
(one-tail p-value = 0.039). Again, this finding is consistent with the prediction of the strategic 
management explanation. 
Table 22: Additional Analysis on Causality between ASR and News/Earnings Management 
 
Panel A: News/Earnings Management for 80 ASR Firms with Superior and Stable Pre-ASR 
Operating Performance 
  Dep. Var. = NM Dep. Var. = EM 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.006 0.016 0.068 0.000 
NMPRE1 or EMPRE1 + 0.289 0.032 0.290 0.053 
NMDUR1 or EMDUR1  0.086 0.621 0.131 0.659 
NMDUR2 or EMDUR1  0.163 0.189 0.272 0.513 
NMPOST or EMDUR1  0.136 0.245 -0.111 0.545 
Firm fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.104  0.323  
N  2,869  563  
 
Panel B: News/Earnings Management after Controlling for Operating Performance and 
Investment Opportunity 
  Dep. Var. = NM Dep. Var. = EM 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  -0.176 0.001 0.356 0.000 
NMPRE1 or EMPRE1 + 0.280 0.004 0.264 0.094 
NMDUR1 or EMDUR1  -0.096 0.262 -0.055 0.782 
NMDUR2 or EMDUR1  0.042 0.603 0.224 0.459 
NMPOST or EMDUR1  0.028 0.706 -0.069 0.668 
ROA  0.021 0.554 0.166 0.044 
MB  0.038 0.058 0.145 0.005 
Firm fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.106  0.216  






Panel C: Management Earnings Forecasts Prior to ASRs 
   Dep. Var. = BN_MF 
 Predicted Sign   Coef. p-value 
Intercept    -0.905 0.102 
BEFORE +   0.203 0.039 
SIZE    -0.033 0.600 
MB    -0.019 0.306 
LITIGATION    0.073 0.581 
LOSS    0.575 0.000 
EARNVOL    3.985 0.070 
Adj. R2    0.011  
N    6,363  
 
Note: Table 22 Panel A reports the results of the following regressions using 80 ASR firms that have 
superior and stable operating performance in 4 consecutive quarters ended quarter −1: 
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index. In the first regression, t is the week index. NM is the abnormal negative 
news in week t. PRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t falls in the period from week −5 to week 
−1 before the ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. In the second regression, t is the quarter index. EM is 
quarterly abnormal current accruals in quarter t, multiplied by −1. Higher values of EM represent more 
downward accrual-based earnings management. PRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is 
quarter −1 before the ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. Firm and year fixed effects are included and 
White standard errors adjusted to account for the possible correlation within the firm cluster are used 
(Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. p-values are one-tail 
if the sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail otherwise. 
 
Panel B reports the result of the above regressions using all ASRs with 2 more control variables, return-on-
assets (ROA) and market-to-book ratio (MB). ROA and MB are measured at the contemporary quarter when 
NM or EM is measured. Firm and year fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to 
account for the possible correlation within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted 
and two-tail otherwise. 
 
Panel C reports the result of the following logit regression using management forecasts issued from 180 
days before the ASR initiation date to 180 days after the ASR completion date. 
𝐵𝑁_𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐻𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼6𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where i is the ASR firm index and j is the management forecast index. BN_MF is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if management forecast j is below the then-current analysts’ consensus forecast, and 0 otherwise. 
BEFORE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if management forecast j is issued in 5 weeks preceding the 
ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. SIZE if the logarithm of the market value of equity. MB is market-to-
book ratio. HL is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in one of the high-litigation-risk industries, 
and 0 otherwise. High-litigation-risk industries refer to biotechnology (SIC 2833–2836 and 8731–8734), 
computers (SIC 3570–3577 and 7370–7374), electronics (SIC 3600–3674), and retail (SIC 5200–5961) 
industries. Loss is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reported a loss, and 0 otherwise. SIZE, MB 
and LOSS are measured at the last quarter preceding the issuance date of management forecast j. EARNVOL 
is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 12 consecutive quarters ended the last quarter preceding 
the issuance date of management forecast j. White standard errors adjusted to account for the possible 
correlation within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient 




7.8 Heckman’s Two-Stage Method 
Repurchasing firms decide to elect ASRs over OMRs to implement share repurchase 
programs. As a result, ASR firms are not randomly selected into my sample, which may lead to 
sample selection bias in the ordinary least squares estimation procedure that I have used. In this 
section, I use Heckman’s two-stage method to correct for the potential sample selection bias. 
In the first stage, I estimate the probability of a share repurchase program to be at least 
partially implemented through an ASR. As discussed in Section 2.4, ASRs differ from OMRs in 
flexibility, credibility and speed of stock delivery. In contrast to ASRs, OMRs allow firms to retain 
more flexibility to implement share repurchase programs in response to changes in stock price and 
cash flow availability. On the other hand, ASRs allow firms to more credibly and quickly to 
accomplish goals of share repurchase programs. Thus, I model the decision to elect ASRs based 
on the cost of foregone flexibility and the benefit of enhanced creditability and immediacy.43 
I consider four determinants of the cost of ASRs resulting from foregone flexibility. First, 
the cost of foregone flexibility is increasing in the volatility of the firm’s stock prices. Greater 
price volatility increases the value of the flexibility option inherent in OMRs to adjust repurchase 
amounts and timing. Second, the value of the flexibility option is increasing in the variability of 
the firm’s cash flows. OMRs enable firms with less predictable cash flows to benefit more from 
the ability to adjust repurchase amounts and timing in response to cash flow availability, while 
ASRs represent contract commitments and pose higher risks in the event of unforeseeable cash 
flow shocks. Third, Bargeron et al. (2011) suggest that ASRs are costlier than OMRs for firms with 
less stock market liquidity. Buying back a large number of shares quickly via ASRs has a larger 
                                                 
43 Bargeron et al. (2011) give more formal discussions on “the flexibility hypothesis” and “the credibility 




impact on the price of less liquid stock and increases the average price paid for the share repurchase. 
Fourth, the percentage of outstanding shares authorized to be repurchased in a program is an 
indicator of the firm’s ex ante flexibility to repurchase shares. Bargeron et al. (2011) suggest that 
the marginal cost of forgone flexibility of ASRs is lower for larger authorizations because firms 
that tend to be unfavorably affected by changes in firm characteristics and stock market will refrain 
from announcing a large authorization in the first place. In sum, I predict that firms with less stock 
price volatility, less cash flow volatility, greater stock liquidity, and larger repurchase program 
authorizations are more likely to elect ASRs over OMRs to implement share repurchase programs. 
Firms announce share repurchase programs for various motivations as discussed in Section 
3.4, such as signaling undervaluation, return of capital to shareholders, improving capital structure, 
increasing EPS, and takeover defense. In Section 5.2.1, I develop several variables to proxy for 
these motivations. I expect the benefit of enhanced credibility and immediacy of ASRs to be 
greater when these motivations are more apparent, so that repurchasing firms can achieve their 
goals more credibly and quickly. Thus, I predict that firms are more likely to elect ASRs over 
OMRs to implement share repurchase programs if these programs are more likely to be announced 
for identified motivations. 
Based on the above discussion, I use the following specification in the first-stage probit 
regression for ASR election: 
𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼7𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛼9𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛼10𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
(27) 
where i is the repurchase program index. The dependent variable, ASR, is a dummy variable that 




the repurchase program is entirely implemented through OMRs. The first four independent 
variables measure the cost of ASRs resulting from foregone flexibility. Specifically, RETVOL is 
the standard deviation of stock returns calculated over the period from trading day −252 to −44. 
OCFVOL is the standard deviation of operating cash flows calculated over 20 quarters ending 
quarter −1. ILLIQUIDITY is the logarithm of the measure of stock illiquidity defined as the average 
of absolute stock returns per dollar of daily trading volume calculated over the period from trading 
day −252 to −44 (Amihud 2002; Bargeron et al. 2011). For repurchase programs that are at least 
partially implemented through an ASR, trading day 0 is the ASR announcement date and quarter 
−1 is the fiscal quarter for which the earnings were last announced before the ASR announcement 
date. For OMR-only repurchase programs, trading day 0 is the repurchase program announcement 
date and quarter −1 is the fiscal quarter for which the earnings were last announced before the 
repurchase program announcement date. REPPCT is the percentage of outstanding shares 
authorized to be repurchased in the repurchase program. The subsequent six independent variables, 
MISVAL, OCFDIFF, MBDIFF, LEVDIFF, EPSBONUS and TAKEOVER, are motivation variables 
that I have defined in Section 5.2.1. I also control for firm size (SIZE) defined as the logarithm of 
the market value of equity. Motivation variables and firm size are measured at quarter −1 defined 
as above. I include Fama-French 12 industry and year fix effects and use White standard errors 
adjusted to account for the possible correlation within the firm cluster. 
I obtain repurchase program announcements from 2004 to 2013 from Capital IQ Buybacks 
Database. I match each ASR with the repurchase program that is announced immediately before 
the ASR announcement. This matching procedure gives me the repurchase programs that are at 
least partially implemented through an ASR. The remaining repurchase programs are OMR-only 




repurchases. I remove repurchase programs announced by financial institutions. The data 
availability for calculating independent variables further reduces the sample size. The final sample 
contains 1,585 repurchase program announcements. 
Table 23 Panel A reports the results of the first-stage probit regression. The coefficients 
have predicted signs although OCFVOL and MISVAL do not enter the regression at a conventional 
level. I report two goodness of fit statistics for the first-stage regression, pseudo R2 (0.295) and the 
area under the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve (0.857). The latter measures the 
predictive ability of the probit regression model. Random guessing generates an area under the 
ROC curve equal to 0.5 and perfect prediction generates one. Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 
(2013) suggest that a model with an area under the ROC curve of 0.70–0.80 (above 0.8) is 
acceptable (excellent). By this rule of thumb, the goodness of fit of the first-stage regression is into 
the excellent range. 
In the second stage, I re-run the main regressions related to news management tests (i.e., 
regressions in Table 5 and Table 9) and earnings management tests (i.e., regressions in Table 6 and 
Table 10) after including the Inverse-Mills ratio (IMR) from the first-stage regression.44 Table 23 
Panel B reports the results of the tests related to news management, and Panel C reports the results 
of the tests related to earnings management. The results indicate that all result remain qualitatively 
unchanged. Furthermore, IMR does not enter each regression, suggesting that selection bias is not 
a significant concern in previous tests. 
  
                                                 
44 IMR is estimated as ϕ(z)/Ф(z), where z is the fitted value of the first-stage probit regression; ϕ is the 





Table 23: Heckman’s Two-Stage Method for News Management and Earnings Management 
 
Panel A: The First Stage Regression for ASR Election 
 Predicted Sign   Coef. p-value 
Intercept    -2.592 0.000 
RETVOL −   -35.859 0.000 
OCFVOL −   -0.898 0.335 
ILLIQUIDITY −   -0.150 0.001 
REPPCT +   3.286 0.000 
MISVAL +   0.158 0.162 
OCFDIFF +   3.461 0.001 
MBDIFF −   -0.135 0.007 
LEVDIFF +   0.815 0.081 
EPSBONUS +   0.116 0.099 
TAKEOVER +   0.256 0.028 
SIZE    0.032 0.619 
Industry fixed effect    Yes  
Year fixed effect    Yes  
Pseudo R2    0.295  
Area under ROC curve    0.857  
N    1,585  
 
Panel B: The Second Stage Regressions for News Management 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.132 0.265 0.077 0.435 
NMPRE1 + 0.326 0.002 0.556 0.007 
NMDUR1  -0.106 0.234 -0.077 0.628 
NMDUR2  0.053 0.555 -0.190 0.179 
NMPOST  0.050 0.602 0.080 0.583 
PRICEUP    0.033 0.746 
EPSBONUS    0.024 0.806 
NMPRE1×PRICEUP −   -0.411 0.026 
NMDUR1×PRICEUP    -0.031 0.866 
NMDUR2×PRICEUP    0.143 0.433 
NMPOST×PRICEUP    -0.157 0.230 
NMPRE1×EPSBONUS    -0.131 0.535 
NMDUR1×EPSBONUS    -0.050 0.787 
NMDUR2×EPSBONUS    0.052 0.510 
NMPOST×EPSBONUS    0.097 0.499 
IMR  -0.118 0.286 -0.080 0.454 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.052  0.090  






Panel C: The Second Stage Regressions for Earnings Management 
 Predicted Sign Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.049 0.082 0.105 0.130 
EMPRE1 + 0.222 0.078 0.414 0.041 
EMDUR1  -0.162 0.405 -0.341 0.268 
EMDUR2  -0.142 0.629 -0.320 0.411 
EMPOST  -0.203 0.194 -0.150 0.507 
PRICEUP    -0.076 0.767 
EPSBONUS    -0.043 0.854 
EMPRE1×PRICEUP −   -0.212 0.317 
EMDUR1×PRICEUP    -0.254 0.536 
EMDUR2×PRICEUP    0.250 0.689 
EMPOST×PRICEUP    0.019 0.940 
EMPRE1×EPSBONUS −   -0.383 0.087 
EMDUR1×EPSBONUS    0.087 0.298 
EMDUR2×EPSBONUS    0.207 0.771 
EMPOST×EPSBONUS    -0.180 0.460 
IMR  0.293 0.132 0.284 0.158 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.091  0.120  
N  2,343  2,343  
 
Note: Table 23 Panel A reports the results of the first-stage regression for ASR election: 
𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖
+ 𝛼6𝑂𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼7𝑀𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖
+ 𝛼10𝑇𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where i is the repurchase program index. ASR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the repurchase program 
is at least partially implemented through an ASR, and 0 if the repurchase program is entirely implemented 
through OMRs. RETVOL is the standard deviation of stock returns calculated over the period from trading 
day −252 to −44. OCFVOL is the standard deviation of operating cash flows calculated over 20 quarters 
ending quarter −1. ILLIQUIDITY is the logarithm of the measure of stock illiquidity defined as the average 
of absolute stock returns per dollar of daily trading volume calculated over the period from trading day 
−252 to −44 (Amihud 2002; Bargeron et al. 2100). For repurchase programs that are at least partially 
implemented through an ASR, trading day 0 is the ASR announcement date and quarter −1 is the fiscal 
quarter for which the earnings were last announced before the ASR announcement date. For OMR-only 
repurchase programs, trading day 0 is the repurchase program announcement date and quarter −1 is the 
fiscal quarter for which the earnings were last announced before the repurchase program announcement 
date. REPPCT is the percentage of outstanding shares authorized to be repurchased in the repurchase 
program. MISVAL is the firm-specific misvaluation derived from Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) model. 
OCFDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific operating cash flows (scaled by total assets) and the 
industry median. MBDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific market-to-book ratio and the industry 
median. LEVDIFF is the difference between the firm-specific leverage ratio and the targeted leverage ratio 
derived from Flannery and Ragan’s (2006) model. EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bonuses 
of top executives are tied to EPS, and 0 otherwise. TAKEOVER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
firm is the target of takeover rumors during the 12-month period before the repurchase program or ASR 
announcement, and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. MISVAL, OCFDIFF, 
MBDIFF, LEVDIFF and SIZE are measured at the end of quarter −1 defined as above. Fama-French 12 
industry and year fixed effects are included and White robust standard errors are used to control for 





Panel B reports the second-stage regression results of news management tests after including the Inverse-
Mills ratio (IMR) from the first-stage regression: 
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑁𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛼6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼7𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼9𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼11𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛼13𝑁𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼14𝑁𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the week index. NM is abnormal negative news in week t. Higher 
values of NM represent more price-deflating news management. NMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if week t falls in the period from week −5 to week −1 before the ASR initiation date, and 0 otherwise. 
NMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t falls in the first 5 weeks of the ASR contract period, 
and 0 otherwise. NMDUR2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if week t falls in the period from the 6th week 
to the last week of the ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. NMPOST is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if week t falls in the period from week +1 to week +10 after the ASR completion date. PRICEUP is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the ASR is likely to be motivated by the desire to increase stock prices 
(either signaling undervaluation or defending against takeover). EPSBONUS is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the ASR is likely to be motivated by the desire to increase EPS, that is, bonuses of top executives 
are directly tie with EPS. Year fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to account for 
the possible correlation within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied by 
100 for expositional convenience. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail 
otherwise. 
 
Panel C reports the second-stage regression results of earnings management tests after including the 
Inverse-Mills ratio (IMR) from the first-stage regression: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽11𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅E1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 
= 1 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑅2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the ASR firm index and t is the quarter index. EM is quarterly abnormal current accruals in 
quarter t, multiplied by −1. Higher values of EM represent more downward accrual-based earnings 
management. EMPRE1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter −1 before the ASR initiation 
date, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is the first quarter during the 
ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMDUR2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if quarter t is any other 
quarter than the first one during the ASR contract period, and 0 otherwise. EMPOST is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if quarter t is quarter +1, +2, or +3 after the ASR completion date. PRICEUP and EPSBONUS 
are defined as above. Year fixed effects are included and White standard errors adjusted to account for the 
possible correlation within the firm cluster are used (Petersen 2009). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 
for expositional convenience. p-values are one-tail if the sign of coefficient is predicted and two-tail 
otherwise. 
 
I acknowledge that endogenous sample selection and endogenous treatment assignment are 




unobservable factors that affect which firms are included in the sample are correlated with the 
unobservable factors that affect the outcome. The Heckman’s two-stage model in this section is 
used to address the issue of endogenous sample selection. The endogenous treatment assignment 
occurs when researchers cannot randomly assign a treatment of interest to individuals. In this 
research, the initiation date of each ASR and thereby the split of pre- and post-initiation period are 
not randomly assigned. This may cause the issue of endogenous treatment assignment. Using an 
instrumental variable is one way to address the issue. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
find an instrument variable that is correlated to the ASR initiation date but is not correlated with 
the firm’s fundamentals. Alternatively, a likely example of endogenous treatment assignment 
exists when bad operating performance triggers negative news and the decline of the firm’s stock 
price, and the firm initiates an ASR to take advantage of the low stock price. The test in Section 
7.2.2.1 indicates that the main results of this research hold in a situation where such endogeneity 






Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
This research provides evidence that firms strategically manage corporate news and 
reported earnings to deflate stock prices prior to ASRs. The purpose of both strategies is to 
maximize the benefits of ASRs and compensate high opportunity costs associated with ASRs. 
Specifically, firms alter the flow of firm-generated press releases and shift negative press releases 
from a short window before the ASR commencement to a short window after the ASR 
commencement. They also report abnormally low current accruals to deflate earnings in the quarter 
immediately before the ASR commencement. Furthermore, firms weigh available strategies and 
use the one that best aligns with ex ante motivations for ASRs. If consequences of news 
management or earnings management contradict ex ante motivations for ASRs, firms are less 
likely to use that management strategy. 
News management and earnings management appear to be successful at deflating stock 
prices prior to ASRs. The pre-ASR stock returns are negatively associated with pre-ASR 
news/earnings management. In addition, the market does not appear to be able to infer pre-ASR 
news/earnings management and correct for them at the ASR announcement date. As a result, pre-
ASR news management and earnings management cannot predict ASR announcement returns. 
However, because pre-ASR earnings deflation and contemporary stock price deflation result from 
opportunistic strategies and will eventually be reversed following ASRs, pre-ASR earnings 
management predicts operating performance and stock price performance for both one-year and 
two-year horizons following ASRs. In contrast, because firms accelerate the release of negative 
news into a short window before the ASR commencement and away from a short window after the 




news management indeed predicts stock price performance in a short window following ASRs. 
Lastly, the evidence presented in this research is more consistent with managers strategically 
manger news and earnings prior to ASRs, rather than managers timing ASRs to follow abnormally 
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